Yet we must not, Renan reminds us, grumble at having too much unrest and conflict. The great object in life is the development of the mind, and this requires liberty or freedom. The worst type of society is the theocratic state, or the ancient pontifical dominion or any modern replica of these where dogma reigns supreme. A humanity which could not be revolutionary, which had lost the attraction of “Utopias,” believing itself to have established the perfect form of existence would be intolerable. This raises also the query that if progress be the main feature of our universe, then we have a dilemma to face, for either it leads us to a terminus ad quem, and so finally contradicts itself, or else it goes on for ever, and it is doubtful then in what sense it can be a progress.
Renan’s own belief was essentially religious, and was coloured by Christian and Hebrew conceptions. It was a rationalised belief in a Divine Providence. He professed a confidence in the final triumph of truth and goodness, and has faith in a dim, far-off divine event which he terms “the complete advent of God.” The objections which are so frequently urged by learned men against finalism or teleology of any kind whatsoever Renan deemed superficial and claimed, rightly enough, that they are not so much directed against teleology but against theology, against obsolete ideas of God, particularly against the dogma of a deliberate and omnipotent Creator. Renan’s own doctrine of the Deity is by no means clear, but he believed in a spiritual power capable of becoming some day conscious, omniscient and omnipotent. God will then have come to himself. From this point of view the universe is a progress to God, to an increasing realisation of the Divinity in truth, beauty and goodness.
The universe, Renan claims, must be ultimately rooted and grounded in goodness; there must be, in spite of all existing “evils,” a balance on the side of goodness, otherwise the universe would, like a vast banking-concern, fail. This balance of goodness is the raison d’être of the world and the means of its existence. The general life of the universe can be illustrated, according to Renan, by that of the oyster, and the formation within it of the pearl, by a malady, a process vague, obscure and painful. The pearl is the spirit which is the end, the final cause and last result, and assuredly the most brilliant outcome of this universe. Through suffering the pearl is formed; and likewise, through constant pain and conflict, suffering and hardship, the spirit of man moves intellectually and morally onward and upward, to the completed realisation of justice, beauty, truth and infinite goodness and love, to the complete and triumphant realisation of God. We must have patience, claims Renan, and have faith in these things, and have hope and take courage. “One day virtue will prove itself to have been the better part.” Such is his doctrine of progress.
II
With Cournot and Renouvier our discussion takes a new form. Renan, Taine, Vacherot and the host of social and political writers, together with August Comte himself, had accepted the fact of progress and clung to the idea of a law of progress. With these two thinkers, however, there is a more careful consideration given to the problem of progress. It was recognised as a problem and this was an immense advance upon the previous period, whose thinkers accepted it as a dogma.
True to the philosophic spirit of criticism and examination which involves the rejection of dogma as such, Cournot and Renouvier approach the idea of progress with reserve and free from the confidently optimistic assertions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Scorning the rhetoric of political socialists, positivists and rationalists, they endeavour to view progress as the central problem of the philosophy of history, to ascertain what it involves, and to see whether such a phrase as “law of progress” has a meaning before they invoke it and repeat it in the overconfident manner which characterised their predecessors. We have maintained throughout this work that the central problem of our period was that of freedom. By surveying the general character of the thought of the time, and in following this by an examination of the relation of science and philosophy, we were able to show how vital and how central this problem was. From another side we are again to emphasise this. Having seen the way in which the problem of freedom was dealt with, we are in a position to observe how this coloured the solutions of other problems. The illustration is vivid here, for Cournot and Renouvier develop their philosophy of history from their consideration of freedom, and base their doctrines of progress upon their maintenance of freedom.
It is obvious that the acceptance of such views as those expressed on freedom by both Cournot and Renouvier must have far-reaching effects upon their general attitude to history, for how is the dogma of progress, as it had been preached, to be reconciled with free action? It is much easier to believe in progress if one be a fatalist. The difficulty here was apparent to Comte when he admitted the influence of variations, disturbing causes, which resulted in the development of mankind assuming an oscillating character rather than that of a straight-forward progress. He did not, however, come sufficiently close to this problem, and left the difficulty of freedom on one side by asserting that the operation of freedom, chance or contingency (call it what we will), issuing in non-predetermined actions, was so limited as not to interfere with the general course of progress.
Cournot and Renouvier take up the problem where Comte left it at this point. Each of them takes it a stage further onward in the development. The fundamental ideas of Cournot we have briefly noted as being those of order, chance and probability. The relation of these to progress he discusses, not only in his Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances and the Traité de l’Enchaînement d’Idées, but also in a most interesting manner in his two volumes entitled Considérations sur la Marche des Idées et des Evènements dans les Temps modernes. Like Comte, he is faithful, as far as his principles will allow, to the idea of order. There is order in the universe to a certain degree; science shows it to us. There is also, he maintains, freedom, hazard or chance. Looking at history he sees, as did Comte, phenomena which, upon taking a long perspective, appear as interferences. Pure reason is, he claims, really incapable of deciding the vital question whether these disturbances are due to a pure contingency, chance or freedom, or whether they mark the points of the influence of the supernatural upon mankind’s development. He refers to the enchaînement de circonstances providentielles which helped the early Jews and led to the propagation of their monotheism; which helped also the development of the Christian religion in the Roman Empire. Hazard itself, he claims,[[6]] may be the agent or minister of Providence. Such a view claims to be loyal at once to freedom and to order.
[6] Essai sur les Fondaments de nos Connaissances, vol. i, chap. 5.
Cournot continues his discussion further and submits many other considerations upon progress. He claims that it is absurd to see in every single occurrence the operations of a divine providence or the work of a divine architect. Such a view would exalt his conception of order, undoubtedly, but only at the expense of his view of freedom. He will not give up his belief in freedom, and in consequence declares that there is no pre-arranged order or plan in the sense of a “law.” He sets down many considerations which appear as dilemmas to the pure reason, and which only action, he thinks, will solve. He points out the difficulty of economic and social progress owing to our being unable to test theories until they are in action on a large field. He shows too how conflicting various developments may be, and how progress in one direction may involve degeneration in another. Equality may be good in some ways, unnatural and evil in others. Increase of population may be applauded as a progress from a military standpoint, but may be an economic evil with disastrous suffering as its consequence. The “progress” to peace and stability in a society usually involves a decrease in vitality and initiative. By much wealth of argument, no less than by his general attitude, Cournot was able to apply the breaks to the excessive confidence in progress and to call a halt for sounder investigation of the matter.