“A graver cause of difference than the great door of the Church of Bethlehem has appeared, and taken precedence of it.
“The Porte, under the influence of French and Russian menaces, conceded to the French Embassy the note of the 9th February, and the Firman of the Mi-Févrièr to the Greeks.
“The Russian Government considers the Firman the Charter of Rights of the Greek Church. The President and M. de Lavalette consider it an affront to France, because it describes her claims, grounded on the Treaty of 1740, as “haksig,” unjust, and establishes a status quo which wholly invalidates that Treaty. M. de Lavalette tells me that the Porte promised to M. Sabatier that it should not be read at Jerusalem.
“M. D’Ozeroff tells the Porte that the Firman must be read at Jerusalem; he declares that if it be not read, according to usage, in the Medgliss at Jerusalem, before the Pasha, Cadi, Members of the Council, Patriarchs of the different sects, it will be valueless and a dead letter, and that, consequently, faith will have been broken with Russia.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 46.)
This irritable state of things assumed a more amicable aspect by December 4, 1852: writing at that date, Colonel Rose says,—
“M. de Lavalette now says that nothing can be more pleasant and amiable (plus doux et plus aimable) than he is with the Porte. I humbly and respectfully demand my right. (Je demande humblement et respecteusement mon droit). M. d’Ozeroff also says, that although he admitted that last year there had been a declaration that the Russian Legation would, under certain circumstances, leave Constantinople, yet, that he could not bring to his recollection having talked of the Legation leaving it on account of present causes of differences with the Porte.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., pp. 49–50.)
While the question of the Holy Places was thus winding its weary way along, the Emperor of Russia was ordering troops to the frontiers of the Danubian Provinces. On the 4th of January, 1853, Sir G. H. Seymour writes to Lord John Russell, that “orders have been dispatched to the 5th corps d’armée to advance to the frontiers of the Danubian Provinces, without waiting for their reserves; and the 4th corps, under the command of General Count Dannenberg, and now stationed in Volhynia, will be ordered to hold itself in readiness to march if necessary. Each of these corps consists of twenty-four regiments, and, as your Lordship is aware, each Russian regiment is composed of three battalions (each of about 1000 men), of which one battalion forms the reserve. General Luder’s corps d’armée accordingly, being now 48,000 strong, will receive a reinforcement of 24,000 men soon after its arrival at its destination, and supposing the 4th corps to follow, the whole force will amount at least, according to official returns, to 144,000 men.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 56)
January 28, 1853, Colonel Rose says, “Both the French and Russian Representatives exhibit now most laudable moderation in the matter of the Holy Places.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 79.)
And now new events occur in this strange drama. The three great Powers—England, France, and Russia—remove their ambassadors and appoint new ones. England sent Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, France, M. de la Cour, and Russia, the notorious Prince Menchikoff. The first act of the Russian officer was an insult to the Porte—an insult committed with intention, and at once indicating both the character of the mission and of the man appointed to execute it. Colonel Rose writes to Lord John Russell, March 3, 1853, “A painful sensation was caused here by the following incident, which occurred yesterday:—Prince Menchikoff paid his official visit to the Grand Vizier, at the Porte, but purposely omitted to pay it to Fuad Effendi, who was ready to receive him.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 85.)
In another despatch, dated March 7, 1853, are these passages:—
“Circumstances connected with the mission of Prince Menchikoff have gradually come to light, and cause grave apprehension for the independence, if not the destiny, of Turkey. * * Unfortunately, Prince Menchikoff’s first public act evinced entire disregard, on his part, of the Sultan’s dignity and rights, which, combined with the hostile attitude of Russia, created the impression that coercion, rather than conciliatory negotiation, would distinguish his Excellency’s mission.”
And, further on, speaking of the affront offered to Fuad Effendi, he says,—
“The affront was the more galling, because great preparations had been made for the purpose of receiving the Russian Ambassador with marked honours, and a great concourse of people, particularly Greeks, had assembled for the purpose of witnessing the ceremony. The incident made a great and most painful sensation. The Grand Vizier expressed to me his indignation at the premeditated affront which had been offered to his Sovereign, and the Sultan’s irritation was excessive. M. Benedetti and myself at once saw all the bearing and intention of the affront. Prince Menchikoff wished, at his first start, to create an intimidating or commanding influence—to show that any man, even a Cabinet Minister, who had offended Russia, would be humiliated and punished, even in the midst of the Sultan’s Court, and without previous communication to His Majesty. Prince Menchikoff wished to take the cleverest man out of the Ministry, humiliate it, upset it, and establish in its place a Ministry favourable to his views. If this manœuvre had succeeded, a second treaty, like that of Unkier Skelessi, or something worse, would probably have been the result.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., pp. 86–7).