Such was the commencement of the mission of that man whose moderation Englishmen have been found prejudiced enough to praise. Nor can there be a doubt respecting the intention of Russia. While her Ambassador was insulting the Porte before the eyes of the assembled people, active preparations were being made to concentrate troops on the Danubian Provinces. Our Vice-Consul, Charles Cunningham, writing from Galatz, February 25, 1853, nearly two months before Prince Menchikoff arrived at Constantinople, says, “For some months past, there have been rumours that a large Russian force has been collected in Bessarabia, and even that these Provinces were to be occupied. From the information I have obtained, I consider it certain that the inhabitants of Bessarabia, in the districts around Ismail and Reni, have orders to prepare quarters for 60,000 troops.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 90). The French Consul at Jassy confirms this statement. He says: “All persons and letters coming from Bessarabia concur in saying that very serious preparations for war are there making—(s’ accordent à dire qu’il s’y fait ce très-sérieux preparatifs de guerre). Vast supplies of biscuit are already prepared, and the troops have received orders to hold themselves in readiness to march at the first signal.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 92.) Yet amidst all this warlike preparation Russia still continued to talk of her “pacific intentions”—of her “desire to preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire”—of her “deep respect and friendly feelings towards His Majesty the Sultan.” She manifested the truth of her words by sending an ambassador to insult, and concentrating troops to overawe, her dear friend, the Sultan, whose rights, more than her own, she hypocritically declared to be the great purpose at which she aimed.

This concentration of troops on the frontier, connected with the conduct of Prince Menchikoff at the Capital, naturally aroused the suspicion and called for the watchfulness of the other Powers. As Sir G. H. Seymour said to the Russian Chancellor, “if the presence of a Russian army on the borders of the Principalities is likely to arouse the apprehension of foreign Governments, what effects is it calculated to produce upon the Porte?”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 58.) That effect was well calculated by Russia. She hoped to produce fear, disaffection, disturbance and bloodshed, in the midst of which she might come in as a protector, carry on her old and well-learnt tactics, and end in appropriating to her own colossal territories—the greater part acquired by fraud or war. It was her old plan. The world has been the almost indifferent spectator of her custom for more than sixty years. She now began in Turkey, as she began in Poland, in Finland, in Courland, in Georgia, in Bessarabia, and in every other country which her insatiable greed and ambition desired. Her process “has almost been reduced to a regular formula. It invariably commences with disorganization, by means of corruption and secret agency, pushed to the extent of disorder and civil contention. Next in order comes military occupation, to restore tranquility; and in every instance the result has been Protection, followed by Incorporation.” [9] But I anticipate.

The plot thickens as it proceeds. From a communication of M. Pisani’s to Colonel Rose, March 19, 1853, it appears that he “got information from good authority that this moderate behaviour on the part of the Russian Ambassador is calculated to induce the Porte to assent to the conclusion of a secret compact.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 107.) Again, Colonel Rose says, March 25, 1853, “The Grand Vizier informs me, also, that, in the projected treaty, there is a clause which could be interpreted into protection, by Russia, of the Turkish Greek Church.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., pp. 107–8.) Yet we are told by the Peace Party that Russia asked for and demanded nothing but the preservation of the status quo; and, as we saw by the articles of the Treaty of Kainardji, such protection formed no part of the status quo.

During all these strange proceedings, and amid all these cross purposes, Prince Menchikoff, true to his Russian policy, was silent as to the main object of his mission. He even “tried to exact a promise from Rifaat Pasha, before he makes known to him the nature of his mission and of his demands, that the Porte shall make a formal promise that she will not reveal them to the British or French Representatives. Rifaat Pasha declined, and Prince Menchikoff declared that if the object of his mission was not promptly settled, he must leave Constantinople; but he modified this declaration by saying that he did not mean thereby to imply that his retirement would be the signal for war.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 109.)

In order that no mistake may be made respecting the object of Prince Menchikoff’s mission, I quote from the note of M. Doria to Colonel Rose, dated April 1, 1853, the following passage:—

“Prince Menchikoff had verbally expressed the Emperor’s wish to enter into a secret treaty with Turkey, putting a fleet and 400,000 men at her disposal, if she ever needed aid against any Western Power whatever. That Russia further secretly demanded an addition to the treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek Church should be placed entirely under Russian protection, without reference to Turkey, which was to be the equivalent for the proffered aid above mentioned.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 112.)

While these interferences with the rights of the Ottoman Porte were systematically pursued at Constantinople, Russia was busily employed in the same insidious course in Servia. Lord Clarendon informs Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, April 18, 1853, that—

“the Prince of Servia has dismissed M. Garaschanin from his service, on the peremptory demand of Prince Menchikoff, and that the Russian Consul at Belgrade has subsequently, in threatening terms, required the removal of several other official persons. This interference with the internal government of the Province has excited much discontent among the Servian people; and your Excellency is instructed to state to Prince Menchikoff, that in the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government, a perseverance in this course will be productive of mischievous results.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 122.)

Can any sane man doubt the object of all this interference, the purpose of all these threatenings, and the aim of all this diplomatic bullying and intrigue? The original causes assigned by Russia for such interference had been removed; and, as Colonel Rose told Prince Menchikoff, “the recall of M. de Lavalette and the retirement of Fuad Effendi must be considered a satisfactory reparation; that Montenegro had been evacuated; that, in short, none of the causes alleged by Russia as causes for a hostile attitude existed any longer.”—(vol. i., p. 122.)

By May 6, 1853, the subject of the Holy Places was settled, both to the satisfaction of M. de la Cour and Prince Menchikoff; when, having received fresh instructions from Russia, Prince Menchikoff sent a decisive communication to the Porte; concerning which Sir Stratford de Redcliffe says,—