“it must appear the more alarming to the Porte, as it has followed close upon his Excellency’s receipt of the firmans and official note which but yesterday terminated with his assent the question of the Holy Places. That communication is, moreover, peremptory in fixing a very brief delay for the Porte’s definitive reply; and it comprises the Russian note verbale of the 19th ultimo in its more formal expression of Russia’s demands. It insists in certain unexplained additions to the settlement of the Jerusalem question, but little palatable to France; and although in some degree moderated in comparison with its original extent, requires, under the name of ‘guarantee,’ a concession, the dangerous character of which will not escape your Lordship’s observation.”—(Vol. i., p. 164.) Prince Menchikoff’s words are, “the Ambassador begs his Excellency, Rifaat Pasha, to be good enough to let him have that answer by Tuesday next, May 10. He cannot consider a longer delay in any other light than as a want of respect towards his Government, which would impose upon him the most painful duty.”—(Vol. i., p. 167.)
We have now reached a point of the present discussion at which we may pause, and sum up the result. It appears from the passages quoted from the various despatches of different ambassadors, that though the French were the first introducers of the question of the Holy Places, the quarrel, so far as they were concerned, was now satisfactorily and amicably settled. That they might have been to blame in the first instance, scarcely affects the after development of the plans and projects of Russia. M. de la Cour was satisfied, Prince Menchikoff was, or said he was, satisfied, the French Government authorised M. de la Cour “to state that, with regard to the question of the Holy Places,” she was “satisfied. The present arrangement is the arrangement made by M. de Lavalette, and France has consequently nothing to say against it. M. de la Cour is enjoined neither to protest nor to make reserves.”—(Blue Book, vol. i, p. 175.) Yet this very moment of apparently amicable arrangement is chosen by Russia to make other claims, and to demand other privileges; then it was that Russia sent in her ultimatum, and sought to exercise the power of a virtual sovereign over 11,000,000 of Turkish subjects, the vast majority of whom dread nothing more than the exercise of such authority, and who have shown, during the present contest, how earnest they are in repelling the assumptions of the Emperor of Russia. In Servia “the great majority are patriotic and desirous to exclude all extraneous intervention in their affairs. They are content with their present position and connexion with Turkey, which strengthens without annoying them.” [11a] So it is with the other Provinces over which Russia seeks to spread the terrible power of her protection. Her protection is degradation, debasement, and oppression. She has no scruples, for she worships a policy. Whatever may help to develope that policy, be it lying, intrigue, rebellion, spoliation, violation of Treaties, or even murder and assassination, are resorted to. Nothing intimidates her—nothing turns her aside. Rebuffed now, she bides her time, and then makes another attempt, to be succeeded by another, and another, and another, if necessary for the accomplishment of her object. She talks of her good faith at the same moment she is violating some solemnly-sworn contract; she invokes the person and aid of Almighty God in all her undertakings, though of the blackest and basest kind. It has been well said that the “kind of faith with which she has acted is shown in the revolts she has instigated and sustained in so many Turkish Provinces while she was at peace with the Sultan and professing the warmest friendship. The good faith of Russia is that which she exhibits in not less than twenty-one schools of Bulgaria, where the Russians from Kiew—the Mecca of the Muscovites—teach the children who are all Turkish subjects, hatred of the Sultan as a part of their religious instruction, and submission to the Czar as necessary to their eternal salvation.” [11b] Such is her protection—such has it ever been; and by this insidious conduct she is every year adding or preparing for future additions to her ill-gotten possessions. But we are told that “the seat of war is 3,000 miles away from us. We had not been attacked—not even insulted in any way;” [11c] and therefore we ought to have had nothing to do with the quarrel. No matter that existing Treaties between ourselves and Turkey declare that we ought to interfere; no matter that the future safety and honour of Europe—probably of England herself—depended upon the course we took in this question; no matter that right, justice, and truth were on the side of Turkey; and wrong, insolence, and unwarrantable aggression on the part of Russia; “the seat of war is 3,000 miles away from us” and—we had nothing to do with the quarrel. Happily the Government and the people took a different view of the subject, and opposed the great enemy.
Prince Menchikoff left Constantinople May 23rd, 1853. Mr. Bright has the following curious passage: “But for the English Minister at Constantinople and the Cabinet at home, the dispute would have settled itself, and the last note of Prince Menchikoff would have been accepted; and no human being can point out any material difference between that note and the Vienna note afterwards agreed upon and recommended by the Governments of England, France, Austria, and Prussia. But our Government would not allow the dispute to be settled.” It would be difficult to select any passage in the whole range of English literature, of a similar length, containing so many sophisms as this. The note of Prince Menchikoff was so identical with the Vienna note, that the Porte rejected both. And instead of the English Ambassador preventing the amicable arrangement of the question, he, acting under instructions from home, exerted every means, short of cowardice and dishonour, to preserve the peace. Passage upon passage could be selected from the Blue Book, from despatches of Lord Palmerston, of the Earl of Malmesbury, of Lord John Russell, of the Earl of Clarendon, from the letters of Colonel Rose and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, illustrative of this statement; and, because the Sultan was advised not to accede to a demand which would have destroyed his authority over 11,000,000 of his subjects, England is charged with not allowing the dispute to be settled; and because the Vienna note only reiterated Menchikoff’s ultimatum, this attempt to produce peace met the same fate as the others; still it is England that prevented the settlement of the dispute. For we are told that “Prince Menchikoff, in his note dated the 21st of May, which has caused a profound impression throughout Europe, has proclaimed that religious objects alone have not been aimed at by him.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 268.) Russia now pursued her usual course. She issued a Manifesto, June 26, 1853;—a copy of this Manifesto was published in the “St. Petersburgh Journal,”—and this Manifesto differed essentially from the Manifesto issued to the Russian people. “Considerable sensation,” says Sir G. H. Seymour, “has been occasioned among the Foreign Missions at St. Petersburgh, by the great differences observable in the Russian manifesto as published in its original state, that is, as addressed to the Russian people, and in the official French translation destined for more general circulation in the ‘St. Petersburgh Journal.’”
The most striking word in the original was “perfidiousness,” as applied to the Sultan, an epithet which the Government translator appears to have been desired to omit.
I need not observe, that the suppression is calculated to give an erroneous general impression of the force of that appeal which the Emperor’s Government has judged it necessary to make to the prejudices—for, in this instance, I will not say opinions—of the Russian people.—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 340.) This manifesto contained this passage:—“Having exhausted all persuasion and, with them, every means of obtaining pacific satisfaction of our just demands, we have found it needful to advance our armies into the Danubian Principalities, in order to show the Ottoman Porte to what its obstinacy may lead.” [12]—(Blue Book, vol. i., p. 323.) Of course, this never meant war—of course, these acts were the legitimate consequences of the Emperor’s continued assertion of his desire for peace, and his intentions of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This pacific course was only for the purpose of possessing a “material guarantee,” and was not a casus belli. The Western Powers were foolish enough so to consider it; and Turkey was persuaded not to declare war when it occurred, because the very power which Mr. Bright says was the cause why the quarrel could not be amicably settled, had not yet given up the hope of her ability to procure peace. The Russians crossed the Pruth, issued their manifesto which was in the stereotype style of all the manifestos which, under similar circumstances, she has issued during the last sixty years—issued to deceive Europe, and not as indices of her conduct. This is the manifesto:—
“Inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia! His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, my august master has commanded me to occupy your territory with the corps d’armée, of which he has been pleased to confide to me the command.
“We arrive among you neither with plans of conquest nor with the intention of modifying the institutions by which you are governed, or the political situation guaranteed to you by solemn Treaties.
“The provisional occupation of the Principalities which I am directed to carry out, has no other object than that of immediate and effectual protection in the unlooked-for and ruinous circumstances under which the Ottoman Government, disregarding the numerous proofs of a sincere alliance which the Imperial Court, since the conclusion of the treaty of Adrianople, has never ceased to give it, responds to our most just proposals by refusals, to our most disinterested advice by the most offensive distrust.
“In his longanimity, in his constant desire to maintain peace in the East as well as in Europe, the Emperor will avoid engaging in an offensive war against Turkey, so long as his dignity and the interests of his Empire will permit him to do so.
“On the very day that he shall obtain the reparation which is due to him, and the guarantee which he is entitled to require for the future, his troops will withdraw within the frontiers of Russia.
“Inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia! I equally execute an order of His Imperial Majesty, by declaring to you that the presence of his troops in your country will not impose upon you either fresh charges or contributions; that the supplies of provisions will be paid for by our military chests at a suitable time, and at a rate fixed beforehand in concert with your Governments.
“Look upon what awaits you without disquietude; betake yourselves in security to your agricultural labours and to your commercial speculations; obey the laws which govern you, and the constituted authorities. By the faithful discharge of these duties you will acquire the best title to the generous solicitude and powerful protection of His Majesty the Emperor.”—(Blue Book, vol. i., pp. 348–9)
This is the usual course of Russian invasions. She burglariously takes possession of territory, and tells the people that if they will be quiet and obedient, they shall receive the “generous solicitude” of the imperial robber. All her proclamations are similar to this in word, identical in purpose, and observed with the same supreme indifference. For the reader’s information I will quote a passage from the proclamation published in 1808, upon the invasion of Finland; it will be seen that it is written in the same spirit, and was carried out with the same fidelity:—“It is with the greatest regret that his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, &c., sees himself forced to send into your country the troops under my order. * * These motives, as well as the regard which his Imperial Majesty owes to the safety of his own states, oblige him to place your country under his protection, and to take possession of it, in order to procure by these means a sufficient guarantee in case his Swedish Majesty should persevere in his resolution not to accept the equitable conditions of peace that have been proposed to him. * * It is his Imperial Majesty’s pleasure that all the affairs of the country should have their ordinary course in conformity with your laws and customs, which will remain in force so long as his Imperial Majesty’s troops shall be obliged to occupy the country. The civil and military functionaries are confirmed in their respective employments; always excepting those who may use their authority to mislead the people, and induce them to take measures contrary to their interests. All that is necessary for the maintenance and food of the troops shall be paid in ready money on the spot. All provisions shall be paid for according to an amicable agreement between our commissaries and those of the country.” A passage from the letter of the King of Sweden will show how these promises are kept. He says, “Honour and humanity require me to make strong representations against the innumerable horrors and the vexations which the Russian troops have permitted themselves in Swedish Finland. The blood of the innocent victims calls for vengeance upon those who authorised such cruelties. * * * Can it be a crime in my Finnish subjects not to have wished to let themselves be seduced by promises which are as fallacious as the principles on which they are founded are erroneous! Is it worthy of a Sovereign to make it in them a crime? I conjure your Imperial Majesty to put an end to the calamities and the horrors of a war which ought to call down on your person and your empire the malediction of Divine Providence.” [14] We know that Finnish protection ended in Incorporation, and, but for the glorious bravery of the Turks at Oltenitza, Citate, and Silistria, and the interference of the Allies, such would, without doubt, have been the fate of the Principalities. The same tactics were employed; similar oppressions exercised; identical courses pursued. Russia ordered the taxes to be paid to her general; required obedience from the Hospadas and service from the people; forbade their communicating with the Sultan, their lawful ruler. This general order will shew what kind of protection she exercised: “Ordered 1st. That all men from the age of eighteen to forty years, married or unmarried, and whatever their profession may be, are required by the generals, colonels, and commanders of corps to do service for the Russian army. 2. That horses, waggons, oxen, and other beasts of burden, may be required for the same service. And, 3. That all boats, barks, or floats now on the Danube, are seized for the present moment for the service of the Russian army. This decree is applicable to all Wallachian subjects. Those who attempt to evade its execution shall be tried by court martial.” Such is Russian protection.
We now reach the period of the famous Vienna note, which, says Mr. Bright, “Russia accepted at once—accepted it, I believe, by telegraph, even before the precise words of it had been received in St. Petersburgh. Everybody thought the question now settled. A Cabinet Minister told me we should never hear another word about it; ‘the whole thing is at an end,’ he said, and so it appeared for a moment. But the Turk refused the note which had been drawn up by his own arbitrators, and which Russia had accepted.” No one will be surprised at the Turk rejecting this note, when he reads the original words of the note and compares them with the suggested amendments of the Ottoman Government:
Words of the Original Note.
If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects.