Now, in my observations I am not about to carry on this discussion with the Gentlemen below me, who are interested in a question which is not the question before the House. They are interested in some vast, and, as it seems to me, imaginary scheme that would involve Europe in protracted and widely-extended hostilities; and I think that, so far as the House is concerned in discussing the question with the Government, these Gentlemen are almost, if not altogether, out of court. It appears to me, if they were logical in their course, finding that the objects of the Government and the objects of the Government of France were entirely different from those which they have at heart, and believing, as they do, that the objects of the allied Governments are not worth a war, that they ought rather to join us on this bench, and, instead of there being one Peace bench in the House, there would be two Peace benches, and the Peace party would clearly gain a considerable accession of strength. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies has stated over and over again—and, amid the confusion of statements which he and his Colleagues have made, I think he will not find fault if I assume that the object of the war is simply the security of the Turkish territory from the grasp of Russia, and probably from the grasp of any other Power—the noble Lord has stated that he apprehends that if Russia were to extend her empire by the possession of Turkey, it would give her a power that would be unsafe with regard to the other nations of Europe. When the noble Lord speaks in that vague, and, if I were not speaking of a man so eminent, I should say, absurd language of the liberties of Europe and the civilization of the world, I should say he means by that merely those great objects, so far as they can be conserved by the conservation of the Turkish territory.
The noble Lord tells us—we are now getting out of some of the mystifications—that he has no kind of sympathy that would lead him into war for the oppressed nationalities of Europe. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) a few nights ago turned the cold shoulder to the people of Hungary. He said he thought there could be no greater calamity to Europe than that Hungary should be separated from the Austrian Empire. Well, then, we have got rid of Hungary; and, next, the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) tells us it is quite a mistake to suppose that he ever intended to go to war for Poland. In fact, he stated—what will be very disheartening to hon. Gentlemen below me—that he never supposed we were going to war for such a Quixotic object; that the case of Poland is one that is hopeless, and therefore it would be madness in England and France—not indiscretion—not a doubtful undertaking—but positive madness in England and France to take any part in promoting resistance in that country.
Having now got rid of Hungary and Poland, we only require that some Member of the Cabinet should get up later in the evening—and that I have no doubt will be the case—to state that it is utterly impossible for this country to involve itself in hostilities with a view to the regeneration of any part of Italy. The noble Lord the Member for London tells us we are not going to war for the sake of conquest; and that, I think, is a matter which ought to be kept in mind by hon. Gentlemen who are urging the Government on to a prolonged war. He stated on Tuesday night, 'Be it always remembered that we are seeking no object of our own;'—it would be a very odd thing if we were to go to war for the objects of somebody else—'that we are seeking no object of our own; that when peace is concluded we shall not have acquired one ell of new territory, or secured any advantage whatever for ourselves. It is for Turkey and the general system of Europe that we are struggling.' In fact, the whole matter always resolves itself into some general mystification, and at this moment we are, every man of us, almost entirely in the dark as to what are the ultimate objects of the war.
One other point that I ought to mention is the question of crippling and humbling Russia. I am, of course, willing to admit that when people go to war they are not expected to be very nice in their treatment of each other, and, if the taking of Sebastopol be an object of those who are in favour of the war, to take Sebastopol they will inflict any injury they can upon Russia. But the noble Lord told us last year that he still intended to leave Russia a great empire. I thought that exceedingly considerate of the noble Lord, and I understand—I think it has been stated in the public papers—that it is considered at St. Petersburg a great condescension on the part of so eminent a statesman. Well, then, if we are not going to war for nationalities, nor for conquest, nor for any such crippling of Russia as would be effected by her dismemberment, we come to this simple question—in the condition in which Turkey has long existed, what are the means by which the security of Turkey can be best guaranteed? No man asserts that the security of Turkey can be absolute, but that it must be partial and conditional. As it is well to have high authority for these statements, I have here an extract from a speech made by Lord Clarendon a few nights ago on the Resolution moved by Lord Grey. The noble Lord then stated:—
'My noble Friend says, and says truly, that the attainment of all this would offer no security to Turkey. The value of a treaty must always depend upon the spirit in which it is agreed to, and the good faith with which it is entered into. No treaty can make a weak Power like Turkey perfectly safe against a powerful neighbour immediately in contact with her, if that neighbour is determined to act the aggressive towards her.'—[3 Hansard, cxxxviii. 1152.]
Thus Lord Clarendon admits, what is perfectly obvious to the common sense of all who have heard anything of Russia or Turkey, except from the lips of the Prime Minister, that what we are seeking to obtain is not an absolute security for Turkey, but a conditional security, such as her circumstances, her population, her government, and geographical position render attainable by her friends and allies. We have now been fourteen months at war, and two Cabinets—the Cabinets of Lord Aberdeen and of the present First Minister—I might say four Cabinets, for the Cabinets of France and Austria must have agreed to the same thing—have agreed to certain terms, and have offered them to Russia. They have been accepted as the basis of negotiations, conferences have been opened, and certain proceedings towards a settlement have taken place; and now I should like to know whether the terms which were offered were offered in earnest. Judging of the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen by the conduct of some of its Members, and especially of Lord Aberdeen himself, I am certain that they were sincere in the terms they offered. But the Times newspaper, which now in its many changes has become the organ and great stimulant of the present Cabinet, expresses its astonishment that any person should think that peace was intended by the Conferences at Vienna. The Times states that the object of the Conferences was not to bring about a peace, but to shame Austria into becoming a faithful and warlike ally.
Now, when the noble Lord the Member for London was sent to Vienna to negotiate, I confess I was one of those who formed the opinion that the noble Lord, amid the many eccentricities of his career, would not have undertaken that mission unless he himself had been honest with regard to the terms to be offered, and anxious, if possible, to consolidate a peace. There were, however, certain persons—malicious people, of course—who found out that it would be convenient to the First Minister to have the noble Lord at a distance, at least for a time. But I never adopted that idea. I did not believe that the noble Lord's journey to Vienna, with a retinue that required him to occupy no less than thirty- two rooms in one hotel, would have been undertaken unless the noble Lord considered that the object was a reality, on which the interests of the country and of Europe depended. I think he would have been the last man in the country to lend himself to such a miserable hoax as going to Vienna, not to make peace, but to shame Austria into becoming a faithful and warlike ally. I assume, therefore, that terms were sincerely offered, and that those terms gave guarantees which were sufficient, and a security which was as ample as the circumstances admitted for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. It is from that starting-point that I would discuss this question.
There are hon. Members in this House who think that even if those terms were obtained they would still be in no degree a compensation for the enormous sacrifices which the country has made. I happen to hold the same opinion, and it was with that conviction that I protested against going into the war. Indeed, I think that the argument I used a year ago, that nothing to be obtained in the war could at all approach a compensation for the enormous sacrifices the country would be called upon to make, has been greatly strengthened. Well, Sir, the terms offered are called 'bases:' from which one understands, not that they are everything, but that they are something capable of what diplomatists call 'development.' I recollect a question asked of a child at school, in one of those lessons called 'object lessons,' 'What is the basis of a batter pudding?' It was obvious that flour was the basis, but the eggs and the butter and the rest were developments and additions. But if the bases are capable of development, so I take it for granted that the meaning of negotiation is not the offering of an ultimatum, but the word involves to every man's sense the probability of concession— butter, it may be—but concession of one sort or another.
I will not go through all the Four Points, because the attention of the House ought really to be centred upon the third article and the matters connected with it. The House must remember that this article involves two most important subjects—first, the territorial guarantee, which if it were sufficiently secured would be everything the House and the country required from the war—namely, that the territories of Turkey shall never be molested, so long as the treaty shall continue, by any of the great Powers who are parties to such treaty; and, secondly, that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea shall cease. Now, the territorial guarantee was granted without difficulty. [An hon. Member: 'No.'] Well, no difficulty was made about the territorial guarantee but this:—Prince Gortchakoff said, very wisely, that he would not enter into an absolute pledge to go to war in case of any infraction of the treaty, and the noble Lord who said 'No' will find, when he has examined the question a little more closely, that it does not make the slightest difference as to the actual results of a treaty whether a Power guarantees in the mode proposed by Russia, or in the manner proposed by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, because, when an infraction of a treaty occurs, the power of judging whether any of the Governments who are parties to such treaty should go to war or not, is left with each individual Government. If, for example, France stretched her dominions westward towards Morocco, or eastward towards Tunis or Tripoli, it would, of course, have been the duty, and would have been in the power of Russia, even had she accepted the exact terms proposed by the allies, to judge for herself whether a case had arisen which required her to go to war, or which justified her in doing so.
Such a case arose very lately with reference to Schleswig-Holstein. We were bound, under an ancient treaty, to go to war in the event of the infraction of certain treaties affecting Schleswig-Holstein; but when this case occurred the subject was considered by the Government, the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) being at the time, I believe, Foreign Secretary—who most wisely and properly, not only for this country, but for the interests of Schleswig-Holstein and of Europe, declined to act upon what was represented to be the strict letter of the treaty, and England did not engage in war in consequence of the disputes which then took place. I must say that what seems to me as the most statesmanlike and elevated declaration in the protocols is the statement of Prince Gortchakoff, that the blood of Russia is the property of Russia, and that he will not pledge himself that years hence—it may be even a century hence—the blood of Russia shall be shed in a cause which, when the time arrives, may be one which would be altogether unworthy of such a sacrifice.