With respect to the question of the Christian protectorate, the House will probably recollect that it was represented over and over again by Ministers in this House—it was stated in the speeches of Lord Clarendon in another place—that the proposition of Russia, as conveyed in the Menchikoff note, was intended to transfer the virtual sovereignty of 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of Ottoman subjects to the Czar. If that were so, the Menchikoff note and all the old protectorate treaties being abolished, surely the House will consider whether the combination of the three propositions—the territorial guarantees, the Christian protectorate, and the Black Sea project—do not give such securities to Turkey as the condition of Turkey will permit. Now the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, as I think my hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) showed very clearly the other evening, is in a certain sense a fact which all the negotiations in the world cannot write off. I see that one of the public journals this morning, commenting upon my hon. Friend's speech, says, 'Yes, truly, the commercial preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea is a fact which cannot be denied;' and then proceeds to argue that it does not follow that Russia should have a political and naval preponderance. But I do not know any case in which there is a commercial supremacy in a sea like the Black Sea that is not followed by a preponderance of every other kind. The question now is, however, how is that preponderance to cease?
The noble Lord the Member for the City of London referred the other night to a proposition made by the French Government, but which, I think, does not appear at all distinctly in the protocols, with regard to making the Black Sea a neutral sea. I conceive that was so monstrous a proposition, in the present condition of Europe, that I am surprised it should have been entertained for a moment by any sensible man. I supposed it was found so utterly indefensible that it does not appear as a distinct proposition in the protocols. This proposal of making the Black Sea a neutral sea gave place to another project, and it appears to me very like asking Russia, voluntarily or by compulsion, to perform the operation of amputation upon herself. I maintain that the third article as offered to Russia in December last could not mean what the noble Lord offered to Russia at Vienna, because the cessation of preponderance does not mean the transfer of preponderance, but rather the establishment of an equilibrium—not the destruction of an equilibrium and the establishment of preponderance on the other side.
Some hon. Gentlemen talk as if Russia were a Power which you could take to Bow Street, and bind over before some stipendiary magistrate to keep the peace for six months. Russia is a great Power, as England is, and in treating with her you must consider that the Russian Government has to consult its own dignity, its own interests, and public opinion, just as much at least as the Government of this country. Now, what was the proposition of this third article? The proposal was, that Russia should have eight ships; but what was the proposition with regard to her present antagonists? That Turkey should also have eight ships, that France should have four, and that England should have four; and I believe that in a preceding protocol, which has not been alluded to in this debate, it is proposed that the contracting Powers should have two ships each at the mouth of the Danube, so that if these terms had been agreed upon, Russia would have had eight ships in the Black Sea, while Turkey, France, and England would have had twenty. Now, that is not a mere cessation of a preponderance; it is not the establishment of an equilibrium; it is a transfer of the supremacy of the Black Sea from that country which, if any country should be supreme there, has the best claim—namely, Russia. Besides this, however, Turkey would have had whatever ships she liked in the Bosphorus, and the allies would also have had as many ships as they chose in the Mediterranean and the Levant.
Now, let us for a moment consider the offer with which Russia met this proposal. The first proposition was that of the open Straits, which is disapproved by the hon. Baronet opposite. I am not about to say that this proposition should have been accepted in preference to the other, but I think it is the true interest of Europe, and also of Turkey itself, that the Straits should be thrown open. At any rate, it must be admitted that the preponderance of Russia, in the sense in which we now understand it, would be absolutely destroyed if the Straits were thrown open. Russia made a proposition which appears to me to be highly satisfactory—that such regulations should be made by the Sultan and his Government with regard to the position and duration of the anchorages of ships between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea as would preclude the possibility, so far as there were means of doing so, of any inconvenience or danger to Constantinople from the opening of the Straits. If that had been agreed to, all nations would have been entitled to the passage of the Straits, and I believe that all nations would equally have respected the privilege thus granted to them. Now, suppose these Straits, instead of being one mile wide, had been ten miles wide, what difference would it make to Turkey? If the Straits were ten miles wide they would be open. Turkey would have no right to close them, and European nations would not permit her to pretend to, or to exercise, any such power; but Constantinople would be no more secure then than it would be now with the Straits open, whether they were ten miles wide or one mile wide. If the Straits were open, the consequences to Constantinople and to Turkey appear to me to be precisely the same. Turkey would be equally safe; Turkey would be equally menaced. Our fleets would visit the Black Sea in the course of the season, and the Russian Black Sea fleet, if it chose, would visit the Mediterranean. There would be no sort of pretence for wrangling about the Straits; and the balance of power—if I may use the term—between the fleets of Russia, France, and England, would be probably the best guarantee that could be offered for the security of Constantinople and Turkey, so far as they are in danger of aggression either from the Black Sea or the Mediterranean.
But it is said, the Sultan's sovereignty would be menaced—that he has an undoubted right to close the Straits. I doubt whether that right will be very long maintained; but if it be maintained, and if you are to reject any proposition which interferes with the Sultan's sovereignty, I ask you whether the sovereignty of the Czar is not as dear to him? and whether, if, in negotiations of this kind, you can find any mode of attaining your object without inflicting injury upon either the sovereignty of the Sultan or the Czar, it would not be much more statesmanlike to adopt it, and so to frame your treaties that neither should feel that it was subjected to an indignity, and therefore seek to violate such treaties at the first opportunity? Well, but the second proposition, which I think the hon. Baronet approved, and which I think the noble Lord proposed, was, that the Sultan should open the Straits at will. I ask the House whether that proposition, if accepted, would not imply that the Sultan could have no other enemy than Russia?—which I think is doubtful. If the Black Sea were open to the West, and the Mediterranean closed to the East, surely that is assuming that the Sultan could have no enemy but Russia. The Sultan could close the Straits to Russia, but the Western Powers could always proceed to the Black Sea. The French plan, in my opinion, exposed Turkey far more to the West than the Russian plan exposed her to the East. Nothing can be more short-sighted than the notion which the noble Lord the Member for London started at the conferences, that Turkey could have no enemy but Russia. In fact, everybody there seemed to be on exceedingly good terms with himself. The Austrian Minister said nobody would suspect Austria— no one could be suspected but Russia. But our experience for many years will tell us that there has been just as much menace from the West as from the East—the rapacity of the West is not less perceptible than that of the East. ['Hear.'] Some one expresses a sentiment in opposition —it is a gentleman who has never read the Blue Books—he does not know that almost the whole of this business began in a threat of the most audacious and insulting character from the Ambassador of France—a threat to order up the French fleet to the Dardanelles, and further to land an expedition in Syria to take possession of Jerusalem and the whole of the Holy Places. Do you mean to tell me, you and the noble Lord himself, who tried to frighten the country with the notion of the French fleet coming to invade England, that the fleet which three years ago threatened England, and more recently threatened the Dardanelles, has for ever abandoned rapacious desires, and that therefore there will never again be a menace against Turkey from France?
I understand, however, there is a very different opinion prevalent upon the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Emperor of Morocco, a potentate somewhat allied to this country, as I am told his empress is an Irish lady—the Emperor of Morocco, who is not very well versed in what is going on in this House, has been making inquiries of the most anxious character as to whether the particular guarantee which the noble Lord was going to enter into included the territory of Morocco; and I understand he has not been able to find it out from the most assiduous study of the Gibraltar newspapers. It so happens that the Governor of Gibraltar—the noble Lord at the head of the Government corrected me the other night when I called him an irrational man—has issued an ordinance by which he has entirely suppressed the newspaper press in that town and garrison.
Now we come to the question, which of the propositions would be most secure? I was very much struck by an observation which fell from my hon. Colleague (Mr. M. Gibson) in the course of his speech the other night—a point I think very worthy of the attention of the House and of the Government; he said the limitation plan was one which must depend for its efficacy on the will and fidelity of Russia. I am not one of those who believe Russia to be the treacherous and felonious Power which she is described to be by the press of this country, as she is described by the noble Lord to be. I believe the right hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark gave her the same character. Although Russia may not be more treacherous than other Powers, when you are making a bargain with her, it is better you should make the efficacy of the terms depend more on your own vigilance than on her good faith. The noble Lord the Member for London has admitted that the limitation plan is, after all, an inefficient one. He said that Russia might get another ship—perhaps three or four—and when she had doubled the navy permitted to her, perhaps the noble Lord would be writing despatches about it, although I am not sure he would do that. I think it would be holding out a temptation to buy Mr. Scott Russell's great ship as one of the eight ships she is to be allowed to keep by the treaty.
My hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding remarked that Russia might purchase vessels of large size from the United States, and still keep within the prescribed limit; but if this great ship, now building in the Thames, should succeed, as I hope she will, Russia might buy her and send her into the Black Sea. Somebody says she could not go there without passing the Straits, but, as she is built for mercantile purposes, that monster vessel might freely be taken up, and then form one of the eight ships allowed to Russia. Another proposition has been alluded to by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Sir W. Clay)—that pointed out by the Russian Plenipotentiary—that Russia and Turkey should enter into a friendly treaty between themselves and arrange that point; but the other diplomatists would not allow it, unless it were done under the eyes of the conference and bearing the same features of force and compulsion as their proposal of the limitation possessed. I was astonished to hear the hon. Baronet, as I understood him, say that, even although it could be shown that the Russian propositions were better than our own, he thought the proposition which bore on its face coercion of Russia was most desirable. A more unstatesman-like and immoral view upon a great question between nations I have rarely heard of. [Sir William Clay rose, and was understood to deny the sentiments imputed to him by the hon. Member.] I understood my hon. Friend so. Perhaps he did not mean what I thought he did mean, but that was the conclusion I came to from his argument, and I do not think he will say I entirely misrepresented him. It has, however, been said by the press that, whether we were sincere or not at the conference, Russia was not. Hon. Gentlemen have read in the Times and other papers blowing the flames of war, that from first to last Russia was treacherous and insincere. I would put it to the noble Lord the Member for London whether he can say that was the case, for I observe he said, in his speech in this House on the 23rd of January last, in answer to a question from the hon. Member for Aylesbury, or some other Member—
'My hon. Friend will see that by that act the Russian Plenipotentiary accepted this interpretation as the basis of negotiation, of course reserving to himself the power, when this basis shall have been laid down in a definite article, of making any observations on the part of his Government which he should think proper.'—[3 Hansard cxxxvi. 911]
Of course the Russian Plenipotentiary, when he accepted it, did so upon the understanding that it was the basis of negotiation and discussion, as no one will deny it was a question capable of being solved in more ways than one, and it was no indication of insincerity for him to refuse the precise mode proposed by the Plenipotentiary for England. With regard to the terms proposed, I should like to read to the House a statement I have on very good authority as to the language which Prince Gortchakoff held at Vienna. The statement I have is not to be found in the protocols, but I believe it may be relied upon as the precise words he used. The noble Lord insisted, as I understand, that it was no indignity to ask Russia to limit the number of her ships in the Black Sea; but I would submit it is precisely the same in principle as if she were asked to limit the amount of her force in the Crimea to four or six regiments. Prince Gortchakoff said—