[365]. I have not ventured to include the words ἔνθα δ’ ἐόντι at the beginning, as the text seems to me too uncertain. See, however, Diels’s interesting note.
[366]. On the source used by Hippolytos in the first four chapters of Ref. i. see Diels, Dox. p. 145. We must carefully distinguish Ref. i. and Ref. ix. as sources of information about Herakleitos. The latter book is an attempt to show that the Monarchian heresy of Noetos was derived from Herakleitos instead of from the Gospel, and is a rich mine of Herakleitean fragments.
[367]. Arist. Met. Α, 3. 984 a 7 (R. P. 56 c): Theophr. ap. Simpl. Phys. 23, 33 (R. P. 36 c).
[368]. For these double accounts see Dox. pp. 163 sqq. and Appendix, [§ 15].
[369]. Diog. ix. 15 (R. P. 30 c). Schleiermacher rightly insisted upon this.
[370]. The word συνοικειοῦν is used of the Stoic method of interpretation by Philodemos (cf. Dox. 547 b, n.), and Cicero (N.D. i. 41) renders it by accommodare. Chrysippos in particular gave a great impulse to this sort of thing, as we may best learn from Galen, de Plac. Hippocr. et Plat. Book iii. Good examples are Aet. i. 13, 2; 28, 1; iv. 3, 12,—where distinctively Stoic doctrines are ascribed to Herakleitos. What the Stoics were capable of, we see from Kleanthes, fr. 55, Pearson. He proposed to read Ζεῦ ἀναδωδωναῖε in Il. xvi. 233, ὡς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν Ἀναδωδωναῖον ὄντα.
[371]. See Patin, Heraklits Einheitslehre (1886). To Patin undoubtedly belongs the credit of showing clearly that the unity of opposites was the central doctrine of Herakleitos. It is not always easy, however, to follow him when he comes to details.
[372]. Philo, Rer. Div. Her. 43 (R. P. 34 c).
[373]. The source of his error was Hegel’s remarkable statement that there was no proposition of Herakleitos that he had not taken up into his own logic (Gesch. d. Phil. i. 328). The example which he cites is the statement that Being does not exist any more than not-Being, for which he refers to Arist. Met. Α, 4. This, however, is not there ascribed to Herakleitos at all, but to Leukippos or Demokritos, with whom it meant that space was as real as matter ([§ 175]). Aristotle does, indeed, tell us in the Metaphysics that “some” think Herakleitos says that the same thing can be and not be; but he adds that it does not follow that a man thinks what he says (Met. Γ 3. 1005 b 24). I take this to mean that, though Herakleitos did make this assertion in words, he did not mean by it what the same assertion would naturally have meant at a later date. Herakleitos was speaking only of nature; the logical meaning of the words never occurred to him. This is confirmed by Κ, 5. 1062 a 31, where we are told that by being questioned in a certain manner Herakleitos could be made to admit the principle of contradiction; as it was, he did not understand what he said. In other words, he was unconscious of its logical bearing.
Aristotle was aware, then, that the theories of Herakleitos were not to be understood in a logical sense. On the other hand, this does not prevent him from saying that according to the view of Herakleitos, everything would be true (Met. Δ, 7. 1012 a 24). If we remember his constant attitude to earlier thinkers, this will not lead us to suspect either his good faith or his intelligence. (See Appendix, [§ 2].)