The injunction to Grouchy, though given by Chesney almost textually, to ascertain whether or not the Prussians were intending to unite with the English and fight a battle for the defence of Brussels,—the very thing which they actually were intending to do,—has evidently made no impression whatever on his mind.
The same determination,—for we know not what other word indicates more correctly the temper of mind which must possess a historian of this campaign who shuts his eyes to the contents of the Bertrand letter,—the same determination, we say, not to recognize the fact that the Bertrand letter shows beyond a question that Napoleon was alive to the danger that the Prussians might be intending to do exactly what they were intending to do, that is, unite with the English and fight another battle,—this time on the Brussels road,—is shown also by the latest English critic, Colonel Maurice. He says:—[501]
“He (Napoleon) gave orders to Grouchy, with a force of 33,000 men and 96 guns, to pursue the Prussians, complete their defeat, and communicate with him by the Namur road.[502] Written orders were subsequently given to Grouchy directing him to move on Gembloux.”[503]
Here, the warning contained in the written order, the injunction to ascertain whether the Prussians were intending to join Wellington, is absolutely and quietly ignored. One would suppose that all that the Bertrand letter contained was an order to move on Gembloux. Colonel Maurice proceeds:—
“He (Grouchy) promised, that if, from the reports he received, he gathered that the Prussians had for the most part retired on Wavre, he would follow them there, in order to prevent them gaining Brussels, and in order to separate them from Wellington. This is the first indication we receive, on any authentic evidence, that any one in the French army supposed that the duty of separating the Prussians from Wellington would become the task of Grouchy’s force. Up till then, all the French supposed that there was no prospect of Blücher’s attempting to unite with Wellington.”[503]
Yet in the body of the Bertrand letter, of which Colonel Maurice quotes the first line, are these words:—
“It is important to penetrate what the enemy is intending to do; whether they are separating themselves from the English, or whether they are intending still to unite, to cover Brussels, or Liége, in trying the fate of another battle.”
We confess our inability to explain or account for criticism of this nature, unless by the hypothesis that to a mind preoccupied with a certain view, firmly held, it is often possible that the plainest evidence should be, so to speak, invisible. It is as plain as anything can be that Grouchy’s letter, from which Maurice makes his quotation, is a reply to that part of the Bertrand letter which we have given above; but Maurice, his mind full of the verbal orders only, wholly overlooks this.
But Colonel Maurice and Colonel Chesney are not alone in their views.
General Hamley,[504] in his account of the campaign, says of Grouchy: “His orders were to follow them [the Prussians], complete their rout, and never lose sight of them.” Hamley does not seem even to have heard of the Bertrand order. Hence his elaborate criticism on Grouchy’s conduct,[505]—leaving out, as it does, the two most important data, viz.:—Napoleon’s explicit warning to Grouchy of the possibility of the Prussians uniting with the English to fight a battle for the defence of Brussels, and his equally explicit statement to Grouchy (as reported by the latter), that he was going that very afternoon to attack the English “if they will stand on this side of the Forest of Soignes,”—is entirely beside the mark, and cannot be considered as possessing any practical value whatever. He has addressed himself to a case which never really existed.[506]