[10] As the attempt to retain the epistemological problem and yet to reject idealistic and relativistic solutions has forced some Neo-realists into the doctrine of isolated and independent simples, so it has also led to a doctrine of Eleatic pluralism. In order to maintain the doctrine the subject makes no difference to anything else, it is held that no ultimate real makes any difference to anything else—all this rather than surrender once for all the genuineness of the problem and to follow the lead of empirical subject-matter.
[11] There is almost no end to the various dialectic developments of the epistemological situation. When it is held that all the relations of the type in question are cognitive, and yet it is recognized (as it must be) that many such "transformations" go unremarked, the theory is supplemented by introducing "unconscious" psychical modifications.
[12] Conception-presentation has, of course, been made by many in the history of speculation an exception to this statement; "pure" memory is also made an exception by Bergson. To take cognizance of this matter would, of course, accentuate, not relieve, the difficulty remarked upon in the text.
[13] Cf. Studies in Logical Theory, Chs. I and II, by Dewey; also "Epistemology and Mental States," Tufts, Phil. Rev., Vol. VI, which deserves to rank as one of the early documents of the "experimental" movement.
[14] Cf. "The Definition of the Psychical," G. H. Mead, Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago.
[15] Cf. The Logic of Hegel-Wallace, p. 117.
[16] Bosanquet's Logic, 2nd Ed., p. 171. The identification of induction and procedure by hypothesis occurs on p. 156.
[17] Ibid., p. 14 (italics mine).
[18] Perhaps the most complete exhibition of the breakdown of formal logic considered as an account of the operation of thought apart from its subject-matter is to be found in Schiller's Formal Logic.
[19] Cf. Stuart on "Valuation as a Logical Process" in Studies in Logical Theory.