[20] The New Realism, pp. 40-41.
[21] Cf. Montague, pp. 256-57; also Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 27-65-66, et passim; and Holt's Concept of Consciousness, pp. 14ff., discussed below.
[22] Cf. Angell, "Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," Decennial Publications of University of Chicago, Vol. III; also Castro, "The Respective Standpoints of Psychology and Logic," Philosophic Studies, University of Chicago, No. 4.
[23] I am here following, in the main, Professor Holt because he alone appears to have had the courage to develop the full consequences of the premises of analytic logic.
[24] The Concept of Consciousness, pp. 14-15.
[25] It is interesting to compare this onlooking act with the account of consciousness further on. As "psychological" this act of onlooking must be an act of consciousness. But consciousness is a cross-section or a projection of things made by their interaction with a nervous system. Here consciousness is a function of all the interacting factors. It is in the play. It is the play. It is not in a spectator's box. How can consciousness be a function of all the things put into the cross-section and yet be a mere beholder of the process? Moreover, what is it that makes any particular, spectacle, or cross-section "logical"? If it be said all are "logical" what significance has the term?
[26] Cf. Russell's Scientific Methods in Philosophy, p. 59.
[27] Holt, op. cit., pp. 128-30.
[28] In fact, Newton, in all probability, had the Cartesian pure notions in mind.
[29] Holt, op. cit., p. 118 (italics mine). Cf. also Perry's Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 108 and 311.