Moral Import of Principles is Intellectual, Not Imperative.—This brings us to the essential point in the consideration of the value of general principles. Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things. The fundamental error of the intuitionalist and of the utilitarian (represented in the quotation from Mill) is that they are on the lookout for rules which will of themselves tell agents just what course of action to pursue; whereas the object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself. No genuine moral principle prescribes a specific course of action; rules[165] like cooking recipes, may tell just what to do and how to do it. A moral principle, such as that of chastity, of justice, of the golden rule, gives the agent a basis for looking at and examining a particular question that comes up. It holds before him certain possible aspects of the act; it warns him against taking a short or partial view of the act. It economizes his thinking by supplying him with the main heads by reference to which to consider the bearings of his desires and purposes; it guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important considerations for which he should be on the lookout.
Golden Rule as a Tool of Analysis.—A moral principle, then, is not a command to act or forbear acting in a given way: it is a tool for analyzing a special situation, the right or wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety, and not by the rule as such. We sometimes hear it stated, for example, that the universal adoption of the Golden Rule would at once settle all industrial disputes and difficulties. But supposing that the principle were accepted in good faith by everybody; it would not at once tell everybody just what to do in all the complexities of his relations to others. When individuals are still uncertain of what their real good may be, it does not finally decide matters to tell them to regard the good of others as they would their own. Nor does it mean that whatever in detail we want for ourselves we should strive to give to others. Because I am fond of classical music it does not follow that I should thrust as much of it as possible upon my neighbors. But the "Golden Rule" does furnish us a point of view from which to consider acts; it suggests the necessity of considering how our acts affect the interests of others as well as our own; it tends to prevent partiality of regard; it warns against setting an undue estimate upon a particular consequence of pain or pleasure, simply because it happens to affect us. In short, the Golden Rule does not issue special orders or commands; but it does simplify judgment of the situations requiring intelligent deliberation.
Sympathy as Actuating Principle of a Reasonable Judgment.—We have had repeated occasion (as in the discussion of intent and motive, of intuition and deliberate calculation) to see how artificial is the separation of emotion and thought from one another. As the only effective thought is one fused by emotion into a dominant interest, so the only truly general, the reasonable as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the generous thought. Sympathy widens our interest in consequences and leads us to take into account such results as affect the welfare of others; it aids us to count and weigh these consequences as counting for as much as those which touch our own honor, purse, or power. To put ourselves in the place of another, to see from the standpoint of his purposes and values, to humble our estimate of our own claims and pretensions to the level they would assume in the eyes of a sympathetic and impartial observer, is the surest way to attain universality and objectivity of moral knowledge. Sympathy, in short, is the general principle of moral knowledge, not because its commands take precedence of others (which they do not necessarily), but because it furnishes the most reliable and efficacious intellectual standpoint. It supplies the tool, par excellence, for analyzing and resolving complex cases. As was said in our last chapter, it is the fusion of the sympathetic impulses with others that is needed; what we now add is that in this fusion, sympathy supplies the pou sto for an effective, broad, and objective survey of desires, projects, resolves, and deeds. It translates the formal and empty reason of Kant out of its abstract and theoretic character, just as it carries the cold calculations of utilitarianism into recognition of the common good.
LITERATURE
For criticisms of Kant's view of reason, see Caird, Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II., Book II., ch. ii.; Paulsen, System of Ethics, pp. 194-203 and 355-363; Fite, Introductory Study, pp. 173-188; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, pp. 112-124.
For intuitionalism, see Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy; Maurice, Conscience; Whewell, The Elements of Morality; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II., pp. 96-115; Mezes, Ethics, ch. iii.; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Book I., chs. viii.-ix., and Book III. entire, but especially ch. i.; History of Ethics, 170-204, and 224-236, and Lectures on Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau, 361-374.
For the moral sense theory, see Sidgwick, History of Ethics, p. 189; Shaftesbury, Characteristics; Hutcheson, System of Moral Philosophy.
For casuistry, see references in Rand's Bibliography, Vol. III., Part II., p. 880.
For the variability of moral rules, see Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Book I.; Bain, Moral Science, Part I., ch. iii.; Spencer, Principles of Ethics, Vol. I., Part II.; Williams, Review of Evolutional Ethics, pp. 423-465; Bowne, Principles of Ethics, ch. v.; Schurman, The Ethical Import of Darwinism; the writings of Westermarck and Hobhouse elsewhere referred to, and Darwin, Descent of Man, Part I., chs. iv.-v.
For the nature of moral judgment and the function of reason in conduct, see Aristotle, Book III., chs. ii.-iii., and Book VI.; Ladd, Philosophy of Conduct, ch. vii.; Sharp, Essay on Analysis of the Moral Judgment, in Studies in Philosophy and Psychology (Garman Commemorative Volume); Santayana, Life of Reason, Vol. I., chs. x.-xii.; Bryant, Studies in Character, Part II., chs. iv.-v.