Studies in Logical Theory

by John Dewey

quoted, [347], [348], [349], [350], [352], [353], [354], [355], [356], [357], [358], [359], [362], [364], [366 note], [368], [370], [371], [374], [379], [380], [381].
Satisfaction:
pause of, as marking attainment of truth, [362 ff.]
Schiller, F. C. S., [327 note], [345 note].
Science:
relation to naïve experience, [10], [11];
its historic stages, [11], [12];
distinction of logical procedure from epistemology, [13];
same history as philosophy, [21], [22].
Self, empirical:
genesis and content of concept of, [290], [292], [331], [332 note 1].
Self, "energetic":
implied in experience of "warrant," [277], [278];
stimulus to development of concept of empirical self, [279-81];
essential principle in all valuation, [281-5];
evolution of moral attitude of reference to, [285-9];
logical function of, in valuation, [296];
important place in economic valuation, [308], [309];
not capable of being described in terms of purpose or ideal, [313-16];
Bradley's misinterpretation of, [332 note].
Self-realization (see also Green, T. H.):
theory of, as moral ideal futile, [298];
logically congruous with determinism and hedonism, [330], [331].
Sensations:
logical import of, [57];
as functions of experience, [58];
as point of contact with reality, [90];
place in judgment, [154];
and ideas, [164 ff.];
(see Impressions, Psychical).
Sensori-motor activity, [193], [200].
Shaftesbury, [301].
Sigwart, C.:
view of judgment, [147].
Skepticism, [50 note], [85].
"Social currency":
implies an identity of aspect of an object to different persons, [229];
object having, an abstraction like social individual, [229];
not a test of objectivity, [318-29].
Socrates:
function of concept, [342].
Sophists, the, [225].
Spencer, H., [248], [250 note 1], [315 note].
Standard (see also Predicate):
identified with predicate in ethical judgment, [238-40];
function of, in ethical judgment, [274], [299], [300];
morphology and mode of reconstruction of, [296], [297];
an ultimate ethical, impossible, [299];
objectivity of, [300], [301].
Stimulus:
of thought, [7], [8], [17], [24], [37-40], [47], [81];
Lotze's view of, [27], [29], [30];
view criticised, [30-36];
confusion of datum with, [61];
defined, [75];
and judgment, [153-4];
as condition of thinking, [193 ff.];
as direct and indirect, [195-7];
of ethical judgment, [238-41], [291];
of economic, judgment, [241-6], [302];
(see Content, Datum).
Stout, G. F.:
referred to, [349].
Stratton, G. M., [318 note].
Structure, [15], [16], [17], [18], [24], [75];
(see Function).
Subject:
of judgment, how constituted, [75 note];
as constructed by thought, [94 ff.], [103];
as a part of judgment, [118 ff.];
as reality, [88 ff.];
as inside and outside of judgment, [93], [96];
functional theory of, [111], [125];
as that requiring explanation, [208], [211 ff.];
as modified by deduction, [212];
given by analysis of situation, [232];
interacts with predicate in judgment, [232];
of ethical judgment, [258], [296-8];
of economic judgment, [259], [260], [304], [309-11];
(see Copula, Datum, Judgment, Predicate).
Subjective:
distinguished from objective, [25];
Lotze's view of impressions as purely, [27], [28];
view criticised, [31];
definition of, [39];
developed only within reflection, [52], [53];
(see Psychical).
Subjectivism:
in Lotze, [83], [84];
in Royce, [360].
Subject-matter of thought:
distinguished as stimulus, datum, and content, [7], [8], [24];
confusion of these (genetic) distinctions, [17], [18];
as antecedent, [Study II];
as datum, [Study III];
as content, [Study IV].

Substance:
ethical theories based on logic involved in rationalistic conception of, [298], [299];
meaning of concept of, [326], [327];
type-form of conduct analogous to concept of a particular kind of, [327], [328].
Substantiation:
significance of Plato's, of ideas, [342 ff.]
Supposition and hypothesis, [178-81].
Sweet, Henry: quoted, [153 note].
Synthetic (see Reconstruction).
Taylor, A. E., [299 note 2], [315 note], [316], [324].
Teleology (see End, Purpose).
Temptation:
ethical, [238], [301];
economic, [305].
Tension:
as stimulus to thought, [37], [38], [49], [50], [53], [70], [85];
in relation to constitution of sensory datum, [53], [58], [59], [70];
constitution of meaning as distinct from fact, [75], [85], [154], [237-46], [250], [251], [255], [291-5], [374 ff.];
(see Purpose, Reconstruction).
Thales:
his ἀρχή, water, [209];
in relation to deduction, [212], [214].
Thought:
forms of, [58 ff.];
as modes of organizing data, [63];
three kinds according to Lotze, [68], [69];
as positing and distinguishing, [69];
validity of its function, [76-82];
of its products, [82-5];
instrumental character, [78-82];
as discriminating sensory qualities, [200-202];
(see Judgment, Reflection).
Time:
as involved in judgment, [120 ff.]
Transcendentalism, [29], [43-8].
Trendelenburg, A.:
view of judgment, [147].
Truth: criterion of, [84];
Bosanquet's conception of, [105];
popular criterion of, [105 ff.];
and purpose, [Study XI];
representational versus teleological view of, [341 ff.];
criterion of, [361 ff.];
(see Objectivity, Validity).
Ueberweg:
view of judgment, [147].
Uniformity:
of nature, [206].
Unity:
of the world, [207].
Universal:
first and second according to Lotze, [56], [59], [69];
ideas as, [97 ff.], [113];
judgment as, [136];
Mr. Royce's treatment of, [354 ff.];
necessity and, [357].
Validity:
of thought, [7], [8];
relation to genesis, [14], [15];
test, [17], [18];
defines content of thought, [24];
problem of, [Study IV];
Lotze's dilemma regarding, [71-85];
of bare object of thought, [72-6];
of activity of thought, [76-82];
of product of thought, [82-5];
(see Objectivity, Reality, Truth).
Value:
Lotze's distinction of, from existence, [28], [29];
view criticised, [31], [41], [45];
organized, of experience, [42-8];
determined in and by a logical process, [233];
nature of consciousness of, [273], [333-5];
function of consciousness of, [335-7];
properly mediate and functional in character, [338-40].
Valuation (see also Ethical judgment, Economic judgment):
includes only ethical and economic types of judgment, [227], [236], [338-40];
general account of process of, [272], [295];
reconstructive of self as well as of reality, [312].
Venn, John:
origin of hypothesis, [169].
"Warrant":
consciousness of, accompanies purely factual as well as valuational judgment processes, [276], [277];
the constitutive feature of survey of factual conditions, [278], [279].
Welton, J.:
origin of hypothesis, [171].
Whewell, William, [163];
view of sensations and ideas, [164], [165];
of induction, [165];
a certain agreement between him and Mill, [166].
Wieser, F. von, [335 note 2].
Will:
as related to thought, [366 note];
(see Activity, End, Purpose).
Wundt, W.:
view of judgment, [147];
view of mathematical induction, [173];
formation and proof of hypothesis, [177 ff.];
distinction between supposition and hypothesis, [178 ff.]
"Wrong" (see "Bad").
Xenophanes:
his logical position, [216].
Zeno:
his dialectic, [214].

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Logic (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 10, 11. Italics mine.

[2] See Angell, "The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, Vol. III (1903), Part II, pp. 61-6, 70-72.

[3] See Philosophical Review, Vol. XI, pp. 117-20.

[4] See statements regarding the psychological and the logical in The Child and the Curriculum, pp. 28, 29.

[5] Lotze, Logic (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 2. For the preceding exposition see Vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 13, 14, 37, 38; also Microkosmus, Book V, chap. 4.

[6] Lotze, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 6, 7.

[7] Lotze, Logic (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 25.

[8] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 36.