Studies in Logical Theory

by John Dewey

The point may be clearer if we recur to the passage and ask just what is meant by "the defiantly mysterious," "baffling," and "capricious" character of the world as fact—as "brute reality." First, if by the world as "fact;" as "brute reality," we mean experience so brute that it is not yet "lighted up with ideas," it is difficult to see how it could be mysterious or capricious, since mystery and caprice appear only when experience ceases to be taken merely as it comes and an inquiry for connections and meanings has begun. That is to say, there can be neither mystery nor caprice except in relation to some sort of order. And order is always a matter of ideas. But it is sufficient to submit Mr. Royce's own statement on this point:

We all of us from moment to moment have experience. This experience comes to us in part as brute fact; light and shade, sound and silence, pain and grief and joy.... These given facts flow by; and were they all, our world would be too much of a blind problem for us even to be puzzled by its meaningless presence.[208]

If next we take the world of fact as in contrast and co-ordinate with the world of ideas, mystery and caprice here, certainly, are not all on the side of the fact. Here, again, must they be functions of the relation between fact and idea. We have seen that without thought there is neither mystery nor caprice. The idea then cannot take part in the production of mystery and caprice, and forthwith deny its parenthood. Of course, mystery and caprice are not the final fruits of this co-ordinate opposition of fact and idea. They are but the first fruits—the relatively unorganized embryonic mass which through the further activities of the parent functions shall develop into the symmetry of truth and law.

There appears then no ultimate "primacy" of either idea or fact over the other. Nor does either appear as a better way of approach to reality than the other. It is only when we say: "Lo! here in the idea," or "Lo! there in the fact is reality," that we find it "imperfect," "incomplete," and "fragmentary," and must straightway "look for another." But surely not in "a certain absolute system of ideas," which is "the object of love and hope, of desire and will, of faith and work, but never of present finding," shall we seek it. Rather precisely in the loving and hoping, desiring and willing, believing and working, shall we find that reality in which and for which both the "World as fact" and the "World as idea" have their being.

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INDEX

Absolute:
as constituting reality, [348];
as related to truth and error, [363 ff.];
as a hypostatized abstraction, [369].
Absolute self, [330].
Accessory:
thought as, [58 ff.]
Activity:
as social, [74];
thought as, [78];
interrupted, and judgment, [154];
and hypothesis, [170];
as sensori-motor, [193], [200];
(see Function, Reconstruction).
Æsthetic experience:
appreciative rather than reflective, [255];
not a form of valuation, [339], [340].
Alternatives: in judgment, [155];
(see Disjunction).
Analogy, [171], [172], [175];
in relation to habit, [176].
Anaxagoras:
in relation to the One and the Many, [219];
his νοῦς, [220], [221].
Anaximander:
and the infinite, [209];
his process of segregation, [214], [215].
Anaximenes:
his ἀρχή, [209];
his scheme of rarefaction and condensation, [209], [213], [215], [224].
Angell, J. R., [14 note], [345 note].
Animism, [49 note].
Antecedents of thought (see Stimulus).
Applied logic: Lotze's definition, [6].
Appreciation:
distinguished from reflection, [255], [339];
not to be identified with valuation, [320-24], [338].
Ἀρχή:
meaning of search for, [211 ff.]
Association of ideas:
refers to meanings, [33], [34];
connection with thought, [80];
doctrine of: analogous to subjectivism in ethics, [261];
presupposes a mechanical metaphysics, [330], [331 note].
Atomists:
treatment of the One and the Many, [221].
Austrian economists, [307], [333].
Authority and custom:
logic of attitude of obedience to, [286];
social conditions compatible with dominance of, [286];
failure of, as moral control, [286].
Bacon:
extreme empirical position, [156 ff.];
view of induction, [157], [158].
"Bad":
practical significance of, as moral predicate, [259];
relation to "wrong," [335].
Baldwin, J. M., [257 note], [378 note].
Becoming: as relative, [206].
"Begründung" and "Bestätigung":
Wundt's distinction of, [179];
criticised, [181], [182].
Biology:
view of sensation, [58];
use of, in logic, [374], [375].
Bosanquet, B., [59 note], [147], [189], [190], [191], [300];
(see Study V).
Bradley, F. H., [47 note], [54 note], [90 ff.], [147], [189], [190], [191], [192], [194], [299 note 2], [331 note], [332 note], [353].
Brentano, [250 note].
Butler, J., [277].
Certain, the:
relation to tension, [50], [51];
as datum, [57].
Coefficients of reality, perception, and recognition:
defined, [263-7];
present in economic and ethical experience, [267-9].
Coexistence, coincidence, and coherence, [28], [29], [33-6], [58], [59], [68].
Conceptions:
Lotze's view of, [59];
Bacon's attitude toward, [157];
relation to fact, [168];
function in Greek philosophy, [342];
(see Idea, Image, Hypothesis).
Conceptual logic:
as related to idea and image, [188-92].
Conscience:
evolution of, [286], [287];
ambiguous and transitional character of, [287];
metaphysical implications of, as moral standard, [288];
not autonomous, [288].
Conscientiousness:
dangers of, consequent upon ideal of self-realization, [316];
Green's defense of, referred to, [316 note].
Conservation:
of energy and mass, [206];
(see Energy).
Content of knowledge:
and logical object, originates in tension, [49];
thought's own, [65];
and datum, [69];
as truth, [79 ff.];
as static and dynamic, [73], [93 ff.], [110 ff.];
(see Study IV; Objectivity, Validity).
Continuity, [10], [13], [55].
Control:
idea and, [75], [129].
Conversion of propositions, [171];
in relation to habit, [176].
Copernicus:
his theory, [178];
compared with Galileo's supposition, [179-81].
Copula, [118 ff.];
scheme of mediation between subject and predicate, [208], [214 ff.]
Correspondence:
of datum and idea, [51];
of thought-content and thought-activity, [70];
as criterion of truth, [82 ff.], [353 ff.]
Darwin, Charles, [146], [150], [179].
Datum of thought, [7], [8], [24];
as fact, [26], [50], [52];
Lotze's theory of, stated, [55];
criticised, [56 ff.];
relation to induction, [61];
and content, [60], [70];
(see Study III; Content, Fact, Stimulus).

Deduction, [211], [212].
Definition:
invented by Socrates, [203].
Democritus:
attempts at definition, [203].
Demonstrative judgment, [134].
Determination:
as criterion of truth, [362 ff.];
impossibility of complete, in finite experience, [364].
Dewey, John, [58 note], [86 note], [266 note 2], [316 note], [381 note].
Dialectic:
Zeno as originator of, [203].
Diogenes of Apollonia, [222 ff.]
Disjunction:
in judgment, [115], [138].
Dynamic:
ideas as, and as static, [73], [76];
reality as, [126].
Earth:
as an element, [213].
Economic judgment:
involves same type of process as physical, [235];
a process of valuation, [236];
type of situation evoking, [241-6], [293-5], [302], [303];
distinguished from ethical, [243 note], [246 note], [271], [302], [303];
relation to physical, [246 note 3];
subject of, the means of action, [259], [304];
analysis of process of, [304-12];
distinguished from "pull and haul," [237], [238];
psychological account of, [310], [311];
a reconstructive process, [311], [312].
"Egoism, Neo-Hegelian," [316].
Ehrenfels, C. von, [318 note].
Eidola:
Bacon's view of, [157].
Eleatics:
their logical position, [216 ff.]
Elements:
as four, [213];
as infinite, [213 ff.]
Emerson, R. W., [204], [246 note].
Empedocles:
attempts at definition, [203];
treatment of the One and the Many, [218 ff.]
Empiricism, [11], [29], [47], [48], [61 ff.];
and rationalism, [80];
criticised, [156];
Jevons, [169];
treatment of imagery, [186-8].
Ends:
controlling factors in acquisition of knowledge, [229];
may themselves be objects of attention and judgment, [233];
judgment of, inseparable from factual judgment, [234];
conflict of, related, the occasion for ethical judgment, [238-41];
indirect conflict of unrelated, the occasion for economic judgment, [241-3];
the subject-matter of ethical judgment, [258], [259];
definition of, the goal of all judgment, [264], [272];
not always explicit in judgment-process, [269], [270];
nature of relation between, in ethical judgment, [273], [274], [291], [292];
types of factual condition implied in acceptance of, [275], [276];
warranted by factual judgment, [276];
nature of, unrelatedness of, in economic judgment, [293-5], [302], [303];
(see Purpose).
Energy:
principle of conservation of, [206], [299], [300];
not valid in sphere of valuation, [328].
"Energy-Equivalence":
principle of, in economic judgment, [308], [309];
meaning of, [309 note].
Epistemology, [5-7], [10], [11], [13], [17], [18], [47], [73], [341];
origin of problem of, [344], [345].
Erdmann, Benno:
concerning induction, [173].
Error:
criterion of, [371].
Ethical judgment:
involves same type of process as physical, [235];
a process of valuation, [236], [332];
type of situation evoking, [237-41], [291-4];
distinguished from mechanical "pull and haul" between ends, [237], [238];
distinguished from economic judgment, [243 note], [246 note], [271], [302], [303];
subject of, an end of action, [258];
analysis of process of, [295-302];
a reconstructive process, [295], [299].
Existence:
versus meaning, [216], [217].
Experience:
duality of, [16];
logic of, [19-21];
how organized, [42];
relation of thought to organization of, [43-8];
as disorganized, [75];
(see Absolute, Functions).
Experiment:
as form of deduction, [212].
Fact:
as equivalent to datum, [26], [50 ff.];
criteria for determining, [106 ff.];
as reality, [110];
in relation to both idea and reality, [380 ff.];
and theory, conflict between, [150], [151];
mutual dependence of, [168];
Whewell's view of, [163];
(see Datum, Idea, Reality, Truth).
Factual judgment:
inadequate to complete mediation of conduct, [230-34];
controlled by ends, [269];
incidental to judgments of valuation, [272], [295];
types of, implied in acceptance of an end, [275], [276];
presents warrant for acceptance of ends, [277].
Fite, W., [331 note].
Fragmentary, [72];
as quality of internal meaning, [360], [361];
as an attribute of finite experience, [364], [376];
(see Stimulus, Tension).
Functions: of experience, [16];
logic of, [18], [23];
distinguished from status, [16];
of thought, [23], [24], [78], [85];
total, as stimulus to thought, [36-8], [80];
different, and logical distinctions, [42];
different, confused by Lotze, [56];
sensations as, [58].
Genetic:
method, significance of, [14], [15], [187];
distinctions, importance of, [24], [53], [62], [71], [85];
effect of ignoring, [53], [62], [71];
(see Psychology).
"Good":
practical significance of, as moral predicate, [259];
relation to "right," [335].
Gore, W. C., [377 note].
Gorgias, [225].
Greek view of thought and reality, [342 ff.]
Green, T. H., [274 note], [288 note 3], [315 note], [316 note], [330], [331].
Habit:
relation of judgment to, interruption and resumption of, [154];
and hypothesis, [170];
and analogy, [176];
and simple enumeration, [176];
and conversion, [176];
and logical meaning, [198];
logical function of, [375], [376].
Heraclitus:
his position, [215 ff.]
Hippo, [209].

Hobbes, Thomas, [301].
Homogeneity:
of the world-ground, [207];
of the world, [209], [210].
Hutcheson, F., [301].
Hypothesis:
nature of, [VII], [143-83];
unequal stress commonly laid on its origin, structure, and function, [143-5];
relation of data and hypothesis strictly correlative, [145], [152], [168];
as predicate, [146], [183];
negative and positive sides of, [146], [155];
came to be recognized with rise of experimentalism, [159];
and test, [174], [175], [177 ff.];
origin of, [170], [171 ff.];
supposition and, [178];
interdependence of formation and test of, [182].
Idea:
continuous with fact, [9], [10], [12];
distinction from fact, [13], [110];
Lotze's confusion regarding, [31], [32], [41], [65];
association of, [33];
contrast with datum, [52-4];
functional conception of, [70], [112 ff.];
objective validity of, [72-5];
as entire content of judgment, [119];
existential aspect of, [97], [99 ff.], [113];
in relation to reference, [97 ff.], [103], [129];
representational theory of, [100 ff.], [113 ff.], [141], [347 ff.], [372 ff.];
universality of, [97 ff.], [113 ff.];
as not referred to reality, [97 ff.];
as forms of control, [129];
function in judgment, [153], [154];
distinguished from image, [183-93];
distinction criticised, [199-202];
problems accompanying discovery of, [341];
in Greek thought, [342];
instrumental and representative functions of, [346 ff.], [372 ff.];
purposive character of, [347 ff.];
external and internal meaning of, [347 ff.];
Royce's absolute system of, [348];
triple relation to purpose in Royce's account, [349 ff.];
logical versus memorial, [351];
in relation to fact and reality, [379 ff.];
(see Hypothesis, Image, Predicate).
Ideas:
Platonic, [247].
Image:
as merely fanciful, [53];
in relation to meaning, [54];
place of, in judgment, [154];
distinction from idea, [189-93];
distinction criticised, [199-202];
as direct and indirect stimulus, [195-7].
Imagery:
empirical criteria of, [186];
function of, [187];

as representative, [186-8], [194];
psychological function of, [193-7];
logical function of, [198], [199].
Immediate:
as related to mediation, [342], [350 ff.]
Impression:
Lotze's definition of, [27], [28], [29], [32];
objective determination of, [30], [31];
objective quality of, [31], [68];
as psychic, [53];
as transformed by thought into meanings or ideas, [67 ff.];
(see Idea, Meaning, Sensation).
Indeterminate:
as quality of finite experience, [364].
Induction:
Bacon's view of, [157];
by enumeration and allied processes, [171];
and habit, [176];
versus deduction, [211], [212].
Inference:
Lotze's view of, [60];
in relation to judgment, [117].
Instrumental:
as character of thought, [78-82], [128], [140], [346 ff.], [372 ff.];
(see Purpose).
Interaction:
physical, [218 ff.]
Interest:
direction of, [205].
Invention:
form of deduction, [212].
James, William, [81 note], [352 note], [375].
Jevons, W. Stanley, [169], [173].
Jones, Henry, [43 note], [59 note], [66].
Judgment:
Lotze's definition of, [59] and [note];
relation of, to ideas, [60];
structure of, [75 note];
Bosanquet's theory of, [86 ff.];
as a function, [107 ff.];
dead and live, [108];
definition of, [86], [111];
relation to inference, [116 ff.];
limits of single, [123 ff.];
negative, [114 ff.];
of perception, [88 ff.], [96];
parts of, [118 ff.], [207], [208];
time relations of, [120 ff.];
as individual, [136];
as instrumental, [128], [140];
as categorical and hypothetical, [136];
as impersonal, [131];
as intuitive, [139];
various definitions of, [147 ff.];
analysis of, [149 ff.];
disjunctive, [155];
psychology of, [153];
purpose of, [154];
and interrupted activity, [154];
unique system of, [224-30];
general analysis of, [230-32];
purposive character of, [353 ff.];
universal, [354];
particular, [358];
individual, [359], [360];
mathematical, [354 ff.], [370];
(see Economic, Ethical, Factual judgments, Copula, Predicate, Reflection, Subject).
Kant, I., [43], [46], [60 note], [163], [263], [301].
Kepler, [146], [181].
Knowledge:
in relation to reality, [102 ff.];
meaning and, [128];
"copy" and "instrumental" theories of, [129], [140], [141];
(see Judgment, Truth).
Külpe, O., [250 note].
Logic:
origin of, [4];
types of, [5-22];
as generic and specific, [18], [23];
relations to psychology, [14], [15], [63], [64], [184], [185], [192 ff.];
effect of modern psychology upon, [345];
relation to genetic method, [15-18];
problems illustrated, [19], [20];
social significance of, [20];
eristic the source of formal, [203];
pre-Socratic, [203];
and epistemology, [341], [342];
(see Epistemology, Psychology).
Lotze:
criticised, Studies [II], [III], [IV];
applied logic, [6];
thought as accessory, [56];
view of judgment, [147];
similarity between him and Whewell, [165 note];
quoted, [6], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [42], [56 note], [62], [63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [73], [77], [83], [84].
Many:
the, and the One, [210 ff.], [218 ff.]
Marginal utility:
principle of, [307], [337 note].
Martineau, J., [262].
Mathematics:
certain forms of proof in, [172 ff.];
judgments of, [354 ff.], [370].
McGilvary, E. B., [257 note].
Mead, G. H., [38 note], [337 note].
Meaning:
and logical idea, [30], [31], [32], [33], [41], [97];
as content of thought, [66 ff.];
three types of, [68];
as property of independent idea, [73-5];
and association of ideas, [33], [80];
and reference, [97];
world of, [98], [103], [112];
and knowledge, [89], [128], [190];
equivalent to response, [198];
versus existence, [216-18];
inner and outer, [347 ff.];
(see Content, Idea, Reference).

Means:
as external and constitutive, [78];
reapplication of, the problem of economic valuation, [242], [243], [246], [259], [260], [303], [304];
objective in so far as not known adequately for one's purpose, [256];
definition of, incidental to all judgment, [272];
factual determination of, sometimes determinative of ends also, [270].
Mediation:
in relation to the immediate, [350 ff.]
Melissus:
his dialectic, [214].
Metaphysics, [8], [9], [13], [18], [85];
and logic of experience, [13];
as natural history, [13-18];
worth, [19-22];
logical and, [72], [74];
(see Epistemology, Logic).
Mill, J. Stuart, [147], [160 ff.], [162], [166].
Mixture:
logical meaning of idea of, [219], [220], [222].
Monism, [224].
Moore, A. W., [76 note], [346 note].
Motion:
conservation of, [206].
Negation, [97], [114 ff.]
Neo-Hegelian, [43], [316].
Newton, I., [146], [159], [179];
his notes for philosophizing, [159 note].
Νόμῳ versus φύσει, [226].
Normative and genetic, [16];
(see End, Purpose, Validity, Value).
Obedience:
a factor in genesis of morality, 257
(see also Authority and Custom).
Object:
how defined, [38], [39], [74], [76];
socially current, [230];
real, individual in significance, [230];
nature of the ethical, [240], [328];
of the economic, [259], [260], [328];
(see Substance).
Objectivity:
Lotze's view of, [68] (see Study IV);
types of, [68];
Lotze's distinction of logical and ontological, [72], [73];
distinction denied, [341], [342];
scope of conception of, [235];
commonly denied to other than factual judgments, [247], [248];
not a property of sense-elements as such, [248], [249];
a category of "apperception," [250];
a mark of the problematic as such, [250], [251], [255];
not ascertainable by any specific method, [252];
"obtrusiveness" as evidence of, [253];
"reliability" as evidence of, [263];
conditions of experience of, [253-6];
conditions of, present in the ethical and economic situations, [257-60];
a real characteristic of ethical and economic judgment, [261-3];
not dependent on social currency, [318-20];
nor on possibility of social currency, [320-24];
nor on permanence, [324-9];
(see Reality, Validity).
One:
the, and the Many, [210 ff.], [218 ff.]
Parmenides:
his logical position, [216 ff.];
influence on Platonic-Aristotelian logic, [217].
Participation:
significance of, in Plato, [342 ff.]
Particularity:
of an idea, [99], [113];
of a judgment, [358].
Perception:
judgments of, [88 ff.], [96].
Perfect, the, [126].
Physical judgment (see Factual judgment).
Φύσει versus νόμῳ, [226].
Φύσις, [207], [224].
Plato, [53 note];
on ideas and reality, [342 ff.], [378], [379].
Pluralism, [81 note].
Positing:
thought as, [68].
Predicate:
how constituted, [75 note];
in relation to reality, [101], [103];
as hypothesis, [147], [153], [155], [156], [183], [186];
develops out of imaged end, [232];
interaction with subject, [232];
in ethical judgment, [258], [291-6];
in economic, [259], [260], [309-11];
(see Copula, Judgment, Hypothesis, Idea, Image).
Predication, [118 ff.]
Pre-established harmony:
in Royce's philosophy, [368].
Presuppositions, [204], [206].
Problematic (see Tension).
Proof:
inductive, [172], [173];
of hypothesis, [174], [175];
relation of, to origin of hypothesis, [179-82];
Wundt's view of, [177], [178].
Proposition:
and judgment, [118].
Protagoras, [226].
Prudence:
ethical status of, as a virtue, [246].
Pythagoreans, the:
their logical position, [216];
use of experiment, [216].
Psychical:
distinguished from physical, [25];
Lotze's view of impression as barely, [27], [28], [30];
view criticised, [31-4], [41], [42];
two meanings of, [38 note];
psychical mechanism, [31];
idea as, [53];
problem of logical and, [54] and [note], [64];
activity of thought also made, by Lotze, [77] and [note];
subjective result, [84];
(see Impression).
Psychology:
and logic, [14-16], [26], [63], [64], [153], [154], [184], [185], [192 ff.], [345], [348];
principle of, functional, [229], [230];
genesis of, [280], [281];
logical value of functional, [293].
Psychologists' fallacy, [37].
Purpose:
logical importance of, [4], [9], [10], [13], [15], [20], [35], [58], [76], [80], [154];
logical aspects of, [Study XI];
in an idea, [347 ff.];
in judgment, [353 ff.];
in criterion of truth and error, [361 ff.];
origin of, as idea, [373 ff.];
as method, [377];
(see End, Reconstruction).
Quales:
of sensation, [55], [56], [60 note].
Qualities:
primary and secondary, [221].
Question:
and judgment, [97], [114 ff.]
Rationalism:
criticised, [156 ff.], [188 ff.], [298 ff.]
Rationality:
of world, [206].
Reality:
as constructed by thought, [94 ff.], [104];
as developing, [126];
as including fact and idea, [108], [110], [125], [382];
as independent of thought, [85], [87 ff.], [104];
as subject of subject, [88 ff.];
popular criterion of, [105 ff.];
possibility of knowledge of, [91 ff.], [102 ff.], [125];
for the individual, [94 ff.], [103], [112], [224 ff.];
as relative to judging, [149];
as given in sensation, [160];
"perception" and "recognition" coefficients of, [263-7], [277];
these present in ethical and economical experience, [267-9];
apprehension of, emotional, [263];
scope of complete conception of, [235], [340];
degrees of, [340];
Platonic conception of, [343 ff.];
Royce's conception of, [348];
as related to fact and idea, [379 ff.];
(see Fact, Truth, Validity).
Reason, sufficient:
principle of, [206].
Reconstruction:
the function of thinking, [38], [40], [46], [75], [76], [85];
effect of denying this, [47], [71], [72];
data and, [49 ff.];
in judgment, [154], [291], [295], [299], [311], [312], [346], [347];
(see Habit, Stimulus, Tension).
Reference:
as social, [74];
problem of reference of ideas, [82 ff.];
as meaning, [97 ff.];
functional conception of, [113];
paradox of, [99];
idea as, [129].
Reflection:
as derived, [1-12];
naïve, [3], [9];
subject-matter of, [7], [8];
logic and, [3], [18], [23];
versus constitutive thought, [43-8];
distinguished, [255];
general nature of, [269];
end not always explicit in, [270];
outcome of, statable in terms of end or means, [272];
(see Judgment, Thought).
Reflective judgment, [134].
Representation:
as one of the two functions of an idea, [345], [347 ff.], [372];
significance of, in ideal reconstruction, [376].
Response:
failure of, and origin of judgment, [154].
Restlessness:
as source of reflection and purpose, [374 ff.];
(see Tension).
Rhetoric:
origin of, [203], [204].
"Right" (see "Good").
Royce, Josiah:
referred to, [76 note], [147];
theory of ideas discussed, [346-82];