LESSON IV.
We do not charge Dr. Wayland with being the author of this new doctrine that man possesses an independent and distinct power, faculty, or sense, by the exercise of which he perceives right and wrong, or, in other words, the moral quality of the actions of men, and upon which perception he may rest with safety, as to its accuracy and truthfulness; for the same doctrine has been suggested by greater men than Dr. Wayland, long ago. Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutchinson, and Dr. Reid have laid the foundation; the latter of whom says, (p. 242,) “The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it.“ Again: “As we rely upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the figures and colours of bodies about us, we have the same reason, with security, to rely upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our conscience with regard to what we ought or ought not to do.”
Such sentiments may seem to some to be deducible from an indistinct and indefinite reference to our judgment after the understanding has been improved by moral culture, when such judgment, by a mere looseness of language, is sometimes described as if the writers confounded it with the state of mind and moral perfectibility produced by the reception of the Holy Ghost. Thus, Archbishop Secker, in his Fourth Lecture on the Catechism, says:
“How shall all persons know what they are taught to believe is really true?
“Answer. The greater part of it, when it is once duly proposed to them, they may perceive to be so by the light of their own reason and conscience.”
Now it is evident that the bishop’s answer is predicated upon the supposition that the understanding has been cultivated in conformity to the principles of moral truth.
But, from such hasty, perhaps thoughtless, snatches of speculation, occasionally found in some few of the older metaphysical writers, our author and his co-associates in this belief have drawn their materials, remodelled the parts, and reared, even as to heaven, a lofty structure upon a doubtful, tottering base, bringing untold social and political evils upon society, and spiritual death, in its fall, to all who shelter under it. But for the good of the world, in opposition to such a doctrine, truth has erected her column of solid masonry, against which the fanaticism and sophistry of these builders can only, like successive drops of water, carry down the walls some useless portions of the cement.
We repeat, how tottering must be the argument founded upon analogy where there is no relation! We all agree that the senses make truthful representations: all see, smell, and taste alike; vinegar will be sour to the savage, as well as the savant. But is their judgment the same about the moral qualities of actions? What says this moral sense, this conscience, in the savage, who is taught to steal from his friend and torture his enemy? Does the reverend doctor think his moral sense will dictate the same conclusion? What right has he, then, to say, it is the voice of nature—of God? Does he fail to perceive that the moral quality of actions is distinguished by man in conformity to his experience, his training, his education?
We see that men often differ about the moral quality of an action. It might be that no two men would have the same idea about the moral quality of a particular action. Would the conscience, this moral sense, or faculty, in such case, be right in each one? If not, who is to determine which is right and which is wrong? And further, of what use to man can be this distinct, independent, and unchangeably truthful power, which, nevertheless, brings him no certainty? But has the mind of man ever found out that God has overdone, or unnecessarily done, any thing? Will these theorists reflect, that, in case God had seen fit to bestow such a sense on man, inspiration would have been useless, and the Bible not wanted? And the condition of man upon the earth would be wholly stationary instead of progressive. And permit us to inquire, whether this notion of theirs is the reason why some of these theorists speak so rashly, we might say blasphemously, of that sacred volume, upon the condition which they dictate?