Studies on Slavery, in Easy Lessons

by John Fletcher

The truth is, we have no such infallible guide. The idea of right and wrong, either theologically or physically considered, is always fixed through an exertion of the powers of the understanding. We have no instinctive power reaching the case. Our judgment, our feelings are often unstable, irregular, and sometimes antagonistic. In abstruse cases, very often we cannot even satisfy ourselves what is right and will it be said that we do not often fail to see the object, design, and law of God touching a case?

On every decision on a question of right or wrong, a train of mental action is called into operation, comparing the ideas already in the mind with the facts of the case under review, and noting the similarity of these facts to our idea of right, or whether the facts conform to our idea of wrong. This decision we call judgment: but when the decision reaches to the question of right or wrong, touching our own conduct only, logicians have agreed to call it conscience; not a distinct action from judgment—much less a distinct faculty; and by no means carrying with it more proof of accuracy and correctness than is our judgment about any other matter, where the ideas and facts are equally manifest and accurately presented.

There is another consideration which to us gives proof that the conscience or moral sense is not an independent faculty of the mind, nor to be relied on at all as infallible. Many of us have noticed the changes that imperceptibly come over our moral feelings, and judgment of right and wrong, conscience or moral sense, through the influences of association and habit. Our affluent neighbour, who manifests to others many virtues and some follies, our mind, by association and habit, regards as a perfect model of human greatness and perfection. Thus a corrupt government soon surveys a corrupt people; and a somewhat licentious, but talented and accomplished clergyman, soon finds his hearers in fashion. Nor is it unfrequent, that which should stigmatize a father is beheld with admiration by the son. Thus wealth, to most, is desirable, but its desirability has been created by association; we recollect the objects it enables us to command, often the objects of our principal pursuit. The quality the mind associates with these gratifications, it eventually associates with that which procures them. Thus, we perceive, the mind is able to form a moral estimate upon considerations wholly artificial, which could never happen in case the moral sense was independent, and a distinct faculty teaching us infallible truth.

But how are we to account for the fact that some of the finest intellects, as well as the most learned men, have fallen into this most dangerous error? It should be a subject of deep thought!

We discover, in some men of the highest order of intellects, the power of arriving, as it were instantaneously, at a conclusion, giving it the appearance of being intuitive, rather than the result of what would be, when analyzed, a long chain of reasoning. Thus, the instant and happy thought often springing to the mind when in some sudden or unforeseen difficulty. The nice and instant perception, often displayed by medical men, of the condition of the patient, is an example; and hence the astonishing accuracy of judgment, sometimes noticed in the military commander, from a mere glance of the eye.

In such cases the mind is often not conscious of any mental action; and others, who observe these facts, are led, sometimes, to confound what, in such cases, is a deductive judgment, with intuitiveness. The judgment, thus formed without any perceptible succession of thought, is merely the result of acquirement from long experience and habits of active ratiocination. Some few instances of this unconscious and rapid thought have been exemplified by mathematicians, when the calculator could give no account how he arrived at the conclusion. Will any one claim that they abstract their answers from the most abstruse propositions intuitively, or by instinct, or by any new and distinct faculty of the mind? This habit of mind is as applicable to morals as to any thing else. But in mathematics the data are everywhere the same; whereas in morals the data are as different among men as are their conditions of life; because our ideas of right and wrong, existing in the mind before the judgment is formed on the case to be considered, were introduced by the aid of the senses, through the medium of experience and education; and it is, therefore, quite obvious that the idea of right in one man may be quite like the idea of wrong in another.

But it remains to show the fallacy of the argument by which Dr. Wayland arrives at his conclusion. Let us examine the paragraph quoted, and sift from verbiage the naked points of the argument:

“We do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men.”

“Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or a combination of faculties? This notion” (the perception of the moral quality of an action) “is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other notion.”

“We have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities.” “Therefore, it is self-evident that this is a separate and distinct faculty.”