“Porro non alienum erit hic observasse non tantum ejusmodi vocabula antiquissima existimari debere, sed etiam ‘ipsas’ significationes verbis subjectas tanto antiquioris usus esse, tantoque magis proprias esse habendas, quanto sunt propiores iis rebus quas corporis sensibus percipimus. Ab iis enim semper servata quadam similitudine ad reliquas quascumque verborum significationes progrediendum est: ut adeo appareat, paucissimas revera esse proprias verborum ‘significationes,’ nec alias esse nisi corporeas, sive eas quibus res sensibus externis expositæ designantur.
“E contrario autem, translatarum significationum copiam immensam, quæ ex propria notione, tanquam ex trunco arboris rami, quaquaversum pateant; manente similitudine inter eas omnes et propriam seu primam stirpis significationem, similiter atque rami, utcumque dispersi, et communem et communis trunci naturam retinent.
“Ex his præterea intelligitur ea verba, quæ ὄνοματα πεποιήμενα a Græcis vocantur, sic dicta quia a ‘nomine’ vel ‘sono’ formentur, ‘propriam’ eam significationem quæ soni, unde facta sunt, naturam referat. Quorum verborum numerus ingens revera in linguis est, et longe major quam vulgo credi solet. Sed, ut ad propositum redeamus, ex iis quæ supra dicta sunt, clare apparet, simplicissimas origines non posse repeti nisi ab ejusmodi verbis, quibus actiones ipsæ significentur; adeoque a verbis sic proprie dictis.
“Quumque actiones infinitæ, sive nulli certæ personæ adsignatæ, per rei naturam antecedere debeant iis quæ certæ personæ attribuuntur, verba ‘infinitiva’ simplicissima proprie primas linguæ Græcæ origines continere certum est.
“Harum autem plurimæ, quum jam a longissimis temporibus, una cum plerisque notionibus propriis, ex usu ceciderint, ac difficillimaæ sæpe indagatu sint, quo certiores progredi possimus, id semper tenendum est, ne quidquam admittamus quod constanti analogiæ linguæ repugnet; dein etiam, ut ex ipsis linguæ reliquiis, rite inter se comparatis, inquiramus a quo verbo originali vocabulum quodque oriatur: etiam tum, quum minus ipsum verbum originale superstes sit.
“Ubi enim in sequentibus agetur de ‘simplicissimis’ verbis ‘primitivis,’ id non ita accipiendum est quasi ea omnia, sicut etiam multa derivata simpliciora, florente lingua Græcæ, in sermone Graæcorum adhuc exstitisse vellem; sed tantum, in primo linguæ Græcæ ortu, aut exstitisse revera aut saltem existere potuisse. Neque enim, in hoc linguæ Græcæ defectu, æque certo sciri potest, an tanta copia, quantam fingere verborum per linguæ naturam constanti analogiæ ductu liceat, prima linguæ Græcæ ætate reipsa viguerit.”
Our object is here to present the Greek scholar, who may not have reflected on the subject, such suggestions as will lead him to perceive that δοῦλος, doulos, is an original Greek word, not borrowed; and although he may not agree with us in the derivation of the term, yet that he may readily satisfy himself what is the true derivation. It is true, Scheidius, in his “Animadversiones ad analogiam linguæ Græcæ,” has criticized the views of Lennepius, and has devoted near thirty pages to that which is our quotation from him; and we did fancy, upon its examination, that he had rather established than weakened the argument of Lennepius: in fact we did propose to quote him as authority; but to the most of us long quotations, in a language to us unknown, are quite objectionable. We therefore refer to his work, pp. 246 to 275, apud Paddenburg et filium, 1790, “Traiecti ad Rhenum.” It has been said by some of those who contend that δοῦλος, when found in the Greek Testament, does not mean slave, that the Greek, like all other languages of modern date, is a compilation from the more ancient ones; and since the Greeks at an early day had no slaves, it is evident, it is good proof that the more ancient tribes, from whom they and their language descended, had none; and in all such early periods of the world men never had words in their language to express things which did not exist among them, of which they could have no idea.
Therefore δοῦλος could not have meant slave,—“an idea of which they had no notion.” Even if this statement were true, we do not perceive how it proves their proposition. To show the futility of such argument, we consent, for the moment, that δοῦλος is not an original Greek word, but was borrowed from some other language, in which it meant something distinct from the idea of slave: say, a freeman, if you choose. Language, and all its parts, has ever been found to conform itself to the habits and wants of those who use it. Wherefore we often find a term, which some centuries ago expressed a certain distinct idea, now to express quite a different one. We therefore cannot say, with any propriety, that, because the word δοῦλος meant a “freeman,” at the age of Noah, that it also meant the same thing at the age of Alexander. If it meant a “freeman” at the age of Noah, we are to determine that fact by its use at that period; if otherwise, we should be able to prove that our word slave does not mean a slave now, but a proud and lofty distinction.
It is a term borrowed from the Schlavonic, where its significance was fame, renown, &c.; but the Schlavonians going into bondage to other nations, upon their inroads on Europe, the term implying fame in their ancient national distinctions came to signify in succeeding ages the condition of bondage. But although, as we have seen, a language is modified by the habits of those who apply it, yet this liability to change ceases when the language ceases to be the common vehicle of thought. Such substantially has been the case with the ancient Hebrew, since the era of the prophets; and such has, emphatically, been the case with the ancient Greek since the breaking down of the Roman Empire.