England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

Meanwhile, Palmerston and Broglie had been quietly endeavouring to induce Austria to join with France and Great Britain in guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey. But Metternich, having contracted the secret agreement with Russia[440] for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, was not disposed to incur the Tsar’s displeasure by entering into a second compact. Broglie, finding that his advances met with no response, suggested that France and England should separately conclude a treaty for the object which both their governments had at heart and invite Austria to adhere to it. Palmerston[441] acquiesced in this plan, but was unable to obtain the assent of his colleagues to its execution. Before any further discussion of the subject could take place Broglie fell, and the Presidency of the Council and the direction of Foreign Affairs passed into the hands of M. Thiers. The new minister professed to be as anxious as his predecessor to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but it was apparent, at once, that his first political object, to which all other questions of European diplomacy would for the present be subordinated, was the negotiation of a marriage between the Duc d’Orléans and an Austrian Archduchess.[442]

With the downfall of the Duc de Broglie the harmony, which had hitherto characterized French and British relations, began to diminish. Both Whigs and Tories had scrupulously abstained from raising the delicate question of the French occupation of Algiers.[443] Broglie and the Doctrinaires were opposed to the permanent retention of the colony, and a considerable section of the Chamber looked upon it as a useless and expensive encumbrance. M. Thiers, however, thought otherwise. He was in favour of “nationalizing the Arabs”—an expression which Mr. Aston[444] interpreted to mean that he was contemplating their extermination. No sooner was he in office than he began to prepare an expedition against the Bey of Constantine, with whom the French authorities had a long-standing dispute. At the same time, whilst protesting that he had no thought of extending French domination over either Tunis or Tripoli, he refused to recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan over those regencies. To support this policy he sent Admiral Hugon to Tunis to oppose, by force if necessary, the entry of the Ottoman squadron into the bay. “I really believe,”privately wrote the British chargé d’affaires to Lord Palmerston, “that in order to gain popularity he wishes for a war with Turkey, provided he could make it appear that it was undertaken to protect French interests.”[445]

Whilst M. Thiers thus set himself to consolidate the French rule over Algeria a secret negotiation was initiated, at Constantinople and at Cairo, for the purpose of establishing, under the guarantee of the French government, the relations of the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt upon a more secure foundation. Campbell appears to have received the first intelligence of what was taking place from his Austrian colleague. The news caused him to pay a visit to M. Ferdinand de Lesseps,[446] who, in the absence of M. Mimaut, was acting as French consul-general. Lesseps was in a great state of indignation, and in his wrath was inclined to be communicative. M. Thiers, he confided to Campbell, before he left Paris, had told him that an important negotiation was in progress, but that he would not discuss it with him as, upon his arrival at Alexandria, he could learn all about it from a perusal of the documents at the consulate. Mimaut, however, had carefully removed every paper relating to the affair, and he was, in consequence, in complete ignorance of all that had passed. He had endeavoured, he added ingenuously, to make Boghos Bey believe that he was acquainted with the transaction, but the astute secretary of the Pasha had discovered the true state of the case and had promptly changed the conversation.[447]

Soon after Campbell’s interview with Lesseps, on December 11, 1836, Sarim Effendi, who was described by Mehemet Ali as a confidential agent of the Sultan, arrived at Alexandria. Ostensibly his mission was concerned with questions of arrears of tribute. In reality, however, he appears to have been empowered to propose some repartition of territory. The statements upon the subject which Campbell succeeded in extracting from Mehemet Ali were conflicting. At one time he told the British consul that the Sultan was willing to invest him with the hereditary government of Egypt and the Pashalic of Acre, whilst, on another occasion, he asserted that the hereditary tenure of all the territories which he actually occupied had been offered to him, on condition that he would undertake to reduce his army.[448] In Paris Lord Granville was unable to obtain any information about this affair. In answer to his enquiries he was told that Roussin had, “with the object of saving the dignity of the Sultan, held out to the Pasha the prospect of obtaining for his son the reversion of his Syrian possessions, in return for the abandonment of the other territories which he occupied.” But he was assured that the admiral had acted without instructions from his government, which had, on the contrary, “discountenanced his proceedings.”[449]

If Mahmud really empowered Sarim Effendi to make substantial concessions to the Pasha, such conduct on his part is altogether inconsistent with the sentiments of implacable hostility which he had constantly entertained towards his powerful vassal. In the spring of 1836 he had shown a strong disposition to renew the struggle, and had sent a secret agent to London to solicit help. His appeal was rejected, but Palmerston intimated that the British government was constrained to urge him to keep the peace from fear that his military resources would be unequal to the contest, rather than from any desire to see the status quo in Syria maintained.[450] Finding that no assistance would be forthcoming from England, Mahmud may have listened to the advice of the French government to make further concessions to Mehemet Ali, in order to put an end to the armed peace which was draining his depleted treasury. But the conditions, whatever they may have been, which were proposed to the Pasha were not accepted. Nevertheless, the negotiation, although it led to no direct results, had an important influence upon the march of events. It disclosed to Mehemet Ali that France and England were pursuing different objects in the East, and gave him grounds for hoping that he need no longer fear a combination of the two naval Powers against him.

But, although the Sultan may have been disappointed and annoyed at the refusal of Great Britain to assist him actively, he could derive comfort from the knowledge that the power of Mehemet Ali was regarded with misgivings in England. Ponsonby’s influence at the Porte grew in proportion as it became more and more evident that his government disapproved of the Egyptian occupation of Syria, and was prepared to uphold the sovereignty of Turkey over Tunis and to resist French encroachments. On the other hand, the Russian ambassador, who declared unceasingly that under no circumstances must the status quo, as established by the Convention of Kiutayeh, be disturbed, found his authority diminish. Early in 1836, shortly before the arrival in England of the Sultan’s secret agent, Palmerston had despatched General Chrzanowski, an able and experienced Polish officer, to Asia Minor. He had served in the Turkish campaign of 1828-1829, and was, Palmerston considered,[451] “just the sort of man to be of the greatest use to Reshid Pasha.”[452] But as the Russians, by whom he was looked upon as a deserter, would greatly resent his employment, he was instructed to avoid Constantinople, and to proceed direct to Smyrna. He would never appear to have been given a command or to have been employed officially by the Sultan, who probably scarcely ventured to defy his powerful neighbour so openly. He was allowed, however, to travel about Asia Minor, and to study the strategical situation. He was thus enabled to furnish Palmerston with excellent military advice, in return for the salary which Lord Ponsonby was instructed to pay him, from the moment of his arrival in the East.[453] Several Prussian officers, among them a certain Major von Moltke, destined to become very famous, were at this time serving with the Turkish army, to the re-organization of which, in preparation for the coming struggle, Palmerston unceasingly urged the Sultan to devote his whole attention.

Whilst instructing Ponsonby to impress upon the Turkish ministers the necessity of increasing the efficiency of the army, Palmerston was intent on creating embarrassments for Mehemet Ali. The economic system, which he had established in Egypt, and which he was imposing upon Syria, presented an excellent field for hostile criticism. By often very equivocal methods the Pasha had gradually expropriated the former freeholders, and had converted them into his own tenants. He would then buy at a fixed rate their produce, and thus, before long, the sale of almost all articles of prime necessity became a monopoly of the State. At first his system appeared to work well, but, when he began to pile up his armaments, he met the increased expenditure which they entailed by reducing the price, which he had hitherto paid to the unfortunate occupiers of the soil. In order to compensate themselves these people were necessarily compelled to raise the price of all articles which the government did not take from them. In 1838 Colonel Campbell computed that, as the result of the Pasha’s administration, articles of ordinary consumption in Egypt were from six to ten times dearer than they had been under the rule of the Mamelukes. Moreover, Mehemet Ali, ever since the year 1816, had been busily endeavouring to convert Egypt into a manufacturing country. With this object he had imported at great expense skilled workmen and machinery from France and England. The native labour required was obtained in the same manner as the army was recruited. Men, women and children were impressed and compelled to work in the factories. But by their unskilfulness they injured the machinery, nor did the articles which they turned out pay the cost of manufacture. The result of this experiment was that some 30,000 peasants, who might with advantage have been engaged in agriculture, were forced to labour unprofitably in the factories of the government. The Pasha, however, was too ignorant of the most elementary principles of political economy to understand the folly of these proceedings, in which he was encouraged to persevere by the foreign merchants, who sold him machinery or who bought his cotton and his indigo upon very advantageous terms.[454]

The British government had always been desirous to put an end to the old system of capitulations,[455] and to negotiate a new commercial treaty with the Porte. But as many influential persons in Turkey were interested in the preservation of existing abuses, the proposals of successive ambassadors had constantly been eluded. At the beginning of 1838, however, Palmerston directed Ponsonby to bring the matter forward again, and to lay great stress upon the prejudicial effect which the abolition of monopolies throughout the Ottoman Empire would not fail to have upon the personal position of Mehemet Ali.[456] This argument attained the desired result. Mahmud quickly resolved that no vested interests should be allowed to interfere with a commercial arrangement, which must either seriously embarrass Mehemet Ali or, should he refuse to adhere to it, bring him into conflict with Great Britain. The Sultan’s consent having been obtained, Ponsonby entrusted to Henry Bulwer the negotiation which was brought to a satisfactory conclusion on August 19, 1838.[457]

In the meantime, it had not escaped the vigilance of the Indian government that the protracted resistance of the Wahabites was weakening, and that Mehemet Ali was upon the point of making himself master of the whole of Arabia. The importance of Aden as an intermediate coaling station between Bombay and Suez had been realized, and it happened, most opportunely, that a quarrel[458] between the ruler of that port and the East India Company enabled the Governor-General to take action at the very moment when the absorption of the Yemen by the Pasha was imminent.[459] The management of the affair was confided to Captain Haines of the Bombay navy, who, early in 1838, was able to inform Ibrahim that the Sultan of Aden had ceded the port to the East India Company “par simple motif d’amitié et de son cosentement.”[460] Nevertheless, the expedition sent from India to take possession of the place encountered, on January 16, 1839, a fierce resistance which was only overcome after a sharp engagement. Palmerston, upon receipt of the news of its cession, at once directed Campbell to warn Mehemet Ali that any movement of his troops against Aden would be treated as an attack upon a British possession. The Pasha, although unable wholly to conceal his chagrin, accepted the situation with a good grace.[461]

Ever since the beginning of the year 1838, great military preparations had been in progress both in Egypt and Syria. The consuls, had in consequence, been instructed to inquire of Mehemet Ali the reason of his armaments. It was whilst they were engaged in warning him that any aggression upon the Sultan would bring down upon him the vengeance of the Powers that the news arrived of the submission of Nejd, the great central district of Arabia, extending from Medina and Mecca to the Persian Gulf.[462] It was impossible to calculate what might result from the enhanced prestige which he had thus acquired in the eyes of the faithful. The immediate effect was seen, a few days later, when he sent for the consuls and announced to each of them separately his unalterable resolution to proclaim his independence. “The interests of his family,” he declared to Campbell, “imperiously called upon him to fix their future state, and it was les larmes aux yeux et le coeur serré that he had taken his present resolution.” Nevertheless, he would wait a reasonable time in the full persuasion that the British government would take such steps as would permit of an amicable and satisfactory settlement.[463]