England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

The Cabinets of the Powers were not greatly disturbed by the Pasha’s threats. Palmerston alone showed any anxiety to arrange the military measures which might be put into force against Mehemet Ali, should he proceed to carry out his declared intentions.[464] But it was soon evident that the Pasha had no desire to bring on a crisis. Although he continued to impress upon the consuls that he was fully as determined as ever to obtain for his children the succession of the countries which he governed, he at the same time announced his intention of proceeding to Upper Egypt to inspect his gold mines. Furthermore, he duly transmitted his yearly tribute to the Sultan. Nevertheless, his military preparations were not relaxed and reinforcements were continuously despatched to Ibrahim in Syria. It was clear that he had no intention of affording the Powers a pretext for taking active measures against him, but hoped, by keeping them and the Porte in a constant state of apprehension, to weary them into conceding him some of his demands.[465] In pursuance of this astute policy he accepted the British commercial treaty with the utmost unconcern. He was confident, he assured Campbell, that he could derive a larger revenue from duties on exports and imports than he had ever obtained under his system of monopolies.[466] M. Molé, on the other hand, testified his surprise and annoyance at the success which had attended Lord Ponsonby’s negotiations. He was greatly afraid, he told Granville, that Mehemet Ali would now be provoked into an immediate declaration of independence. But, upon learning that the Pasha had announced his intention of adhering to the terms of the British treaty, he promptly instructed Roussin to conclude, on behalf of France, a similar arrangement with the Porte.[467]

Whilst the aims and ambitions of Mehemet Ali were once more attracting the attention of the Powers, Anglo-Russian relations again assumed a threatening aspect. Both the British and Indian governments had, for some time past, been disturbed by the ascendency which Russia was acquiring over the Court of Teheran, and by the intrigues of her agents in Afghanistan. Encouraged by Count Simonitch, the Russian envoy, the Shah, who entertained pretensions to the sovereignty of Afghanistan, at the close of the year 1837, marched against Herat. Before the siege had been long in progress both the British and Russian ministers arrived upon the scene—the one to endeavour to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and the other to direct the operations of the Persian army. Whilst Macneil and Simonitch thus strove for supremacy in the camp of Mohammad, Eldred Pottinger, a subaltern of the Indian army, who had reached Herat disguised as a horse-dealer, stimulated by his example the courage of the garrison. At the same time Captain Witkewitch, a secret agent of Count Simonitch, arrived at Cabul, for the purpose of drawing Dost Mohammad into the Russo-Persian alliance and of counteracting the influence of Alexander Burnes, who, like his Russian rival, was in Afghanistan upon a mission which was described as commercial. The idea of a Russian agent established at Cabul, free to intrigue with Ranjit Singh, the Maharajah of Lahore, and supported by the whole weight of Mohammedan Persia, seriously alarmed Lord Auckland, the Governor-General.[468] To combat this danger he conceived the fatal plan of sending an Anglo-Indian army into Afghanistan to overthrow the Barakzai dynasty, and to set up in the place of Dost Mohammad an exiled Sadozai prince, a pensioner of the Indian government.

The conduct of the Russian agents in Persia and Afghanistan was made the subject of a note which, on October 26, 1838, Clanricarde, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, was directed to deliver to Count Nesselrode. The Russian Chancellor, whilst deprecating the construction placed by Palmerston on some of Count Simonitch’s actions, admitted that he had exceeded his instructions and undertook to recall him.[469] This promise was duly carried out. Consequently, when Witkewitch arrived at St. Petersburg he was coldly informed that he must forthwith return to his post at Orenburg. In despair at finding that the negotiations, which he had conducted so skilfully, were to be disavowed, the unfortunate man blew out his brains.[470] Only a little more than two years later Burnes, his rival, perished at Cabul at the hands of an infuriated mob.

The assurances and explanations of Count Nesselrode were accepted as satisfactory by Lord Palmerston. The visit of the Tsarewitch, the future Alexander II., to London, in the spring of 1839, contributed still further to restore harmonious relations. Nevertheless, the general situation which confronted Palmerston was disquieting. Russia, which by means of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi had assumed the exclusive protectorship of Turkey, now appeared to exercise a dangerous ascendency over the Court of Persia. Although the Shah had been compelled to raise the siege of Herat, and although the proceedings of Simonitch and Witkewitch had been disavowed, there was room for grave anxiety. Distant as was the frontier line of the Sutlej from the most advanced Cossack posts, the presence of Russian agents in the intervening States foreboded trouble. At Lahore, Hyderabad and Cabul, the appearance of a new power in Central Asia could not fail to be eagerly discussed.

But it was not alone the advance of Russia beyond the Caspian which gave those responsible for the safety of British India cause for uneasy reflection. At this time, when the introduction of steam as a means of transport was making the question of rapid communication a matter of the first importance, Mehemet Ali was building up an Arab Empire which already extended from Khartum to the Taurus mountains and the Persian Gulf. Whether in the future the Indian mail would be carried over the Isthmus of Suez, or whether Colonel Chesney should succeed in establishing steam communication by way of the Euphrates, the ruler of Egypt was master of either route. Nor did he stand alone. Whilst busily engaged in strengthening her own position as a Mediterranean power, England’s most formidable naval rival was showing a marked disposition to befriend him. In Syria France was the acknowledged protector of the Catholics, and her influence was reported to have increased of late years.[471] From Algiers she was extending her grasp over the whole north coast of Africa, whilst in Spain she was striving to re-establish that predominating influence which she had formerly exercised. It seemed possible that France, in alliance with Spain and Mehemet Ali, might yet be enabled to realize Napoleon’s dream of converting the Mediterranean into a “French lake.”

When Mehemet Ali had announced his intention of shaking off his allegiance, Mahmud had seemed to defer to the pacific counsels of the Powers, and had refrained from ordering his troops in Asia Minor to invade Syria. But, before the spring of 1839, it was clear that he was resolved to appeal to arms, and that all the efforts of diplomacy to prevent a renewal of the conflict would be fruitless. It was not alone his bitter hatred of his rebellious vassal which prompted the Sultan to disregard the advice of the ambassadors at Constantinople. His sole claim to the Khalifate rested upon the protection of Mecca, and, inasmuch as Mehemet Ali was in possession of the Holy Cities, were he to declare himself independent, Mahmud must forfeit his right to command the temporal obedience of Mohammedans. Already Constantinople was seething with disaffection, and he is said to have been aware that a plot had been formed to depose him and to enthrone his son, under the guardianship of Mehemet Ali.[472]

Mahmud was dying from a complication of disorders, but he gave his whole expiring strength to his military preparations. Men, horses and guns were hurried across the Bosphorus and forwarded to Hafiz Pasha in Asia Minor. Moltke with his plane-table was busily engaged in exploring the country up to Nezib, “a small town hidden among the olive trees close against the Syrian frontier.”[473] At the news that the Porte was bent upon war, Mehemet Ali, curtailing his visit to Khartum, hastily returned to Cairo, whilst at Constantinople the ambassadors made a last endeavour to dissuade the Sultan from disturbing the peace.[474] But Mahmud was not to be diverted from his object, and in Paris, on May 23, 1839, it was known that Hafiz Pasha had crossed the Euphrates and that hostilities were about to begin.

French historians have generally imputed duplicity to the British government in this affair. Palmerston, they say, whilst pretending that he was anxious to dissuade the Sultan from war, was in point of fact allowing Lord Ponsonby, his agent at Constantinople, to encourage the Turkish ministers to break the peace. Ponsonby was unquestionably opposed to the policy of maintaining the status quo in Syria. In his opinion Mehemet Ali was the sore which was sapping the strength of the Ottoman Empire, and, seeing that it was a British interest that Turkey should be in a condition to resist Russia, he held that England should assist the Sultan to crush his too-powerful vassal.[475] It is undeniable that Palmerston allowed him a liberty of action and of language which he would not have tolerated in any other ambassador. There can be no doubt, moreover, that he regarded the Egyptian question in very much the same light as Ponsonby. But he differed from him in one very important particular, inasmuch as he considered that the moment had not yet come when Mahmud could, with a reasonable chance of success, try conclusions with the Pasha. France, he was well aware, would never join in an attack upon Mehemet Ali. Indeed, it was rather a question whether she would not openly espouse his cause. The possibility of a combination between Russia and France could not be dismissed as a development outside the range of practical politics.[476] Hitherto, Nicholas’ dislike of Louis Philippe had rendered the chance of such a contingency very remote. But, were England to adopt a separate policy in the east, it was improbable that the Tsar would allow his personal animosity to stand in the way of an alliance, which he might consider would serve the best interests of his Empire. Accordingly, when, at the close of the year 1838, Reshid Pasha, the Reis-Effendi, arrived upon a special mission to London, he discovered, to his disappointment, that Palmerston was not prepared to hold out any hopes that the British government would join in an attack upon Mehemet Ali. Only, Palmerston explained, in the event of the Pasha beginning hostilities, could England furnish the Sultan with naval assistance. Mahmud being intent upon war, a purely defensive alliance could be of no service to him, and was declined.[477] If the bellicose policy of the Sultan had received any encouragement from Lord Ponsonby, Reshid’s conferences at the Foreign Office in London must have made it clear that the ambassador had been using language which he had no authority to employ. When, therefore, the Sultan ordered Hafiz Pasha to advance, he was perfectly aware that he was acting in opposition to the wishes of the British government, which did not believe that he had an army capable of defeating Ibrahim’s Arab and Egyptian troops.

Directly it was known that the Turkish army had been set in motion and that all hope of maintaining the peace must be abandoned, the Soult Cabinet asked the Chamber for a credit of ten million francs. The sum demanded was accorded by an overwhelming majority and, in the debates which followed, the deputies were enabled to declare their views upon the eastern question. The sympathies of the majority were plainly on the side of Mehemet Ali, and ministers were given clearly to understand, by the long succession of orators who in turn ascended the tribune, that with the large sum which had been placed at their disposal they must do something both great and glorious.[478] Soult, in the meanwhile, had despatched two officers, the one to Constantinople and the other to Alexandria, with instructions to proceed, after conferring with Admiral Roussin and M. Cochelet, to the headquarters of the two armies, in order to endeavour to bring about a suspension of hostilities. The friendly feelings towards England entertained by Marshal Soult, and the better understanding with regard to Spanish affairs between the French and English governments, which followed his assumption of office, have already been mentioned. Their co-operation in the eastern question was no less cordial. “We are in complete accord,” said Palmerston to Bourqueney, the French chargé d’affaires in London; “our communications are not those of one government with another but of two colleagues in the same Cabinet.”[479] It was decided that both the French and British fleets should proceed to the Levant, and that the admirals should be instructed to do all in their power to induce the opposing generals to suspend hostilities. Both Soult and Palmerston, however, were agreed that the great danger in the situation lay in the possibility that Nicholas might avail himself of the outbreak of war for invading Turkey, under the plea that Constantinople must be protected against Ibrahim. They, accordingly, resolved to intimate to the Porte that, in the event of Russian aid being invoked, or of a Russian fleet entering the Bosphorus, permission should be given to the French and British squadrons to pass through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora.[480]

Mehemet Ali, when the news arrived that the Turks had crossed the Euphrates, displayed the greatest self-restraint. In his heart he was, doubtless, eager for the fray, but he was determined that the responsibility for the outbreak of the war should rest with the Sultan. Accordingly, he delivered a written communication to the representatives of the Powers, in which he undertook to withdraw his troops to Damascus, provided the Turkish army would recross the river.[481] It was only on June 10, upon receipt of a report from Ibrahim that his cavalry had been attacked within the Egyptian frontier, that he directed him to assume the offensive.[482] But three days after these orders had been despatched Captain Caillier, the officer sent off by Marshal Soult, arrived at Alexandria. He was the bearer of despatches from the Marshal to M. Cochelet, instructing him to declare to Mehemet Ali that the Powers were taking steps to settle the eastern question, and that they must insist upon the immediate withdrawal of the Egyptian army within the boundaries of Syria. The Pasha, after some little hesitation, consented to write to his son enjoining him not to pursue the Turks beyond the frontiers of Syria and to halt wherever Caillier might come up with him.[483] But before Marshal Soult’s emissary could reach Ibrahim’s headquarters that general had completely defeated the Turks, on June 24, 1839, in a great battle near Nezib.