England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

Soult had instructed Guizot to declare that France was sincerely anxious to establish a permanent and lasting peace in the East. But to attain the desired result, she was convinced that Mehemet Ali must, at least, be given the hereditary tenure of Syria and Egypt. He was to impress upon Palmerston that the real object of the “trifling concessions,” which Brunnow had been empowered to make, was to obtain the signature of England to some agreement to which France would refuse to adhere.[535] Thiers, in his first despatch, expressed his approval of these instructions, and of the language which M. Guizot had employed in carrying them out. He directed him to persevere with his arguments and constantly to impress upon the British government that France had no “parti pris,” no “système irrévocable,” nor was she bound by either promises or engagements to the Pasha. Her sole desire was to contribute to the establishment of peace upon a firm and durable foundation. The coercion of Mehemet Ali would demand a vast expenditure of military strength, and Lord Palmerston would, doubtless, agree that the armed intervention of Russia would greatly menace the independent existence of the Ottoman Empire.[536] Thiers, whose judgment on this, as on many other occasions, was greatly influenced by his hopes, was persuaded that the decision to call in a Turkish plenipotentiary, and the delay which it entailed, signified that the plans of Palmerston and Brunnow had encountered some serious obstacle. But the longer the negotiations could be drawn out, the better he would be pleased. Whilst matters were drifting to a deadlock in London, his agents, he trusted, would be enabled quietly to effect some definite arrangement at Constantinople or at Cairo.[537]

Guizot in his Mémoires has described at length his proceedings in London. As he himself admits, he entertained an exaggerated belief in the strength of Mehemet Ali.[538] But, on the other hand, he had not Thiers’ serene confidence that England would never conclude an agreement for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question without the co-operation of France. On March 12, when relating a conversation he had had with Lord Palmerston in one of the drawing-rooms at Stafford House, he expressed the opinion “that the British government regarded the present moment as a favourable opportunity for settling affairs in the East, and that a sudden resolve might be taken to act without us.” Again, a few days later, he sent M. Thiers a warning couched in more emphatic language. Full powers to conclude a convention, Lord Palmerston informed him, had been transmitted to Nourri-Effendi, the Turkish ambassador in Paris, who would shortly arrive in London. “It is possible, therefore, that we may be on the eve of important decisions. . . . The British government has two interests at stake in the eastern question—the wish to keep Russia from Constantinople and the fear of French influence in Egypt. . . . The present moment is looked upon as favourable for the attainment of these objects. By a singular combination of circumstances, Russia is both prepared to abandon her pretensions to exercise an exclusive protectorship over the Ottoman Empire, and to assist England to weaken the Pasha of Egypt. . . . Great Britain, consequently, is far from regarding the present situation as embarrassing, but on the contrary deems it a most fortunate development which she must make use of to the best advantage. . . . She is aware, however, that in prosecuting this policy she may impair her good understanding with France. To retain our friendship she will make some concessions, but I am disposed to think that she has no intention of allowing the present opportunity of attaining her ends in the East to escape.”[539]

Matters, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly. Nor was the situation altered by the arrival, early in April, of Nourri-Effendi. The Porte in sending him to London only desired to make manifest its intention of conferring with its allies. When the deliberations should begin in earnest, it purposed to be represented by Chekib-Effendi, who had been appointed Ottoman ambassador at the Court of St. James’, and another month must elapse before he could reach England. Guizot, however, reported that he perceived a strong tendency upon the part of both Austria and Prussia to draw closer to France. Bülow had asked him in confidence whether the concession to Mehemet Ali of the governorship of Syria for his life would meet with the approval of his government. Neumann had also talked to him in the same strain. But Thiers was little disposed to accept any compromise. These overtures, in his opinion, were symptoms that the Powers were beginning to realize that they were in a false position. Before long, he was certain, they would adopt the French view of the question in its entirety. Until some agreement should be arrived at with England, he recommended that Guizot should abstain, as far as possible, from any discussions with the ministers of the Northern Courts.[540] Nor was Palmerston’s suggestion admissible that the Turco-Egyptian difficulty should be submitted to a conference of the Powers. Under existing conditions, “the differences between France and her allies were too marked to permit of any general deliberation conducing to a satisfactory result.”

In the month of March, Palmerston’s brother, Sir William Temple, the British minister at Naples, had been instructed to insist upon the immediate execution of the King’s promise to abolish the sulphur monopoly and to ask for an indemnity on behalf of the English merchants who had suffered by its imposition. Upon King Ferdinand’s refusal to comply with this demand, Admiral Sir Robert Stopford was directed to blockade the coast and to seize and send to Malta such Neapolitan merchant vessels as he could capture. Thiers, having ascertained that his offer would be acceptable to both parties, proposed to mediate in the dispute. He was glad of the opportunity, which was thus afforded him, of displaying both that France and England were still upon excellent terms and of extending French influence in Italy. Thiers’ mediation was successful. The Neapolitan Court conceded the British demands, and, early in July in consequence, the blockading squadron was free to carry out Palmerston’s policy in another direction. Soon after it had accepted his offer to settle the sulphur dispute, Thiers made a second proposal to the English government. In this instance he was probably desirous simply of acquiring popularity at home.[541] On May 10, Guizot formally asked that the remains of Napoleon might be handed over to a deputation of officers and conveyed back to France, on board a French warship, for interment in Paris. Palmerston made no difficulty about immediately complying with this request.

The extraordinary confidence of both Louis Philippe and of M. Thiers that, under no circumstances, would Great Britain separate herself from France in the eastern question[542] reposed upon their joint conviction that Palmerston’s colleagues in the government would never allow him to disturb the harmony of French and English relations. Mr. Ellice,[543] the brother-in-law of Lord Grey, and a former Cabinet minister, was largely responsible for encouraging this erroneous belief, which was to bring the two countries to the verge of war. Since about the year 1835, “Bear Ellice,” as he was generally known, by reason of his connection with the Canadian fur trade, had been much in Paris. Although he appears to have disliked the responsibilities of office, he was keenly interested in public affairs and was an inveterate political gossip. Grey, who was well aware of his brother-in-law’s vanity and peculiarities, nicknamed him le grand faiseur. In Paris he frequented Princess Lieven’s salon, where he was consulted and listened to with a deference which he enjoyed exceedingly.[544] Not only was he very intimate with M. Thiers, but, according to Creevey,[545] “Louis Philippe could scarcely bear to have him out of his sight.” “I hear,” wrote Palmerston at a most critical time, “that Thiers says he has three agents upon whom he can rely—Guizot, Flahaut[546] and Ellice.”[547]

Guizot had quickly discovered that the Cabinet was not united upon the eastern question. At Holland House, where he was a constant guest, neither his host nor hostess concealed from him their antagonism to Palmerston. Clarendon, notwithstanding the insight into Louis Philippe’s diplomacy which he had acquired at Madrid, was a declared opponent of any solution of the Turco-Egyptian difficulty which might endanger the French alliance. Charles Greville, with whom Guizot appears to have become very friendly, had no scruples about informing him of any dissensions in ministerial circles. The vindictive clerk of the council detested Palmerston and distrusted his policy. Dedel, the Dutch minister, in talking over these events a year or two later with the Duchesse de Dino,[548] expressed the opinion that Guizot’s great mistake lay in imagining that intrigue played as large a part in public affairs in London as in Paris. Palmerston, he told her, had proofs of his proceedings, which would have justified him in demanding his recall. This last statement is probably somewhat exaggerated. Guizot, however, whatever he may have done, appears to have judged the situation with great discernment. “Not to mention Lords Holland and Clarendon,”he wrote to Thiers on June 1, “Melbourne and Lansdowne would be very loath to see the French alliance dissolved. . . Yet Palmerston, I believe, is as firm as ever, and I am far from certain whether those of his colleagues who disagree with him would stand up to him very firmly, when it comes to the point.”[549]

The overtures which Bülow and Neumann had made to Guizot were followed by a definite proposal from Austria. Metternich was alarmed. He believed that Palmerston had formed a totally erroneous opinion of the military situation. He was certain that naval assistance alone would not enable the Turks to regain possession of Syria. He had no intention of allowing Austrian troops to be employed in the East, and Russia had recently sustained reverses in the Caucasus which might make it difficult for her to send an imposing force into Asia Minor. Great Britain was engaged upon warlike operations in Afghanistan, and was, besides, threatened with trouble in China and Canada. It would be, therefore, an arduous undertaking to attempt to coerce the Pasha without the co-operation of France. To obtain her assistance, he suggested that Syria should be divided into two portions. The southern half, including the fortress of Acre, might, he proposed, be given to Mehemet Ali. But, should the French government be not satisfied with this concession, Austria would agree to enforce these conditions upon the Pasha in combination with England and Russia and without the participation of France.[550]

Palmerston reluctantly decided to agree to the Austrian proposal and, on May 8, officially informed Guizot that the British government adhered to it. But this concession only served to strengthen Thiers’ belief that the Powers would before long adopt his views completely. Chekib-Effendi had not yet arrived, and there was, therefore, no necessity for returning an immediate answer. Even when the Turkish plenipotentiary reached London, Palmerston appeared to be in no hurry to resume the negotiations. On the other hand, Guizot was inclined to think that the representatives of the other Powers were growing restless. Even Brunnow seemed disposed to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, and there appeared to be a growing feeling that no settlement could be concluded without the assent of France. Thiers’ answer to the Austrian plan of partitioning Syria could not, however, be indefinitely postponed, and, on June 16, he directed Guizot to tell Lord Palmerston that he could not entertain it. “We could not,” he wrote, “suggest it to Mehemet Ali; he would refuse it, and we could not refute his arguments which we should ourselves consider to be sound and well founded.” He was greatly struck by the account which Guizot had sent him of Brunnow’s attitude, “which could only be ascribed to disasters in Circassia. It was clear that Russia was not ready to embark upon serious operations elsewhere.”[551]

When Thiers thus declined to consider the Austrian proposal, he believed that his hopes of bringing about secretly a direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha were about to be realized. Mehemet Ali had been unable wholly to conceal his disappointment on learning of the collective note of July 27, 1839. When it was officially communicated to him by the consuls of the Powers, he declared firmly that there could be no peace until the hereditary tenure of Syria should be conferred upon him and until his enemy Hosrew Pasha, the Grand Vizier, should be dismissed from office.[552] Since then, he had sometimes angrily asserted that he would wait no longer and that he should order Ibrahim to march upon Constantinople, whilst, on other occasions, he had shown a disposition to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. Throughout the winter and the spring he pressed on his military preparations. Some of these, however, proved very unsuccessful—an attempt to form a national guard in Egypt itself breaking down completely.[553] At the same time he appears to have experienced great difficulty in keeping Ibrahim’s army in Syria supplied with money, food, and clothing,[554] whilst, to add to his embarrassments, in the spring, the Druses and other tribes began to display renewed symptoms of disaffection.[555] Palmerston, now that he no longer feared the separate intervention of Russia, would probably have been well pleased could the Pasha have been provoked into some act of aggression against the Sultan. But he was too sagacious to be moved from his attitude of prudent inaction by the threatening language of Campbell’s successor, Colonel Hodges, which, however, caused some alarm at Vienna and at St. Petersburg, where neither Metternich nor Nesselrode entertained Palmerston’s contemptuous disbelief in the military power of Mehemet Ali.[556] M. Thiers seems to have been wilfully blind to the difficulties of the Pasha’s position, and to have persuaded himself that it was from respect to the wishes of the French government that Ibrahim abstained from advancing into Asia Minor.