England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

M. Cochelet, the French consul-general, was probably instructed[557] to urge Mehemet Ali to refrain from hostilities, to limit his demands to the hereditary tenure of Syria and Egypt and, generally, to depend upon the good offices of France for the attainment of his wishes. M. Thiers, however, was well aware that his plan of bringing about a direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha would encounter far more serious difficulties at Constantinople than at Cairo. Ever since the arrival of M. de Pontois, the successor of Admiral Roussin, Ponsonby had constantly reported that the French minister was endeavouring to persuade the Porte to conclude a peace with Mehemet Ali, without reference to the Powers.[558] But the advice of M. de Pontois had hitherto been disregarded. Hosrew, Reshid, and Halil Pasha, the most influential of the Turkish ministers, were very hostile to Mehemet Ali and firm supporters of the British policy. Soon after his accession to office, Thiers appears to have decided to supplement the efforts of the recognized representative of the French government by those of an unofficial agent. At the beginning of May, a correspondence was opened between M. Jacques Coste[559] and Fethi Ahmed Pasha, the Minister of Commerce and brother-in-law to the young Sultan. Under ordinary circumstances there would be nothing to excite attention in the fact that a prominent French journalist should write on political matters to a Turkish statesman, whom he had known as Ottoman ambassador in Paris. But the close intimacy which notoriously existed between M. Coste and M. Thiers gives importance to this particular correspondence. Certainly both Palmerston and Ponsonby and, indeed, Ahmed Pasha himself, who delivered the original letters into the hands of the British ambassador, appear to have been satisfied that the sentiments and advice contained in them emanated from M. Thiers.[560]

The primary object which M. Coste had in view was to persuade Fethi Ahmed Pasha that it was essential for the Porte promptly to conclude a peace with Mehemet Ali. All the powers, he contended, were pursuing selfish ends with the sole exception of France, and she was both resolved not to intervene herself and not to allow any other Power to interfere actively in the Turco-Egyptian dispute. Her hands were free and she was strong enough to enforce her will upon Europe. The perfidy of England’s policy was manifest. As in 1839, Great Britain now proposed to incite the Porte to make war upon the Pasha. If she could achieve this object she would, of a surety, encourage Russia to intervene in order to crush the Egyptians, whilst at the same time she would insist at Vienna and in Paris upon the necessity of preventing the occupation of Constantinople by the armies of the Tsar. Should she be enabled to carry out her Machiavellian plan of bringing about a general war she purposed, in the confusion, quietly to lay hands upon Egypt, which she had long coveted for herself. He was sorry to hear that Chekib-Effendi, when passing through Paris, had declared to M. Thiers that it would be better that England should take Egypt, than that it should continue in the possession of a rebellious vassal of the Sultan. Such reasoning was deplorably unsound. “That which England takes she keeps,” whereas, in the future, it should be an easy task for the Sultan to compel the descendants of Mehemet Ali to give back the territories which must now be surrendered temporarily. Writing on June 8, M. Coste suggested, as a compromise, that Syria might be given to Ibrahim and Adana to another son of the Pasha. They would certainly quarrel among themselves, and the Porte might avail itself of their dissensions for expelling them altogether. Let the Sultan be assured of the wisdom of the old saying, “diviser pour regner.”[561] This curious correspondence continued intermittently until the fall of M. Thiers in September. But after the end of June, Coste’s communications became less frequent and were less cordially expressed. On July 8 he explained that the silence with which his well-meant advice had been received “had placed him in an awkward position with M. Thiers,” whilst to Prince Vogoride, a son of the Prince of Samos, another of his correspondents, he conveyed his surprise and annoyance that his letters, written “en quelque sorte sous la dictée d’un tres haut personnage” should have elicited no response.[562]

Whilst the French agents at Constantinople were thus striving to render nugatory the provisions of the collective note, another attempt to achieve the desired result was being made in a different quarter. The Sultana Mother was believed to have been concerned in the secret negotiation conducted by Sarim-Effendi,[563] under the patronage of Admiral Roussin and M. Mimaut, during M. Thiers’ first administration, and her support was now obtained to the plan of a direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha. The sudden dismissal, on May 19, of Hosrew, the Grand-Vizier, was the result of her intrigues.[564] The first news of this event was conveyed to Mehemet Ali by M. Cochelet. The Pasha at once declared that the fall of his old enemy had removed the last obstacle to a satisfactory conclusion of his quarrel with the Sultan. He should, he announced, forthwith send back the Turkish fleet, and Sami Bey, his confidential secretary, should proceed without delay to Constantinople to make the necessary arrangements.[565] Nevertheless, some three weeks elapsed before the Pasha’s emissary started upon his journey, and it was only on June 13, on the eve of his departure, that the object of his mission was disclosed to Colonel Hodges and the other agents of the Powers.[566] But Cochelet, on May 26, duly reported this new development to his government in a despatch, a copy of which M. Thiers transmitted to M. Guizot with instructions that its contents must, for the present, be kept strictly secret. In spite of these precautions, however, Cochelet’s confidential communication appears to have been divulged to Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, who, on June 16, was enabled to inform Neumann in London of the negotiation which had been initiated between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan.[567] Meanwhile, at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby had discovered that a potent influence was at work to induce the young Sultan to surrender Syria in exchange for his fleet. But, encouraged by the British ambassador, both Reshid and Fethi Ahmed Pasha declared that they should resign, were any compact of that kind to be concluded, and their firm attitude defeated the insidious schemes of the Sultana Mother, and rendered abortive the mission of Sami Bey.[568]

M. Thiers, however, was confident that the news of Hosrew’s dismissal would be followed quickly by the intelligence that the Sultan and the Pasha had settled their differences amicably. This unexpected development would, he was convinced, place a totally new complexion upon the Turco-Egyptian question. But in point of fact, Palmerston had been informed by Neumann of the negotiation which was to be opened between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. Thus, when the news reached London of the mission of Sami Bey to Constantinople, he was fully prepared for it. Far from being suddenly confronted by the embarrassing prospect that the settlement of the affair was about to pass out of his control, he was, on the contrary, enabled to adduce the proceedings of the French agents at Constantinople and at Cairo, as a reason for promptly concluding a treaty for the protection of the young Sultan from the machinations of his enemies.

Thiers’ illusions were by no means shared by Guizot. The ambassador divined correctly that the crisis of the affair was approaching. Since the rejection of the Austrian proposals Palmerston, he reported, had pointedly avoided all discussion of the eastern question with him. But from the moment that the news arrived that a direct negotiation was in progress between Cairo and Constantinople he had been very busy. This last development, moreover, had made a great impression upon the representatives of the Powers, and those of them, who had lately been inclined to adopt the French view of the question, were now, it was evident, less favourably disposed. Cabinet councils had been held, dissensions had arisen, and Palmerston, he believed, had threatened to resign. It was probable, he considered, that Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia would agree to some form of joint action in the East, and that France would be formally asked whether or not she would participate in whatever measures they might resolve to adopt.[569] This idea that no treaty would be actually concluded until France should have been invited to adhere to it, was the one point upon which M. Guizot may be held to have misled M. Thiers. Princess Lieven, who was staying at Stafford House, is said to have encouraged his delusion. She appears to have tried to extract from Bülow, the Prussian minister, some information about the progress of the negotiations. Her enquiries, however, only elicited from him the fact that he was still without the new letters of credence which the recent death of Frederick William III. had rendered necessary. From this circumstance Guizot seems to have inferred that there was no immediate danger of the conclusion of a treaty between the four Powers, inasmuch as Bülow had not yet been officially accredited to the Court of St. James’.[570]

As Guizot had correctly surmised, Palmerston experienced the greatest difficulty in inducing his colleagues to adopt his views. Both Holland and Clarendon strongly deprecated the conclusion of any treaty to which France would not be a party, and Melbourne and Lansdowne seemed disposed to agree with them. Palmerston, thereupon, placed his resignation in the hands of the Prime Minister.[571] In a long letter, on July 5, in which he recapitulated the whole history of the Turco-Egyptian question, he explained the reasons which made it impossible for him to remain at his post. Were Great Britain to elude the engagements which she had contracted towards the Sultan, because France was not prepared to co-operate with the other signatory Powers, Russia would resume once more “her separate and isolated position” towards Turkey. England, he contended, would thus by her own deliberate act, re-establish that protectorship of Russia over Turkey, which had for so long been a cause of apprehension to other Powers. “The ultimate results of such a decision would be the practical division of the Ottoman Empire into two separate and independent States, whereof one would be a dependency of France and the other a satellite of Russia.” Never would he consent to be an instrument for the execution of a policy which, he believed, must entail disastrous consequences upon his country. Unless, therefore, his colleagues were prepared to pursue the course which he advocated he must retire, even though his resignation should lead to a break up of the government.[572]

The most recent intelligence from the East had, moreover, supplied Palmerston with an argument which had a great effect in overcoming the resistance of his opponents in the Cabinet. A formidable insurrection was reported to have broken out in Syria, where the tribes were in open rebellion against Mehemet Ali. He could, therefore, contend that the treaty, which he urged his colleagues to conclude with Russia, Austria and Prussia, was a Liberal measure, inasmuch as it meant the delivery of an oppressed people from a tyrannical ruler. This last consideration, combined with the desire to avoid the crisis which must result from the resignation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, induced the dissenting members of the Cabinet reluctantly to assent to Palmerston’s proposals.[573] Accordingly, on July 15, “a convention for the pacification of the Levant” was signed by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, on the one side, and that of the Sublime Porte on the other. In view of the expediency of speedily affording military succour to the Syrians, it appears to have been agreed that Bülow should be considered as empowered to act on behalf of his Court.

By the convention which was thus concluded the four Powers undertook actively to assist the Sultan to reduce the Pasha to submission—Austria and Great Britain engaging to intercept all communication by sea between Egypt and Syria. To this instrument was annexed a Separate Act in which were laid down the terms which the Porte purposed to offer to Mehemet Ali. The hereditary tenure of Egypt was to be conferred upon him together with the governorship for life of the greater part of the pashalic of Acre. But, if he should not accede to these conditions within a space of ten days, the offer of Acre would be withdrawn. A further delay of ten days would, however, be accorded him in which to consider the second proposal which would be limited to the hereditary pashalic of Egypt. If, after the specified term had elapsed, he should still refuse to accept the proffered conditions, the Sultan would be free to bring the negotiations to a conclusion and “to follow such ulterior course as his own interests and the counsels of his allies might suggest to him.” In a third document, known as The Reserved Protocol, it was laid down that, inasmuch as “the state of affairs in Syria, the interests of humanity and grave considerations of European policy” made it desirable that active operations should begin with as little delay as possible, the naval measures to which Austria and Great Britain were pledged would be initiated at once, without waiting for the ratification of the convention.[574]

The decision of the four Powers to conclude this treaty had not been communicated to M. Guizot. French historians have adduced the secrecy which was observed as a proof of Palmerston’s malevolent intentions towards France. But no other course could have been pursued with safety. It was certain that France would not take part in coercing the Pasha,[575] and it was no less certain that she would warn him of the measures which the allies were proposing to adopt against him.[576] Inasmuch, therefore, as it was advisable that the naval commander in the Mediterranean should receive his orders before Mehemet Ali could be aware of the nature of the pressure which was to be brought to bear upon him, it was impossible to acquaint M. Guizot with the resolution of the Powers. Nor was the expediency of enabling the British fleet to forestall any hostile move on the part of the Pasha the only reason which made secrecy desirable. Although Palmerston was not apprehensive that the French government would proceed to extremities, it was possible that M. Thiers might decide actively to support the Pasha. In that case war could not be avoided and it was very necessary that Sir Robert Stopford should receive the earliest information of the intentions of his government. No communication, accordingly, was made to the French ambassador until the couriers from London had obtained a start of forty-eight hours. But, on July 17, Palmerston invited M. Guizot to call at the Foreign Office, where he read out to him a memorandum acquainting him with the convention which had been concluded. The numerous efforts which had been made to induce France to co-operate with the other Powers were insisted upon, and great regret was expressed that she had not seen fit to comply with the several proposals which had been communicated to her. Palmerston then proceeded to explain the general nature of the measures of coercion which it was intended to apply to Mehemet Ali, without, however, supplying the ambassador with a copy of the treaty. Guizot, after disputing the accuracy of certain statements contained in the memorandum, took his departure. The situation was so grave that he must receive instructions from his government before he could discuss it.[577]