[CHAPTER VIII]
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
Henry Bulwer,[578] who during the absence of Lord Granville from Paris was in charge of the embassy, was agreeably surprised at the calmness with which M. Thiers received the news of the conclusion of the treaty. At their first interview, after the arrival of Guizot’s despatch, he contented himself with expressing a pained astonishment that England should have treated her ally with so little consideration. The affair would, he feared, arouse the greatest indignation throughout the country and, for the present, he must beg him to observe the strictest secrecy about it.[579] A few days later, in the course of a long and confidential conversation with Louis Philippe, Bulwer was enabled to judge of the King’s opinion of the situation. Adopting the contention, which Thiers was instructing Guizot to urge in his conferences with Palmerston, that no definite proposals for settling the eastern question had ever been made to the French government, Louis Philippe complained of the secret manner in which the treaty had been negotiated. “Ah, Mr. Bulwer,” said he, “I know you wished to read me a lesson, I know it, but it may be a perilous one for all parties.” Assuming a more confidential tone, the King then proceeded to explain the difficulties by which he might be confronted. It would not be easy, he feared or affected to fear, to maintain peace. Thiers, he had reason to believe, would wish him to go to war, and in that case he might be placed in a very delicate position. “How do you think I should stand,” he asked plaintively, “were Thiers at the head of a large parliamentary party to announce that he had resigned, sooner than submit to the dishonour of France?” It was to be hoped that the coercion which the four Powers proposed to apply to Mehemet Ali would either at once prove effectual, or fail completely and be promptly abandoned. The sooner the affair could be settled the better. For his part, only this was a circumstance which Bulwer must never disclose to M. Thiers, he had taken steps to induce the Pasha to refrain from ordering Ibrahim to pass the Taurus mountains.[580] On August 3, before leaving Paris for the Château d’Eu, Louis Philippe discussed the situation in the same spirit with Lord Granville.[581]
The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was announced in London on the 25th, and two days later, the news was published in the Paris papers. The expectation of the King and of M. Thiers that it would arouse a dangerous excitement was fully realized. The bourse was panic-stricken and securities fell heavily. The Chambers were not sitting, but the press with one accord gave voice to the popular indignation. The decision of the four Powers to adopt, without consultation with France, hostile measures against her protégé Mehemet Ali, was denounced as a national insult which must be wiped out in blood. The tone of the Constitutionel, which was notoriously inspired by the President of the Council, was nearly as bellicose as that of the National, the organ of the republican and military party. M. Thiers, if he did not actually encourage, certainly did nothing to allay, the excitement, which was increased, on August 1, by the publication of a Royal ordinance decreeing substantial additions to both the army and the navy.
In London the affair only began to attract much public interest, when the extent of the resentment which it had aroused in Paris became known. The High Tories, who had always disliked the French alliance, were delighted to think that that combination was at an end. The more moderate members of the party, however, who followed the leadership of Wellington, Peel and Aberdeen, whilst agreeing as to the necessity of driving Mehemet Ali from Syria, regretted that means had not been found of inducing France to adhere to the treaty. The Times,[582] which was very antagonistic to Palmerston, supplied its readers, on August 3, with an article by Henry Reeve in which he expressed a sincere hope that relations with France “would not be imperilled for the sake of a desperado like Mehemet Ali,” and, at the same time, suggested that throughout the negotiations the Foreign Office had not improbably been the dupe of Russia. The Radicals adopted this view, and furthermore, deprecated any intervention in Turkish affairs. It was only in their quarter of the House that the policy of the government encountered any real hostility. But even their attack was not pressed with much spirit, and Palmerston, on August 6, a few days before the prorogation of Parliament, had no difficulty in repelling Joseph Hume’s allegation that the insurrection in the Lebanon had been fomented by British agents.[583]
Guizot, in the meanwhile, had had several conferences at the Foreign Office, and had discussed the situation with both Melbourne and John Russell. The position which the French government intended to assume was set forth in a memorandum which he was instructed to read to Lord Palmerston. No formal proposals for a treaty, M. Thiers contended, had ever been made to France. Various suggestions, it was true, for settling the Turco-Egyptian question had been put forward, with none of which she had been able to agree. She had always looked upon Mehemet Ali as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and considered his strength as necessary to the preservation of Turkey. Hence she had constantly opposed the idea of wresting Syria from him by force, and she was now disposed to think that the four Powers had scarcely realized the magnitude of the task upon which they had embarked so light-heartedly. “Treat Lord Palmerston,” wrote M. Thiers, “as he treated you. Read out to him this written declaration. Question him boldly. Ask him whether he has any plans for helping the rising in Syria, and what measures he proposes to adopt should the Pasha return a flat refusal to the Sultan’s demands? Press him hard. Place him in the position of having to confess that he has acted in a very foolhardy fashion. . . . Be careful, however, to frame your questions in such a way that, should he decline to answer them, you are not compelled to announce a rupture of relations. For the moment France must restrain herself.”[584]
There is no reason to suppose that Guizot displayed any lack of skill in the performance of his prescribed task. He was, however, unable to report that he had achieved the smallest measure of success. Palmerston, whilst expressing his deep regret that a divergence of opinion should have alienated the two Cabinets, and admitting the hope, which Guizot himself was convinced was sincere, that their separation would be of brief duration, was clearly determined to carry out the treaty to the letter. As regards the military situation in Syria—the point upon which M. Thiers laid the greatest stress—he was full of confidence. Ibrahim, surrounded by a hostile population and deprived of communication by sea with Egypt, would, he felt certain, be reduced to impotence. Melbourne, however, displayed far less confidence, and the Austrian and the Prussian ministers, with whom Guizot also conversed, adopted an almost apologetic tone. Indeed, throughout this affair, it would seem that the appellation of “time-serving dog” applied by Charles Greville to Neumann might with equal justice have been applied to Bülow, his Prussian colleague.[585]
Whilst news from the East was eagerly awaited Guizot was summoned to the Château d’Eu, where he would be enabled to confer with both the King and M. Thiers. From the subsequent proceedings of the chief actors in these transactions, as well as from the somewhat meagre account of his visit which M. Guizot has given in his Mémoires, it is not difficult to surmise the nature of the plan which it was resolved to adopt. France was to arm upon an imposing scale, and her representatives at the different Courts were to assume an attitude of dignified resentment. Such a course possessed a twofold advantage. Abroad, it could not fail to have a great effect upon the timid Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, and might even incline them to withhold their ratification of the treaty. At home, warlike preparations would be popular, and might prevent people from enquiring too closely into the policy which had resulted in the isolation of France. Moreover, M. Thiers was glad of the opportunity, which the crisis afforded him, of strengthening the army and of repairing the effect of many yeas of military neglect.