England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

But, although the King and his minister were thus resolved to show a menacing front to Europe, Guizot was supplied with confidential instructions of a most pacific character. Palmerston, they were convinced, had grossly miscalculated the strength of Mehemet Ali, and it was to be hoped that the unexpected difficulties which the execution of the treaty could not fail to encounter would produce a great revulsion of feeling, not only at the continental Courts, but among the majority of the members of the British Cabinet. Should, therefore, M. Guizot perceive signs of a disposition to adopt a less uncompromising attitude towards Mehemet Ali and to draw nearer to France, he was to encourage it by all means in his power. Provided the Treaty of July 15 could be declared to be at an end, the French government would gladly join with the Powers in guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey, on the basis of the maintenance of the conditions of the Convention of Kiutayeh. M. Thiers, it will be seen, was thus ready to consent to restrict Mehemet Ali to the life government of both Syria and Egypt, a state of affairs to which he had always declared that it was useless to expect him to submit. As an alternative to this solution of the difficulty, France might be invited to mediate on behalf of the Pasha with the allied Powers. In that case the hereditary tenure of Egypt and the life government of Syria for Mehemet Ali would be the basis of the negotiation.[586] This was another arrangement which a few weeks before M. Thiers had rejected as altogether inadmissible. The Comte Walewski, a natural son of Napoleon, who had been sent upon a special mission to Egypt, on August 2, for the purpose of counselling the Pasha to refrain from beginning hostilities, was, accordingly, instructed to suggest to Mehemet Ali that he should defer his dispute with the four Powers and the Porte to the mediation of France.

But in addition to these instructions Guizot carried back with him to London a letter from Louis Philippe to his son-in-law, the King of the Belgians. Leopold was at Windsor Castle, consumed with anxiety at the thought of the dangers to which a European war must expose his newly established Kingdom. Louis Philippe’s letter of August 13 was plainly intended to be read by Queen Victoria, and was drawn up with the object of seriously alarming her, and of prejudicing her against Palmerston. “The situation in which France finds herself,” wrote the King, “is neither of her choice nor of her creation. It was said of the death of the Duc d’Enghien that it was worse than a crime, it was a blunder. I say now of the Treaty of July 15, that it is worse than a blunder, it is a misfortune of which the consequences are incalculable. The situation is particularly painful for me who have always scouted the notion that England could ever enter into an alliance without France. I find I am wrong. For the present we can only wait and see. But there is one thing we must do and that is to arm, and we are doing so vigorously. Our rôle must be one of expectation. We must see what England means to do, before deciding what France shall do, either in the way of restoring or preserving the balance of power.”[587]

A few hours before M. Guizot departed from England to visit the King at Eu, a steamer left the Thames having on board Louis Napoleon, who, with some fifty followers, a tame eagle and a bundle of proclamations, purposed to overthrow the Orleans Monarchy. His destination was Boulogne, where a subaltern officer of the garrison had been drawn into the plot. On the morning of August 6, the Imperial Pretender disembarked at Vimereux and presented himself before the 42nd regiment upon the barrack square. But his appearance aroused no enthusiasm. Finding that their plans had miscarried, the conspirators attempted to regain their ship. Their flight was, however, intercepted by the police and the national guards, who captured the whole party and lodged them in the gaol. Four years before Louis Napoleon had made a similar attempt at Strasburg. On that occasion he had not been brought to trial, but had simply been placed on board a ship and sent off to America. This second offence, however, could not be treated with the same leniency. On September 28, he was arraigned before the peers and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in the fortress of Ham. The affair excited little public interest and was generally treated with contemptuous indifference. Certain French newspapers, however, published accounts of meetings between the Pretender and Palmerston, and declared that his attempt must have been connived at by the British government. But at his first interview with Baron Bourqueney, who had come over to London to take charge of the embassy during the absence of Guizot, Palmerston was enabled to pledge his word of honour that, for “the past two years, neither he nor Lord Melbourne had set eyes upon Louis Bonaparte or upon any of the adventurers by whom he was surrounded.”[588] His assurance was readily accepted and the matter was quickly forgotten.

Upon his return to London, Guizot found awaiting him an invitation to Windsor. Among the party at the Castle were the King of the Belgians, Melbourne, Palmerston, and Wellington. Leopold, to whom Guizot at once delivered Louis Philippe’s letter, applied himself diligently to the task of extricating his father-in-law from his difficulties. With the view of terminating the isolation in which France was placed, he proposed that the convention of the four Powers for the pacification of the Levant should be merged in a larger instrument, to which she might be a party. But Palmerston, with whom he had a long conference, whilst acknowledging the advantages to be derived from a general agreement to uphold the integrity of Turkey, declared emphatically that no plan of that kind could be considered, until the Treaty of July 15 should have been executed in all its details. On August 20, at the termination of his visit, Guizot carried back with him to London the conviction that Leopold’s efforts had in no way modified the situation. He had, however, been able to derive some small consolation from the evident desire of the Queen and of Prince Albert to treat him with unusual consideration, whilst he had noted with satisfaction that Melbourne had appeared depressed and even Palmerston seemed out of spirits.[589]

From the French point of view the news from Syria was of a distinctly reassuring character. The insurrection in the Lebanon, upon the wide development of which Palmerston was supposed to have confidently depended for the realization of his plans, had been suppressed without difficulty by Ibrahim Pasha. This circumstance, combined with the efforts of King Leopold, revived the active opposition of those of Palmerston’s colleagues who disapproved of his eastern policy. They urged, accordingly, the expediency of making some friendly advances towards France. Palmerston consented with an unexpected alacrity to meet their wishes. He had not answered Thiers’ memorandum of July 21, and he now proposed that he should reply to it and thus re-open communications with the French government. But his long despatch of August 31, was scarcely so conciliatory as some of his fellow-ministers would have desired. It was in effect an amplification of the memorandum which, on July 17, he had read out and handed to M. Guizot. It gave a luminous account of the negotiations and set forth the British case with admirable clearness, but only in the concluding paragraphs was a vague hope expressed that, after the complete execution of the Treaty of July 15, France would once more resume her place in “the union of the five Powers.”[590] The document was intended for publication and, in drawing it up, Palmerston had been more concerned to convince his countrymen of the justice of his cause than to conciliate the French government. As the event was to prove, he had judged correctly in supposing that a lucid exposition of his policy would greatly strengthen his hand, and enable him to counteract the intrigues of the French party, in the Cabinet. When, about a month later, his despatch was communicated to the press, it silenced the opposition of all fair-minded persons.[591] Guizot, suspecting at once the real object which Palmerston had in view, lost no time in urging upon Thiers the necessity of presenting, no less skilfully, the French case to the public.[592]

The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was known at Constantinople on August 3. The Porte, acting under the advice of the ambassadors of the four Powers, proceeded without loss of time to carry out its conditions. Rifat Bey, accompanied by Mr. Alison of the British embassy, was despatched to Egypt with the Sultan’s ultimatum, and measures were promptly taken for rendering effective aid to the Syrian insurgents.[593] At the same time as the documents relating to the treaty were sent to Constantinople, the instructions of the Admiralty were forwarded to Sir Robert Stopford, commanding the British Mediterranean Squadron. All communication by sea was to be cut off between Egypt and Syria. If the Pasha’s fleet should be discovered within the harbour of Alexandria, it was not to be allowed to leave. Should an Egyptian squadron be cruising off the Syrian coast, the admiral was to use his own discretion as to the means to be employed for carrying out the intentions of his government. Peaceful persuasion was to be tried in the first instance, but, should it prove ineffectual, force must be resorted to without hesitation. Five thousand stands of arms from the stores at Malta were placed at his disposal, for distribution among the insurgent mountaineers. Lastly, Stopford was warned to be on his guard against “any sudden movement of the French squadron, in consequence of orders which might be sent from Paris, under the first impulse of irritation which the French government would naturally feel at finding itself placed in a separate and isolated position.”[594]

The French naval force in the Mediterranean was at this time extremely efficient[595] and, in point of numbers, slightly superior to the British. Ever since the beginning of the year, Palmerston had made the strength of the Toulon fleet the subject of numerous representations to the French government.[596] Should, therefore, warlike counsels prevail in Paris the initial advantages of the naval situation would be on the side of France. But, as early as July 25, Palmerston was so satisfied that no danger of that kind was to be apprehended, that he desired that Stopford should be informed that the French government had clearly “no intention of opposing by force the measures which the allies had resolved to execute.”[597] That officer, on receipt of his instructions, had proceeded to Alexandria, both to support by his presence the demands which Rifat Bey was pressing upon the Pasha and to prevent the egress of the Egyptian fleet. A few days before his arrival, the squadron, which Mehemet Ali had recently sent to the coast of Syria,[598] had hastily returned to Alexandria, upon the advice, as it was believed, of the French admiral.

Whilst he was in these waters, Stopford was joined by Admiral Bandiera with two Austrian frigates, one of which was commanded by the Archduke Charles Frederick. Commodore Charles Napier, famous for his destruction of the Miguelite Meet, had at the same time been detached to the coast of Syria with five sail of the line and some smaller vessels. Arriving off Beyrout, on August 12, Napier found that the insurrection, which he had been informed was in full progress, had been suppressed. Nevertheless, two days later, he took up a position “abreast of the town” and sent an officer on shore to notify to the governor that the four Powers had decided to restore Syria to the Sultan, and to demand that the arms taken from the inhabitants of the Lebanon should be restored to them. Furthermore, he issued a proclamation calling upon the Syrians to return to their allegiance to the Sultan, and proceeded to detain a number of small vessels carrying provisions and military stores for the use of Ibrahim’s army. But, as the twenty days allowed Mehemet Ali for considering the demands of the Porte had not yet expired, he did not consider himself justified in beginning actual hostilities. Finding, therefore, that Soliman Pasha[599] was not disposed to comply with his summons and that his proclamation produced no effect, he withdrew his squadron to a better anchorage and employed his time in reconnoitring the coast.[600]

M. de Pontois, the French ambassador to the Sublime Porte, had, in the meanwhile, not been idle. On August 16, on receipt presumably of instructions from M. Thiers, he sent his dragoman to Reshid Pasha, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The message, of which M. Cor was the bearer, was to the effect that France was deeply offended at the action of the Ottoman plenipotentiary in signing the Treaty of July 15, and that she was resolved to support Mehemet Ali and actively to oppose the measures of coercion which the allies were proposing to apply to him.[601] M. de Pontois himself further declared to the Russian minister that he regarded war between France and England as inevitable. This threatening language was at once reported by the representatives of the Powers to their respective Courts and Lord Ponsonby, at the same time, sent to warn the British admirals that an outbreak of hostilities with France was to be seriously apprehended.[602] A few days later, however, the French ambassador, whether in consequence of fresh instructions from Paris, or whether because on considering the matter he was afraid he had said too much, saw fit to disavow the language imputed to him.[603] This was the attitude adopted by M. Thiers when, in due course, representations on the subject of M. de Pontois’ menaces were made to him by the Powers. The full brunt of his ill-humour fell, as was usual, upon the Austrian ambassador, who met with a very warm and disagreeable reception. “Vous pouvez dire à Reshid Pasha qu’il en a menti,”[604] was the only statement which Apponyi could extract from him. Guizot, but in more courteous terms, conveyed the same explanation to Lord Palmerston. No written communication having passed between M. de Pontois and Reshid Pasha, the matter was allowed to drop.[605] It was evident that whatever might have been the precise words used by M. Cor, the message of the French ambassador to the Reis-Effendi was a rather clumsy attempt to frighten the Sultan into withholding his ratification of the treaty.

France meanwhile was arming in most ostentatious fashion. On September 13 the fortification of Paris was decreed by a Royal ordinance. This was a measure which had been under consideration for some time past, but which had always been set aside on account of the difficulty of inducing the Chambers to consent to the required expenditure. Thiers, as a student of the campaign of 1814, had constantly advocated it, whilst Louis Philippe was also in favour of it because, as was generally believed, he hoped that a circle of forts round the capital would greatly facilitate the suppression of any revolutionary movement. M. Thiers gave his closest personal attention to the military preparations. With the journalists and stock-jobbers, by whom he was surrounded,[606] his conversation turned on war unceasingly. In the early days of August he had hinted at a campaign upon the Rhine, whilst the papers which he inspired denounced the treaties of 1815 and talked of “natural frontiers.” But his thoughts soon assumed a new direction. The débordement,[607] when it came, would be in Italy, where Austria was to be assailed at her most vulnerable point. Lying on the floor, with his maps spread out before him, like the great man about whom he had written so much, he planned vast military and diplomatic combinations.[608]