Hostilities were commenced by Japan at Port Arthur and Chemulpo two days before her formal declaration of war, which was not made until the 10th February. This action on her part evoked some unfavourable criticism, though many precedents for this step existed. Her declaration of war was followed a fortnight later by the signature at Seoul of a Protocol by which Japan guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Korea, who in return granted to her all facilities in the peninsula which might be necessary for the prosecution of the war. It will be remembered that a similar step was taken by Japan at the outset of her war with China.
When the latter conflict took place the world in general, for the most part ignorant of the conditions existing in the two countries, anticipated the defeat of Japan, an opinion governed to a great extent by considerations of geography, population and visible resources. On the same grounds a similar view, adverse to Japan’s chances of success in a struggle with Russia, prevailed in most quarters. For a nation far inferior in extent of territory, population, military organization, and resources, to challenge a leading European Power seemed, on the face of things, a proceeding which could only invite disaster. The two countries were, nevertheless, not so unevenly matched as was supposed to be the case. Without doubt Russia was an adversary with whom the strongest military state would have preferred to keep on good terms. Her extensive territories and large population, her apparently inexhaustible resources, gave her great advantages over Japan. These advantages were, however, counterbalanced by certain patent weaknesses. The war was unpopular. The policy of adventure which provoked it was condemned by her own wisest statesmen. There was much political unrest. She was fighting not in Europe, but on a remote fringe of her vast empire. The Amur Railway, projected with a view to consolidate her widely separated dominions, was not completed east of Lake Baikal; nor had the railway authorities yet finished the portion round the southern end of that lake, communication across which was still maintained by specially built steamers. It was doubtful, therefore, if the recently built Chinese Eastern Railway, which served as a temporary substitute, would prove to be a reliable line of communications for war purposes. In Japan, on the other hand, the war was not only popular, but eagerly welcomed. The efficiency of the army, no less than the fighting capacity and endurance of the Japanese soldier, had been tested in the war with China, and in the course of the eight years that had since elapsed the Government had spared no effort to bring it to the level of European standards. Though Japanese statesmen, conscious of Russia’s strength, might share the apprehensions felt abroad as to the issue of the struggle, they derived encouragement from the whole-hearted support given to the Government by the people. All classes realized that the stake at issue for Russia was very different from what it was for Japan. The former was fighting to acquire fresh territory; the latter was fighting for her life. Under these circumstances a warlike nation, fighting at its own doors, might conceivably accomplish great things against a foe whose heart was not in the struggle. The spirit which animated her people and her army was one of the factors in Japan’s success.
No time was lost by the Japanese in the conduct of military operations. On the 8th February a Japanese squadron, escorting transports, arrived off Chemulpo, where two Russian vessels were lying at anchor unprepared for hostilities. Given the choice of being attacked in the harbour or fighting outside, the Russian commander chose the latter alternative. His two vessels were no match for the squadron they encountered. Driven back into port badly damaged, one was sunk and the other blown up by its crew. The same night Admiral Tōgō, the Japanese naval Commander-in-Chief, delivered a torpedo attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. In this action two Russian battleships and a cruiser sustained severe damage. On the following day the Japanese troops (some four battalions) which had arrived under naval escort at Chemulpo landed, and occupied the Korean capital. The first actions of the war thus resulted in favour of Japan.
At this early stage it became apparent that Russia’s superiority at sea was greatly nullified by the faulty disposition of her squadrons. While her main fleet in Far Eastern waters was stationed at Port Arthur, a powerful squadron remained isolated at Vladivostok. A large portion of her navy, moreover, was kept at home, whence it only emerged late in the war to be destroyed in the battle of Tsushima. Two other obstacles the Russian commanders had to contend with: the ice-bound condition of Vladivostok for several months in the year, and the almost insurmountable difficulty of repairing vessels owing to the absence of adequate dockyard facilities. In all these respects Japan had an advantage. Her harbours were free from ice. She was well provided with naval arsenals, and with dockyards for the repair of her ships. On the outbreak of war, too, her fleet was at once concentrated at Sasébo, the naval arsenal near Nagasaki, a detached squadron being posted in the Korean straits, whence it could watch Vladivostok. From the first, therefore, the Russian naval forces in the Far East were separated, nor throughout the war were they ever able to effect a junction. Moreover, whereas the Russian home fleet took no part in the war until it was drawing to a close, the Japanese navy early in the struggle received a welcome reinforcement in the shape of two new battleships acquired in Europe from a neutral Power.
In the naval operations which ensued at Port Arthur the Japanese, besides resorting to vigorous bombardments, delivered repeated torpedo attacks, and attempted on several occasions to seal up the harbour by sinking vessels at the entrance. Neither of these courses was attended with the success hoped for; nor had they the effect of inducing the Russian fleet to come out and fight. Greater success resulted from the laying of mines in front of Port Arthur. In April the Russian flagship Petropavlosk struck one of these mines and was blown up, the new Russian admiral, Makharoff, who had just taken over command of the fleet, being killed in the explosion. Another battleship was at the same time seriously damaged. A little later the Japanese also laid mines at the entrance of Vladivostok, thus restricting the movements of the Russian squadron at that port, which had previously shown mischievous activity in attacks on Japanese transports. When the Russians, copying the methods of the enemy, took to laying mines themselves, the results were disastrous for the Japanese, two of their best battleships and a despatchboat being destroyed by this means in the month of May. These losses were, however, so carefully concealed that the Russians knew nothing of their occurrence till it was too late to take advantage of them.
The excessive caution displayed by the Russian naval commanders in the opening stages of the war was no effective answer to the bold tactics of their opponents. The inaction of the main fleet at Port Arthur, its refusal for several months to accept the risks of a general engagement, gave the Japanese navy thus early in the struggle a moral superiority that was never lost. Furthermore, it enabled Japan to gain practically the command of the sea, so essential to the prosecution of military operations on the mainland.
The Japanese operations on land began with the disembarkation of the 1st Army of three divisions under General Kuroki at the mouth of the Ta-tong river and the occupation of the important town of Ping-yang, where the Chinese army had made its first stand in the war of 1894–5. The few Russian troops in the neighbourhood fell back on the Yalu river, the boundary at this point between Korea and China. Here in a strong position on the Chinese side of that river, and at its junction with a tributary stream, the Ai-ho, a Russian army of some 20,000 men under General Zasulich awaited attack. This was delivered by the Japanese after some preliminary skirmishing on the 30th April, and resulted in the defeat of the Russians with the loss of over twenty guns, their casualties being far greater than those of the victors. A few days later the 2nd Japanese army under General Oku landed at Pitzuwo, a place on the east coast of the Liaotung peninsula some sixty miles from Port Arthur, and cut the railway line connecting that fortress with Liao-yang, the town chosen by General Kuropatkin, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, for the concentration of his forces. The disembarkation of this army was covered by the Japanese fleet, which had made the Elliot islands its advanced base. In the middle of May another Japanese force, which afterwards formed part of the 4th Army led by General Nodzu, landed at Takushan, midway between Pitzuwo and the mouth of the Yalu. At the end of that month the 2nd Army, after a severe struggle, defeated a Russian force entrenched in a formidable position at Nanshan, on the isthmus of Chinchou, which connects the two peninsulas of Liaotung and Kawn-tung. The position captured was of importance, as guarding the approaches to Port Arthur. On this occasion the Japanese took many siege guns, but their casualties were much heavier than those of the Russians. The landing of Oku’s army was followed early in June by that of the 3rd Army under General Nogi, to whom was assigned the rôle of besieging Port Arthur. Soon afterwards the repulse by General Oku of a Russian force sent to relieve the fortress enabled the 3rd Army to begin the execution of its task. Meanwhile further Japanese reinforcements had reached Takushan, and in July General Nodzu arrived and took command of the 4th Army, the formation of which was by this time complete. This, and the 1st Army under Kuroki, then moved westwards on parallel lines through the mountain passes of Southern Manchuria, driving before them the Russian forces which they encountered; while General Oku with the 2nd Army moving from the south-west struck northwards, the objective in each case being Liao-yang, where General Kuropatkin had established his headquarters. At this stage the campaign in Manchuria divided itself into two distinct and independent operations: the advance north and west of the three Japanese armies under Generals Oku, Kuroki and Nodzu in a converging movement towards Liao-yang; and the investment of Port Arthur by the 3rd Army under General Nogi.
As the result of the converging movement of the northern armies, in the course of which the treaty port of Newchwang was occupied, their total length of front had in the beginning of August been reduced from 150 to 45 miles. This success was not gained without severe fighting at different points, in which, however, the Japanese losses compared, on the whole, favourably with those of the enemy. On the 10th of the same month the Russian fleet at Port Arthur made its first and only sortie in full strength, its object being to join forces with the squadron at Vladivostok. The attempt failed. In the general engagement that ensued four Russian ships succeeded in running the gauntlet of the Japanese fleet and reaching neutral ports, but the other vessels were driven back into harbour severely damaged. Of those which escaped, three were interned at the ports where they arrived; while the fourth, the Novik, which had put into Kiaochow, was subsequently intercepted and sunk on her way to Vladivostok. A similar sortie made about the same time by the Vladivostok squadron was equally unsuccessful. These two engagements put an end to the activity of the Russian naval forces in the Far East.
The battle of Liao-yang, the first big battle of the war, was fought under the immediate direction of Marshal Ōyama, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, who had accompanied the 2nd Army on its march north. There was little disparity in point of numbers between the forces engaged on each side, but the Russians had an advantage in cavalry over the Japanese, and were also much stronger in artillery. Beginning on the 23rd of August, it lasted until the morning of the 3rd September, when Kuropatkin gave orders for the retirement of the whole army towards Mukden. The losses on each side were about equal, a fact which, considering the strength of the Russian position, was very creditable to the Japanese. In the beginning of October the second big battle, that of the Shaho, so called from the name of a river in the vicinity, took place. On this occasion it was Kuropatkin who took the offensive. Again the Japanese were successful, the Russians being driven back with twice the loss sustained by their opponents.
On the 2nd January Port Arthur fell. After the investment of the fortress had become complete, three successive general assaults made in August, October and November had failed. Eventually, on the 5th of December, the Japanese succeeded in storming the position known as 203 Metre Hill, which commanded the remaining defences, as well as the harbour in which was contained what was left of the Russian main fleet. A month later the commander of the fortress, General Stoessel, surrendered. The siege had cost the Japanese between thirty and forty thousand casualties, but the prize was well worth this cost. The Russian main fleet had ceased to exist, and Nogi’s troops were free to march north to reinforce the Japanese armies threatening Mukden. During the short interval separating the fall of Port Arthur from the final battle of the war Kuropatkin again assumed the offensive. But the attack was not pushed vigorously, and after a few days of fighting the Russians at the end of January retired, having sustained heavy losses. It was now midwinter, but, in spite of the intense cold, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief decided to continue his advance on Mukden. In this decision he was influenced by the successful working of the single line of railway by which the communications of the Russian armies were maintained. The utility of this line had exceeded all expectations. By this means constant reinforcements were reaching Kuropatkin. Delay until spring, moreover, would help the Russians in several ways: it would give time for the arrival of fresh troops; it would enable them to strengthen their entrenchments at Mukden; and the break-up of winter would render military operations difficult. A further consideration, which doubtless had some weight in the resolution formed by Ōyama, lay in the fact that his armies would shortly be strengthened by the addition of Nogi’s troops from Port Arthur.