The same officer wrote to me a short letter on the 20th of July, in which he repeats these sentiments, and concludes by stating, that the greatest service I could render my country, in the actual situation of affairs, was "to keep the garrison in order, and bring the minds of the officers back to reason."
I was authorized, through the same channel, to proceed with the inquiry, (if I thought it advisable,) without waiting for my colleagues, reporting the result, for the orders of Government: and a discretion was vested in me to grant a pardon to the non-commissioned officers and privates of the garrison, if I should judge it necessary: but this was evidently in reference to the possible occurrence of a case of extreme emergency, which Colonel Barclay stated the Governor felt assured would not arise.
It will certainly not occur, on a perusal of what I have stated, that there existed the slightest ground for the Government of Fort St. George indulging those expectations which they have declared they did in their letter to the Secret Committee. Is it possible that they could, at the moment, have expected that an officer, instructed as I was, should have commenced his proceedings with "strenuous exertions to excite the men against officers," whom he was directed to reclaim to their duty by the efforts of reason and argument? And when he had been commanded to carry on a military inquiry, in order to ascertain the nature and degree of the crimes of different individuals, was it reasonable to suppose he would disappoint the very object[54] for which that was instituted, by a premature attempt to seize and bring ringleaders to trial, on whose guilt he was expressly told "it was his duty to report, and to await the orders of Government?"
It is sufficiently obvious, from what has been stated, that when the Government of Fort St. George wrote those paragraphs (which have been quoted) to the Secret Committee, the object was more to preserve a character of consistence, than to give a correct view of the actual situation of affairs at the moment of the occurrence of those events which are described. The Government, in a subsequent part of the same dispatch, gives a more just account of the character of this proceeding. "We had hitherto," they observe, "continued to expect, that the firmness of our measures, and the good sense of the officers of the army, would have finally succeeded in restoring order: but we were convinced, by the failure of Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's mission, by the addresses received from Hyderabad, and by the intelligence received from other quarters, that it was necessary to calculate on the possibility of the officers proceeding to the last extremities of rebellion; and to consider the means of preventing, or finally of meeting, that arduous state of things. The moderate course of conduct pursued by the Government, and which was founded on a favourable opinion of the loyalty of the army, had failed; and we were reduced to the alternative of making the concession demanded by the officers, or subduing them by force."
Is it not evident from this paragraph alone, if other evidences were wanting, that the Government considered my mission to Masulipatam as a proceeding which was calculated, by its moderation, to reclaim the officers to their duty; and in no degree whatever related to that course of measures which was subsequently adopted? A most desperate remedy was ultimately applied to the existing evils: and in having recourse to the expedient of exciting the men against their officers, and in impairing the strength if not destroying that link by which almost all are agreed we hold India, the Government of Fort St. George might perhaps be justified by the emergency of the moment; and the controlling authorities in England may be satisfied that this operation, however terrible, was necessary and politic; but assuredly (even if all this is granted) no person can believe that any authority but Government could adopt such a measure. It appears too much to have expected, that an officer sent to moderate the minds of a body of officers, and to reclaim them to their duty by argument and reason, should (acting upon his own discretion, and without orders) have adopted this desperate expedient; and that he should have commenced his efforts to persuade the officers to return to their duty, by exciting their men to throw off their authority.
The Government of Madras proceed to state, that it ascribes my failure to an apparent unreasonable and unwise forbearance and attention to the feelings of officers who had, by their acts of violence and aggression, forfeited all claims to consideration; that my time was occupied in negotiations with disorderly committees, and in fruitless attempts to bring officers back to their duty by argument. A reference is made to my reasons for this conduct, as stated in my letters[55] under date the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July. The measures which I recommended are there stated. These, the Government observed, "consisted of a modified repeal of the orders of the 1st of May; the restoration to the service, and to their appointments, of all the officers whom we had found it necessary to suspend or remove; with an intimation to the army, that their claims to Bengal allowances would be brought to the notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors." It is stated in the conclusion of this paragraph, that I returned to Madras, "having succeeded no further in accomplishing the objects of my mission, than in preventing the officers from adopting any flagrant acts of outrage to authority during my residence at Masulipatam." As my failure is ascribed to an apparent unreasonable and unwise attention to the feelings of officers who had by their acts of violence forfeited all claims to consideration, may it not be asked, What was the situation of these officers when I was deputed by Sir George Barlow with instructions to restore them to better feelings, and a juster sense of duty, by the efforts of reason and argument? Were they not in a state of outrageous mutiny? Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, had been placed under sentries, and it was hourly expected they would openly throw off even the show of obedience; and yet at such a period I received instructions from Sir George Barlow to use every effort of reason and argument to reclaim the officers to their duty. When I had, as appears from my Journal[56] and letters, in a great degree succeeded, having released Colonel Innes from his arrest, prevailed upon a mutinous garrison to abandon its design of immediately throwing off its allegiance, and of marching to Hyderabad, obtained from them a reluctant recognition of my authority, and was proceeding with the inquiry which I had been directed to make: when all these changes, I say, had been effected without one concession, by the force of that reason which I was directed to employ; and I had reported all that I had done; I received a letter from Colonel Barclay, written by order of Sir George Barlow, approving of my measures, desiring me to continue my efforts to reclaim the officers, and to direct their attention to the decision of the authorities in England: and yet, when my success within the few days I was at Masulipatam had been as great as it was possible to expect such means could produce, (for changes in men's minds that are effected by reason and argument must be gradual,) I am accused, in a secret dispatch to my superiors in England, of having failed in my mission, from a forbearance, which, though subsequently termed unreasonable and unwise, I have shown Sir George Barlow deemed, or professed to deem, at the moment of my departure from Madras, wise and politic; and from an attention to the feelings of those very officers, to whose feelings and reason, when their crimes were at the greatest height, I had been directed, by the verbal instructions of Sir George Barlow, and the letters of his secretary, to address myself.
It is stated, that my time was occupied in communication with disorderly committees. To this I reply, that I never recognised any committee in any public or official manner that could either compromise my own authority, or commit the dignity of Government. I communicated, it is true, chiefly with those officers who, from their rank or ability, appeared to have most influence over the rest. Not to have done so, would have been to neglect the employment of those means to which I have shown Sir George Barlow exclusively trusted for my success. I learnt, that there existed a garrison committee, of which every officer was a member, and which could never meet without danger of a mutiny that in its consequences would have precipitated a rupture between the Government and most other parts of the army: an extreme which it was my constant labour to retard, if I could not altogether avert. This committee I endeavoured, by my influence with the senior and more reflecting officers of the garrison, to dissolve; and I considered my success in this point as a great step towards the restoration of order. The control of the proceedings of the whole became vested in a few senior officers of comparative moderation, whose minds were more accessible to reason, and whose small numbers rendered them less liable to those violent impressions which produce such mischief in large and turbulent meetings. But all the communications I ever had, either directly or indirectly, with any individual or bodies of officers at Masulipatam, are stated in my journal: and, it will be seen from that, I never made the slightest concession to the repeated demands of the officers of that garrison. That my proceedings were not such as is prescribed by an observation of the regular course of military discipline there can be no doubt: but Government had itself decided that question. They had refrained (for the reasons stated in the dispatch to which I have so often referred) from resorting to the usual means, the employment of force for quelling the mutiny at Masulipatam. I was deputed on what is termed in this very dispatch a mission, (a word in itself including a volume,) in order that I might reclaim to duty, by the efforts of reason and argument, the officers of a garrison which were known to be almost to a man unanimously bent on mutiny and opposition to authority; and yet I am subsequently condemned by the Government that sent me, for having used the only means by which it was possible I could accomplish that object.