The statement made in the same paragraph of this dispatch regarding the character of those measures which I recommended, with a view of terminating the agitation of the army, will, I am assured, not be considered as either fair or liberal, by any person who gives an attentive perusal to my secret and confidential letter to Sir George Barlow upon that subject. I saw, immediately after my arrival at Masulipatam, that some conciliatory measures must be instantly adopted by Government, if it intended to avoid the desperate extreme of a contest with its own army. A contest which, it will be recollected, I never doubted would early terminate in favour of the former: but success, I was convinced, would bring dangers of a hundred fold greater magnitude than any that could result from issuing the order[57] that I recommended.
On the succeeding day I wrote another letter[58], which contained the following paragraph:
"I can think of no improvement to this order, except you conceive the great object of avoiding hostilities would justify the following addition to it. 'Government received a representation from a number of the officers of the coast army, in which they solicit the equalization of their allowances with those of the officers of the Bengal army: This is a subject, the consideration of which must exclusively rest with the Honourable the Court of Directors, under whose notice this application will, in course, be brought, and by whose decision it will be the duty of the officers of the coast army to abide.'"
I may ask, Whether the order I suggested in my letter of the 5th of July justifies the assertion in the letter from the Madras Government, that I recommended "the restoration to the service and their appointments of all the officers the Government had removed." The terms of the order I suggested were only, that in the full confidence that the officers of the coast would immediately abandon their proceedings, Government would recommend the officers suspended to the Court of Directors. That it restored Colonels Bell and Chalmers to command, from which they had been removed, and also one or two staff officers who were in a similar predicament. There is assuredly a wide difference between the immediate restoration of all the officers suspended from the service, and the conditional promise of a favourable recommendation to that authority by which, under every circumstance, the fate of these officers must have been decided. With respect to Colonel Bell, I conscientiously believed at the moment, from what I knew of the case of that valuable officer, that Sir George Barlow would not be reluctant to consent to his restoration; and with regard to that of Colonel Chalmers and one or two others in nearly similar predicaments, I conceived that if any measure of this kind was adopted, it should be as complete as it was possible to make it, without affecting the principle which was to carry conciliation in act (words, after what had passed, could be of little or no avail) as far as was possible, without serious injury to the authority and dignity of Government. It was this consideration which led to the communication already quoted from my letter of the 6th of July regarding the first Memorial forwarded by General McDowall. What I recommended was nothing more than what had, I believe, been done as an act of course, and was stated in a mode which, though conciliatory, reminded the army of their duty, and gave them no reason to believe more, than that the Court of Directors would see the document in question. I think at this moment, as I did at that in which I recommended this measure, that nothing could have been more fortunate than its adoption. I know I differ on this point from very high authorities, who believe that any concessions, (and such they would appear to deem every act of conciliation,) however modified and corrected, would have been ruinous to Government: but, in spite of these imposing opinions[59], I must ask reflecting men to look near the subject, to examine the evil which this measure could have produced, consider the ills that were at that moment to be expected, and to think on those that have resulted from the complete success to authority that the most sanguine could have anticipated, and then to pronounce their cool and deliberate judgment. There certainly could be no apprehension entertained that this order would have strengthened, to any purpose of immediate violence or opposition, the discontented and turbulent: but the danger stated is, that those would have deemed it a victory. Let us for a moment suppose they had been led, by their first feelings of joy at their escape from a punishment which they had merited, to have considered it as such, what permanent effect could such a feeling produce? What had they gained? Nothing. The fate of the officers who had been suspended remained to be decided by the Directors; with whom it must, under all circumstances, ultimately rest. Their Memorial for an increase of allowances was to be brought before the same body, but without even a promise from Government of any recommendation. There was an end to their combinations and committees[60], and, with them, to all those threats they had thrown out against the local Government, which, it was evident, would acquire such a vast accession of strength by the spirit of moderation and conciliation which it had shown, as would fully enable it to enforce the most severe discipline, and particularly in all cases which were attended with a danger of the recurrence of evils of a similar character to those it had so recently encountered. The majority, indeed, of the officers of the army, and all the most respectable, had seen at this moment the desperate situation into which they had unwarily suffered themselves to be led. They would have had no sentiments but those of gratitude to a Government, whose consideration had presented them with the means of escape. All these would, if such an indulgence had been shown to their errors, have ranged themselves with enthusiasm on the side of Government, and would have been the most forward to retrieve the character of the service, by the punishment of those whom a hardened spirit of disaffection and turbulence had led to continue in opposition. That such a class would also have remained, there is no doubt; and Government might have been satisfied, at the moment this measure was taken, that future punishments would have corrected any erroneous opinions regarding the true motives that had induced so generous and politic a proceeding.
The situation of affairs at the period stated was such, that though there could be little doubt of the ultimate success of Government even under the violent course it pursued; yet that did not appear likely to be attained, if extremes were resorted to, without bloodshed. His Majesty's regiments at Hyderabad[61] and Travancore would be, if a contest was precipitated, in the utmost danger; and if the combat between our European and native troops had once commenced, feelings would have been instantly engendered, the dreadful action of which no man could calculate. That these results were averted, was owing to a variety of causes, very little, if at all, connected with either the foresight or vigour of the Government of Fort St. George.
But, passing over what was likely to be the probable results of the desperate extreme to which the Government of Fort St. George had resort, (though it is by a consideration of these results that the merit of my suggestions should be tried,) let us contemplate what has occurred, from the most favourable issue that could have been anticipated. The officers of the coast army must long continue to feel that degradation which they have endured. Years must elapse before the action of this feeling will cease to produce disunion and discontent in that establishment. But these are comparatively light considerations, as all questions must be, connected with a body of men over whom we must always have such strong ties and efficient control as the European officers of our armies in India. It is the firm allegiance and continued obedience of the natives of which the strength of those armies is composed, which forms by far the most important principle in our government of this great Empire. This can never be denied: and it is as true, that in that almost religious respect with which the sepoy of India has hitherto regarded his European officer, consisted what has been always deemed the chief link of this great chain of duty and obedience. That link (as far as relates to the sepoys of the coast establishment)[62] has, if not broken, been greatly shattered and impaired. A temporary object of importance, no doubt, has been gained by a sacrifice of one a thousand times the value of the object. The dignity of the local Government of Fort St. George has been saved from an imputation of weakness, by a measure which threatens the most serious danger to the future safety of our whole empire in India. An evil, for which there were many and certain remedies, has been averted, by incurring one, the progress of which (from its character,) cannot be calculated; which is, from its nature, irremediable; and of which we know nothing, except that it is efficient to our destruction.