It will be noticed by the above figures that Davis's Division lost four officers and 42 men killed, 18 officers and 256 men wounded, while Sigel's two divisions lost only three officers and 28 men killed, seven officers and 149 men wounded.
The heaviest loss fell upon the 9th Iowa, which had 39 killed, 176 wounded and four missing. The next heaviest was upon the 4th Iowa, which had 18 killed, 139 wounded and three missing.
Gen. Van Dorn estimated his loss at 1,000 killed and wounded and 300 missing. This is known to be inaccurate, because more Confederate than Union dead were buried on the battlefield, and Gen. Curtis sent 500 prisoners to the rear.
The question naturally occurs: Why did Van Dorn relinquish such a supreme effort with such a small loss?
Our amusing acquaintance, Gen. Pike, does not conceal the fact that he and those around him were very badly whipped. After joining Van Dorn he resumed his old habit of standing around "observing the enemy." He reports that he did this for two hours at a stretch when Curtis was delivering the final crushing blows upon Van Dorn. He then moved with much promptness toward the rear, for an officer came up with the stunning intelligence, "You are not safe here, for the enemy's cavalry are within 150 yards of you." This seemed to have escaped his "observation" up to that time. He rode on, and his pace was accelerated by hearing another officer cry out "Close up; close up; or you will all be cut to pieces."
He halted presently, but had to start again, for a shell was sent by the enemy up the road from the point of the hill around which he had just passed. The cry of "The cavalry are coming was raised, and everything became confusion." He escaped the "enemy's cavalry by rapid riding," but was unable to get ahead of his fastgoing troops and stop them, until they reached Elm Spring, many miles away. He came to this sage conclusion:
The enemy, I learn, had been encamped at Pea Vine Ridge for
three weeks, and Sigel's advance was but a ruse to induce
our forces to march northward and give them battle in
positions selected by themselves.
There were others who shared his feelings; for he says:
Just before night, Saturday afternoon, I had met Col. Rector
in the hills, who told me he had about 500 men with him;
that they were in such condition that they could not go more
than six or eight miles a day, and that he thought he would
take them into the mountains, hide their arms in a secure
place, and, as he could not keep them together and feed
them, let them disperse. He asked my opinion as to this, and
I told him that no one knew where the rest of the army was;
that Gens. Van Dorn and Price were supposed to be captured
and the train taken; that if his men dispersed with their
arms they would throw them away, and that I thought the
course he proposed was the wisest one under the
circumstances. The enemy were pursuing on all the roads, and
as it was almost impossible for even a dozen men in a body
to procure food, I still do not see what better he could
have done.