Curtis's cavalry found these guns and brought them into camp; also, all the artillery that was captured the day before from Davis's and Carr's Divisions.
Gen. Van Dorn made several reports which are strangely inconsistent with one another, and seem the natural efforts of a man to find the best excuses that will present themselves from day to day for his failure in a great effort. His first report, which was to Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston and the Confederate War Department, and sent two days after the battle, reads as follows:
Headquarters Trans-Mississippi District, March 9, via Hog
Eye; March 10, 1862.
Fought the enemy, about 20,000 strong, 7th and 8th, at
Elkhorn, Ark. Battle first day from 10 a. m. until after
dark; loss heavy on both sides. Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh
and Col. Hebert were killed; Gens. Price and Slack were
wounded (Gen. Price flesh wound in the arm); the others
badly wounded, if not mortally; many officers killed and
wounded; but as there are some doubts in regard to several I
cannot yet report their names. Slept on the battlefield
first night, having driven the enemy from their position.
The death of Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh and Col. Hebert
early in the action threw the troops on the right under
their commands in confusion. The enemy took a second and
strong position. Being without provisions and the right wing
somewhat disorganized, determined to give battle on the
right on their front for the purpose only of getting off the
field without the danger of a panic, which I did with
success, but with some losses.
I am now encamped with my whole army 14 miles west of
Fayetteville, having gone entirely around the enemy. I am
separated from my train, but think it safe on the Elm
Springs road to Boston Mountains. The reason why I
determined to give battle at once upon my arrival to assume
command of the army I will give in report at an early day.
In this it will be seen that he disclaimed any intention on the second day of making more than a fight to cover his retreat. This is clearly an afterthought to excuse the poor battle that he put up. There is no doubt that he had still hoped to whip Curtis's army, and that he had men enough to do it, if they had been handled properly and had fought with the same determination and aggressiveness that the Union troops did. For some weeks he continued to send in reports, explanatory and partially contradictory of his first.
Gen. Sterling Price's report, made March 22, gives no idea that the retreat was determined on after the events of the first day, but says with relation to the close of the struggle on the evening of March 7:
The fiercest struggle of the day now ensued; but the
impetuosity of my troops was Irresistible, and the enemy was
driven back and completely routed. My right had engaged the
enemy's center at the same time with equal daring and equal
success, and had already driven them from their position at
Elkhorn Tavern. Night alone prevented us from achieving a
complete victory of which we had already gathered some of
the fruits, having taken two pieces of artillery and a
quantity of stores.
My troops bivouacked upon the ground which they had so nobly
won, almost exhausted and without food, but fearlessly and
anxiously awaiting the renewal of the battle in the morning.
The morning disclosed the enemy strengthened in position and
numbers and encouraged by the reverses which had unhappily
befallen the other wing of the army when the brave Texan
chieftain, Ben McCulloch, and his gallant comrade, Gen.
Mcintosh, had fallen, fearlessly and triumphantly lead-. ing
their devoted soldiers against the Invaders of their native
land. They knew, too, that Hebert—the accomplished leader
of that veteran regiment, the Louisiana Third, which won so
many laurels on the bloody field of the Oak Hills, and which
then as well as now sustained the proud reputation of
Louisiana—was a prisoner in their hands. They were not slow
to renew the attack; they opened upon us vigorously, but my
trusty men faltered not. They held their position unmoved
until (after several of the batteries not under my command
had left the field) they were ordered to retire. My troops
obeyed it unwillingly, with faces turned defiantly against
the foe.
It will be noticed that Price is not as frank as usual in giving reasons for his rapid retirement at the moment when, he claims, he was in the full flush of victory. "The retirement of several batteries not under my command" is a conspicuously inadequate excuse.