I find, therefore, that it was a natural condition of affairs which spontaneously brought to the surface this thought of an alliance between England and the United States. In the course of events, the situation of England and the United States, standing vis-à-vis to all, or several, of the continental powers, was a strong possibility, and it set the English-speaking races seriously thinking about their fate under such circumstances. The political and military horoscope of Europe was laid bare to them, and they were confronted, for the first time in their history, with the possibility of a war in which they might find themselves in armed opposition to two, or more, or all, of the continental powers of Europe. In truth, many urgent and earnest appeals were, and are, constantly made, in desultory newspaper articles, and in various unofficial ways, in favour of a coalition of the continental powers of Europe against what is termed {51} the "Anglo-Saxon race." The usual arguments are used and the usual epithets applied. They are accused, as race attributes, of "greed," "rapacity," "brutality," and, what is worse, of "hypocrisy." Engaged, as we of the United States were at that period, in a war which we believed to be righteous, we were for the first time in a position to estimate at their proper value such accusations when applied to England herself, and how far they might be considered as the product of senseless fear and blind jealousy and envy.
Before the Spanish War began, no one seriously thought of, or considered, an alliance. It is true that the reading classes among us generally found that in proportion as their knowledge extended beyond one or two given points, their respect and admiration for England became increasingly great. But in practice it was always with some difficulty that the ordinary affairs of national intercourse and business could be adjusted between her and the United States. Like members of the same family, we became easily excited, and were always ready, under such circumstances, to say disagreeable, intemperate, and biting things of each other.
England's covert support and open sympathy with the United States changed our feelings towards the mother country; it awakened our gratitude, and aroused European fear and envy. When Manila was captured by Dewey a new scene in international history was unfolded. The event revealed to the full gaze of astonished Europe the tremendous power and influence of the {52} British Empire and the United States acting in concert.
While there was no actual compact or treaty between the English and Americans, the diplomats of Europe were quick to imagine one. A spectre is always more alarming, and often more effective, than a reality. The situation of affairs was the same as if a treaty had actually existed. The friction, the misunderstandings, the fretfulness, which theretofore existed between the United States and England, and which the other powers of Europe relied upon as a sufficient barrier to prevent any concerted policy between them, suddenly disappeared, and they stood before the world as friends and allies. Here was a new and undreamed-of combination. The cards of diplomacy must be reshuffled, and in future deals the strong possibility of the Anglo-Saxon race being found together, solidly unified, must be considered and provided against.
It should be remembered, that the support given to the Americans, in the Spanish War, was not merely formal, although not sanctioned by treaty. It subjected England to the risk of being involved in serious complications with the other nations of Europe. She took all the risk and responsibility of allowing an impression to prevail that her sympathy, and support, if need be, were with the United States. All the moral force of an actual treaty resulted to the United States from the situation. The position of England, in fact, was precisely the same as if she had openly avowed {53} herself as, and contracted to become, an ally of the United States, and the Americans distinctively gained by it. This episode cannot now be lightly brushed aside. It should never be forgotten by the American people. It was a generous act on the part of the British nation openly to tender its sympathy to the United States. It was voluntary and unsolicited. England did not stop to discuss and analyse the causes of the war with Spain. She placed herself by our side on the broad grounds familiar to her own people, and gave us full credit for the rectitude of our intentions, as proclaimed by ourselves.
There was no qualification attached to her sympathy. It would have been an easy task for casuists and international lawyers to have raised an argument in favour of Spain, but it was not heard in England. There were no public meetings in the British Empire to protest against our war with Spain: none of her orators, or well-known public men, or high officials, denounced our conduct as unjustifiable or unrighteous. Not a word of that kind was heard from any respectable quarter. There was never an occasion in history when national gratitude was more justly due from one nation to another. The less we say as to how this debt has been repaid the better our feelings and manners. We must, at least, candidly admit that many American criticisms of England in the Boer War have been in a very different spirit—sufficiently ill-bred, harsh, and unfriendly. That may be passed by. Difference of opinion on such subjects {54} is natural, and language is generally exaggerated in proportion to ignorance of the subject. But a more recently developed sentiment among us is deserving of severer censure: a few of our people are disposed to turn the sympathy and assistance of England at that critical moment into a ground of complaint against her; not only is her friendship denied and denounced, but she is accused of having beguiled us into the paths of imperialism, and our rulers share in the denunciation, as having succumbed to her blandishments—a monstrous and wholly unique instance of political perversity.
It must not be assumed, however, that a feeling of gratitude, on the part of the United States, should be manifested or repaid by making an alliance with England. This would be mere sentiment,—commendable but misplaced. An alliance based upon such a foundation would be built upon quicksand. Gratitude is a noble quality, but it is more dangerous than gunpowder when applied to political affinities.
But to return to the main subject; the thought of an alliance between the English-speaking people grew out of the Spanish-American War, and speculations, at first limited to a purely military view, of an offensive and defensive treaty between the two nations, for temporary purposes, have gradually grown and enlarged, until they have led to conjecture concerning the whole future of the English-speaking nations, their wealth and resources, their religious, moral, and political growth and destiny: they have also led to researches into {55} the history of the past; thus embracing both a backward and forward view.
Happily, the thought of an alliance has sunk deeply into the minds of many serious people, who realise that in a seemingly accidental, certainly unpremeditated, way, a great historical truth has been uncovered, which, in its full growth and maturity, may lead to the greatest epoch in the history of the English-speaking race. The Spanish-American War, lamentable as it was in some of its aspects, inevitable in others, surprising in all, may hereafter be regarded as an event of supreme importance in the history of England and the United States, just as the accidental discovery of the Corpus Juris Civilis was to the world of that period, in enabling it to form new conceptions of law, and through these conceptions to advance many steps in its progress from barbarism to civilisation; or, to bring the illustration closer home to us, as the accidental assembling of a few enterprising men in a London inn gave rise to the undertaking of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and that, in its indirect results, to the enormous possibilities inherent in the fact of the establishment of the Anglo-Saxon race on this continent.