With Canada a separate nation, as she is now, a real, lasting entente between the British Empire and the United States, is impossible.
"'T is true 't is pity; and pity 't is 't is true."
{160}
At the first blush I am sure to encounter reluctance and opposition on all sides—from the Canadians as well as the English and Americans. I meet at the outset sentiment and pride, two of the strongest and most invincible sentinels that guard the approach to human reason and judgment. As Mr. Lecky says: "The sentiment of nationality is one of the strongest and most respectable by which human beings are actuated. No other has produced a greater amount of heroism and self-sacrifice, and no other, when it has been seriously outraged, leaves behind it such enduring and such dangerous discontent."[1]
While the bond existing between England and Canada is sentimental and as "light as air," it creates a union between the two people "as strong as iron." Canada would never renounce England's formal sovereignty without her fullest and freest consent; and I believe England would exhaust the last drop of her blood to prevent a forcible annexation. Canadian sentiment and English pride stand ready to oppose the proposition. The United States, on the other hand, does not seek or want Canada to join the Union, and deep and strong opposition to such a course may also be encountered here. On the mere face of the question, therefore, annexation seems difficult and hard to accomplish. It should not be forced. It cannot be bought. Neither arms, money, nor commercial advantages can be of themselves sufficient potent factors to accomplish this end. It {161} must come voluntarily: it must spring from the hearts of the people. It is well not to underestimate the difficulties of the proposition, and with that view I have gone beneath the surface in search of higher and nobler motives than those which ordinarily impel individual or national action. In this way only can sentiment be satisfied and pride placated. But it will be argued by some, ice must be broken to reach annexation; if all three parties interested must be converted to this view, why not, if it is to come at all, leave it to the "fulness of time," or, in other words, to processes entirely natural. As it now stands, say they, there is no impelling necessity, no heavy past experience of evils to force us together, as in the case of Scotland, and of our thirteen original States—no circumstances, on the other hand, that directly favour it.
But I ask the Canadians, the English, and the Americans, in all seriousness, When will the "fulness of time" occur? I assert that the fulness of time has been reached, and that the natural processes have matured. They have ripened over night as the result of years being crowded into two events—the Spanish-American and the Boer Wars. These wars show us our weaknesses and our strength.
The Anglo-Saxons, to be impregnable, must be united. I shudder to draw the reverse picture. Shall we wait until a dispute occurs between us? Shall we fold our arms until a war breaks out, and reveals through its lurid light our real relation to {162} each other? Thucydides says: "In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the dominion of imperious necessities."[2] If we wait until our necessities tell us that we belong to one family and should be confederated together, who can divine the conditions and inequalities which will result? Can we not now, therefore, look the situation fully and candidly in the face, and decide calmly and dispassionately in what our best interests consist?
I admit that the mere aggrandisement of the United States by the extension of her territory; the benefit to Canada by opening the door to material development and improved commercial privileges; the release of England from the heavy and unprofitable responsibility of defending Canada against attacks by the United States,—these are influences which, though none are more weighty and important, would not of themselves operate to produce annexation. They must be combined with others, connected with the future welfare and progress of all the three powers involved. We must all see and realise that our future onward march can only be successfully made together. Interest, in other words, must be combined with sentiment. In the great march towards civilisation we cannot take separate paths. The Anglo-Saxons must go together.
I take it for granted, therefore, that we truly believe the solidarity of the Anglo-Saxon races is the {163} great desideratum of this century; and that although it may be more important to England than to the United States or Canada to hasten this result, yet all three are so bound up together that in the end they are vitally interested in bringing about a common understanding as quickly as circumstances will admit it.
The present relation which Canada and the United States and England bear to each other confirms this last view. England is the third party standing between Canada and the United States in the negotiation. What is her position? What are her interests? What position has she in the ultimate annexation of Canada? What should she do—aid or oppose annexation? I shall endeavour to answer these questions satisfactorily.