The present Dominion of Canada, consisting of the Provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, and the other unorganised territories, was created by virtue of the Act of the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain, entitled "The British North American Act, 1867." This Statute practically constituted the Dominion of Canada an independent nation, subject only to the Imperial power of Great Britain as to its foreign relations. Since its passage the English Government exercises no more actual rule in the Dominion of Canada than it does in Chicago or New York; in fact, Canada can even maintain formidable tariffs to keep Great Britain out of her markets. I do not overlook the fact that Canadian co-operation, {164} in men and money, may always be relied upon by the mother country in the time of her need, nor do I belittle the moral support which the Canadians will extend to her when required. Canada is a pure and shining jewel in her imperial crown.
Therefore she would undoubtedly make sacrifices in parting with Canada. But she could not retain Canada by force against the will of the latter; and she would not do so even if she could. While it is also true that a formal English representation is still kept up, the Dominion of Canada as a matter of fact, through a Governor-General, is now bound to Great Britain, notwithstanding the forms created by the Act of 1867, only by a mere sentimental tie—a bond of sympathy recently, by the Boer War, renewed and strengthened and now so strong that both Canada and Great Britain would probably exhaust themselves in endeavouring to maintain it if sought to be forcibly rent asunder. Such is the ligament which binds these two powers. Conquest in such a case, even in the event of war, is out of the question. If the Canadians were subdued by the Americans, God forbid that they should sink so low in the scale of generosity and national manhood as to forcibly annex them to their Government! And, if conquest will not avail, it requires something more than logic and selfish argument to dissolve such a tie. The particular sympathy which exists between Canada and the British Empire must be balanced by the future vital interests of the whole Anglo-Saxon people; and while mere selfish interests might not {165} alone appeal to these three nations to agree voluntarily to annexation, the ultimate safety, welfare, progress, and unity of the whole Anglo-Saxon race should affect them when everything else might fail. Would the Canadians stand in the way of the accomplishment of such a mighty result? Would not England under such circumstances generously yield to a request of Canada for consent to annexation?
I shall endeavour to traverse the whole field of the discussion, and lay bare every view that can influence fair and honest judgment. As a matter of fact, the position of England, as she stands between Canada and the United States, is not an enviable one. She is liable any minute to be involved in a war with the latter power on account of the former, in whom she has not a great material interest, and from whom her people receive very little appreciable benefit. As a question of mere selfish policy, therefore, England has everything to gain by the annexation of Canada to the United States, and everything to lose by continuing to be her formal sovereign and her actual champion. It is true, that under the present relations, if unhappily a war should ever occur between England and the United States, England might worry the United States through Canada, but it is not too much to say that this worriment would be of short duration. Any misunderstanding between Canada and the United States, involving war, precipitates England in a bloody and ruinous contest with the United States, without having the slightest {166} material interest in the issue. She would gain by being relieved of this immense burden of responsibility, which exists without any adequate quid pro quo, or corresponding advantage. What more trying position for England than the necessity of championing quarrels not of her own making, where both of the contending parties have claims upon her forbearance, and in a sphere where her powers and resources would have to be employed to the full, and then only wasted? There arises out of these conditions a question of grave import, whether any nation is justified, before its own people, in assuming such a burdensome relation. I do not argue the point, I merely ask the question—"Has England the right to spill the blood of her people and spend their money; should she involve the happiness and future of her citizens to maintain this purely sentimental tie?" Quite apart from all this, it is reasonably certain, judging from her conduct towards her other colonies, that if Canada should desire to disrupt the formal relations existing between herself and England, the latter power would acquiesce upon a simple request.
I pass, then, to the relations between Canada and the United States accruing out of England's position. In the event of a dispute between England and the United States, Canada, although perfectly disinterested in the quarrel, is liable to be drawn into a war, because she happens to have a formal relation with England, and acknowledges that power as sovereign. The first shock of a war {167} between England and the United States would be felt by Canada. Her condition is paradoxical; it creates a dilemma; it evolves a situation most remarkable and striking. England can be forced into a war because of her empty and hollow sovereignty over Canada; Canada is subject to destruction because she officially acknowledges England's sovereignty. Either nation is liable to invasion and devastation, if not ruin, because of formal ties. If the power of England were to decline and wane,—which Heaven forbid!—what would be the future of Canada? Isolated from England, where could she turn, except to the one contiguous power of the United States, and perhaps under circumstances far less pleasant than those which would accompany a voluntary union. These are serious aspects of the question. Standing alone, notwithstanding their importance, these considerations might not be overpowering, but if the situation described above can be dissipated by a free, voluntary, honourable, and wholesome alliance, is it not for the advantage of all that it be accomplished, thereby removing for all time the serious consequences which may at any moment arise from these formal and anomalous conditions? Remove the cause and avoid the result.
But there are other views which must not be overlooked or disregarded. Canada is a friendly neighbour of the United States, but a fast-growing commercial rival. Separated as adjoining owners are from each other, by a mere partition, a division line, and capable of walking upon the other's {168} territory at will, the results of this physical contiguity are easily foretold. Jealousies, rivalries, encroachments upon each other, and grievances fast piling up between them, are liable to set the feelings and passions of their people afire by the most insignificant discord or incident. But why cannot we live together as Christian neighbours and friends, striving to reach a common goal, and attending to our own affairs? So far as mere physical area is concerned, there is undoubtedly room for two Anglo-Saxon nations to exist separately and independently upon this continent, working out their own destinies in their own way, and not only undisturbed, but aided and encouraged by each other. Moreover, as Canada is the weaker nation, the Americans should treat her not only fairly, but generously. I think that this spirit predominates among the greater portion of the people of the United States to-day. I do not believe there are any considerable number of Americans anxious to have Canada become a member of their political household, except by her free and unqualified consent. I know there are only a few who would think of force or purchase to consummate that result. But, on the other hand, there are many Canadians and Americans who would welcome annexation if it could be brought about graciously and naturally. If Canada and the United States could exist as independent nations; if their political orbits (in other words their laws of movement) were fixed externally apart; if by commercial treaties they would open to each other free and unrestricted {169} trade; if their citizens would intermingle not as jealous rivals and strangers, but as fair competitors and friends, their international existence would be ideal. As long as we are separated, I insist that decency and good manners should teach us to treat Canada as a friend and neighbour. We should study the rights and duties of meum et tuum. And no matter what eventually becomes of the proposition here suggested, we should be generous and broad in our treatment of her. But is it safe to expect all this? Is it human nature? Will not self-interest and temporary advantage dominate our behaviour when the critical moment comes? I appeal to the good sense and judgment of the Anglo-Saxon people; I point to all history to answer these questions. I interject no opinion of my own, except so far as it is founded upon the actions of states and nations situated similarly to the United States and Canada. What has been the result? If mutual consent has not brought them together, has not union been accomplished by force? It would have been ideal for the original thirteen States to have existed as independent nations, developing and extending themselves into the highest stages of civilisation; but aside from the immediate necessity which drove them into a federation, how long could they have existed apart as independent states? The cities of Greece remained separate and independent for ages, but they at length succumbed, vainly striving to combine when combination was too late. And what was their condition before this? Were they not constantly at war {170} with each other? Are not some of our most glowing illustrations of the efficiency and soundness of confederate governments drawn from the history of Grecian cities; and is not the language of Professor Freeman, in speaking of these Greek cities, most strikingly and forcibly applicable to Canada and the United States?
"But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of separate free cities, an evil which becomes only more intense as they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. (And I might add commercial rivalry.) This is the constant state of war which is almost sure to be the result. When each town is perfectly independent and sovereign, acknowledging no superior upon earth, multitudes of disputes, which in a great monarchy or a federal republic, may be decided by peaceful tribunals, can be settled by nothing but an appeal to the sword. The thousand causes which involve large neighbouring states in warfare all exist, and all are endowed with tenfold force in the case of independent city commonwealths. Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs done to individual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns a neighbour into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form condensed and intensified by the very minuteness of the scene on which they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the inhabitants of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of hearsay: but a rival whose dwelling-place is within sight of the city gates quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt. The highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly been found in the local antipathies between neighbouring cities.[2] . . . The greatest work that orator or diplomat ever achieved was when Demosthenes induced the two cities to lay aside their differences and join in one common struggle for the defence of Greece against the Macedonian invader."[3]
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Another authority develops the same views:
"Neighbouring nations are natural enemies of each other, unless their common weakness forces them to league in a confederate republic, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighbourhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all States to aggrandise themselves at the expense of their neighbours."
This sentence is quoted by Alexander Hamilton,[5]. in reference to which the latter adds this significant remark: "This passage at the same time points out the evil and suggests the remedy."