At 6.14 P.M. the enemy’s salvoes were falling near ships of the 1st Battle Squadron, and the Marlborough’s Division of the Battle Squadron became engaged with some ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at 6.17 P.M. immediately after turning for the deployment. At this time fire was opened by the Marlborough on a ship stated to be of the “Kaiser” class, at a range of 13,000 yards and on a bearing 20° abaft the starboard beam; this knowledge enables us to deduce the position of the van of the German Battle Fleet at this time.
Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy’s Fleet steering to the eastward, the battle cruisers leading, followed by the Battle Fleet in single line, the order being, four ships of the “König” class in the van, followed by ships of the “Kaiser” and “Heligoland” classes, the rear of the line being invisible. A report that had reached me at 4.48 P.M. from the Commodore of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron indicated that ships of the “Kaiser” class were in the van of the Battle Fleet. The order of the Fleet may have been changed subsequent to this report, but there is no doubt that ships of the “König” class led during the Fleet action. The point is not, however, of importance.
At about 6.38 P.M. the 6th Division was in line and our deployment was complete.
Enemy shells had been falling close to the Colossus and her 5th Division since 6.18 P.M., and these ships opened fire at 6.30 P.M.; but the conditions of visibility made it difficult to distinguish the enemy’s battleships.
At 6.23 P.M. a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed down the line, on the starboard, or engaged, side of our Fleet, apparently partly disabled. Her identity could not at the time he clearly established, but her German colours were flying and she was in a position for attacking the Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 P.M. the Iron Duke fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with turret guns by other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear of the line.
At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible to form an opinion on board the Iron Duke, in her position towards the centre of the line, as to the formation of the enemy’s Fleet. The identity of ships in sight on the starboard beam was not even sufficiently clear for me to permit of fire being opened; but at 6.30 P.M. it became certain that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of the Battle Fleet and that the vessels then before the beam were battleships of the “König” class. The order was, therefore, given to open fire, and the Iron Duke engaged what appeared to be the leading battleship at a range of 12,000 yards on a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other ships of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squadron) opened fire at about the same time, and the van divisions (2nd Battle Squadron) very shortly afterwards; these latter ships reported engaging enemy battle cruisers as well as battleships. The fire of the Iron Duke, which came more directly under my personal observation, was seen to be immediately effective, the third and fourth salvoes fired registering several palpable hits. It appeared as if all the enemy ships at that time in sight from the Iron Duke (not more than three or four, owing to smoke and mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second battleship was seen to turn out of the line badly on fire, and settling by the stern. A large number of observers in the Thunderer, Benbow, Barham, Marne, Morning Star and Magic stated afterwards that they saw this ship blow up at 6.50 P.M.
The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged about 12,000 yards to the southward, though much less on other bearings, but ranges could not at times be obtained from the range-finders of the Iron Duke at a greater distance than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 P.M., in a temporary clear channel through the mist, good ranges of 15,000 yards were obtained of a battleship at which four salvoes were fired by the Iron Duke before she was again hidden by smoke and mist. The very baffling light was caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly also by the heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the opposing Fleets. The direction of the wind was about west-south-west with a force 2, causing the enemy’s funnel smoke to drift towards our line, thus further obscuring our view of his Fleet.
The visibility at the rear of the battle line was apparently greater than in the centre at about 7 P.M., and the enemy’s fire, which was probably being concentrated on our rear ships, was more accurate at this period, but quite ineffective, only one ship, the Colossus, being hit by gunfire, although numerous projectiles were falling near the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons.
Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the Battle Fleet could see only three or four enemy vessels at any one time, those in the ships of the rear division did occasionally see as many as eight, and were consequently better able to distinguish the formation and movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing to the small number of ships in sight, due to smoke and mist, to distribute the fire of the battleships by signal in the customary manner; the only course to adopt was for the captains to direct the fire of their guns on to any target which they could distinguish.
The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-east by east, as already stated, but the van had hauled on to south-east without signal shortly after deployment in order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 P.M., as the range was apparently opening, the course was altered by signal to south “by divisions” in order to close the enemy. The King George V., leading the van of the Battle Fleet, had just anticipated this signal by turning to south. The alteration was made “by divisions” instead of “in succession” in order that the enemy should be closed more rapidly by the whole Battle Fleet.