This large turn (of four points) “by divisions” involved some small amount of “blanketing” of the rear ships of one division by the leading ships of that next astern, and at one time the Thunderer was firing over the bows of the Iron Duke, causing some slight inconvenience on the bridge of the latter ship; the “blanketing,” however, was unavoidable and the loss of fire involved was inappreciable.
At 6.45 P.M. one or two torpedoes crossed the track of the rear of our battle line, and the Marlborough altered course to avoid one. They were apparently fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which were barely visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to those on board the Iron Duke. They might, however, have been fired by enemy battleships which were within torpedo range, or by a submarine, the Revenge reporting that it was thought that one had been rammed by that ship. The tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by the observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very skilful handling of the ships by their captains.
At 6.45 P.M., however, a heavy explosion occurred under the fore bridge of the Marlborough, abreast the starboard forward hydraulic engine-room. The ship took up a list of some seven degrees to starboard, but continued in action so effectively that she avoided three more torpedoes shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.3 P.M., and at 7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König” class, hitting her so frequently that she was seen to turn out of line.
The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to his flagship stated that the vessel had been struck by a “mine or torpedo.” It was assumed by me that a torpedo had hit the ship, as so many vessels had passed over the same locality without injury from mine. This proved to be the case, the track of this torpedo not having been sufficiently visible to enable Captain Ross to avoid it.
The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy’s torpedoes being visible was a matter of great surprise to me, and I think to other officers. Reports had been prevalent that the Germans had succeeded in producing a torpedo which left little or no track on the surface. The information as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one torpedo was reported by observers on board the destroyer Oak to have passed close ahead of the Iron Duke at about 7.35 P.M., finishing its run 2,000 yards beyond that ship, and a second was observed by the Benbow to pass apparently ahead of the Iron Duke at 8.30 P.M., neither of them was seen on board the flagship by the trained look-outs specially stationed for the purpose.
Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to south, a signal was made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to take station ahead of the Iron Duke and for the 1st Battle Squadron to form astern. This signal had, however, been already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the Iron Duke in accordance with the general battle orders giving discretionary powers to the commanders of squadrons, and the line had been partly reformed before the signal was made.
An incident occurred at about 6.47 P.M. which was an indication of the spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which it is impossible to speak too highly. The destroyer Acasta, which had been badly hit aft during her attack on enemy light cruisers in company with the Shark and had her engines disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her commanding officer, Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, signalled the condition of his ship to the Iron Duke as that ship passed, leaving the Acasta on her starboard or engaged side. The ship’s company was observed to be cheering each ship as they passed. It is satisfactory to relate that this destroyer and her gallant ship’s company were subsequently brought into Aberdeen, being assisted by the Nonsuch.
Shortly after 6.55 P.M. the Iron Duke passed the wreck of a ship with the bow and stern standing out of the water, the centre portion apparently resting on the bottom, with the destroyer Badger picking up survivors. It was thought at first that this was the remains of a German light cruiser, but inquiry of the Badger elicited the lamentable news that the wreck was that of the Invincible. It was assumed at the time that she had been sunk either by a mine or by a torpedo, and, in view of the safe passage of other ships in her vicinity, the latter appeared to be the more probable cause of her loss. Subsequent information, however, showed that she was destroyed by gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already recorded.
At 7 P.M. Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that the enemy was to the westward.
Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile, brought the enemy’s line into view once more, and between 7.0 and 7.30 P.M. the Battle Fleet was again in action with battleships and also battle cruisers, as they could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period was very baffling. The range varied from as much as 15,000 yards at the van to as little as 8,000 in the rear, this difference in range indicating that the enemy’s Fleet was turning to the westward, as shown in the accompanying plan facing [page 358].