In 1905 Delcassé was quietly preparing to carry out his plan for the development of Morocco, when the kaiser landed in Tangiers without the slightest warning, and announced in a public address that he had come to visit his friend, the independent sultan of Morocco, in whose country all foreign nations had equal rights. The speech was received by the world as a challenge to France and a means of announcing that Germany was no longer to be ignored. The moment of the landing at Tangiers was well chosen by the kaiser; for only three weeks earlier Russia, the ally of France, had been defeated by the Japanese at Mukden and could give her no assistance.
In this unfortunate situation it was necessary for France to bend before the storm. She agreed to submit the whole Moroccan question to an international congress, thus appealing to the principle of the Concert of Europe, and when she learned that the kaiser demanded that she dismiss the minister whose hands had been played so skillfully against Germany, she agreed to that also.
The dismissal of Delcassé recalls an incident of 1807. In that year Napoleon forced the king of Prussia to dismiss Stein, his great minister, who was bending all his efforts to reëstablish Prussia on a war footing. It marked the triumph of Napoleon’s power for the time being, but it was a futile action; for Stein out of office under such circumstances had more influence than ever, and the shameful way in which he was treated only emphasized Prussia’s humiliation and made the Prussians more determined than ever to assert their national power. Similar results in France in 1905 followed the stab given to that nation’s faithful and efficient minister.
The international congress assembled at Algeciras in 1906. It adopted a compromise decision, which gave something to each side and satisfied neither. Germany was supposed to have gained when the congress recognized the territorial integrity of Morocco under the sovereignty of the sultan and guaranteed equal rights of trade in the country to the citizens of all the signatory powers. On the other hand, France and Spain were jointly to have the right to instruct and furnish officers for the Moroccan police force. Winning in a quarrel rarely makes the victor think well of the vanquished. Certainly Germany, who had now blocked the plans of France, was not less bitter in her attitude toward that nation; while France, feeling that she had been caught at a disadvantage, smothered her indignation and waited for the opportunity to make things even.
In 1907 disturbances occurred in Moroccan ports and French marines were landed to preserve order. When they were not withdrawn in a year Germany protested and an irritating diplomatic discussion followed. At last Germany was persuaded to submit the point actually at issue to the Hague tribunal, whose decision was not conclusive and satisfied neither side. Then a Franco-German convention was held to pass on the rights of each nation in Morocco. Its decision, given in February, 1909, announced that the interest of Germany in the province was only economic; and as France agreed to give equal protection in such matters, the kaiser promised he would not interfere in the country. In each of these incidents war seemed about to begin, and Europe awaited the results in great anxiety. When the clouds lifted the nations breathed freely again.
Still there was no way under the existing system to solve the difficulty that presented itself, had Germany only decided that she would not trust her cause to peaceful negotiation. The fact that she took such a step was to her own people but a mark of the kaiser’s love of peace. This and similar incidents, in which the militarists carried their country to the verge of war only to be held back by the hand of the emperor served to lay the foundation for that popular belief in Germany that a peace policy had been steadily followed under provocations and that Europe was indebted to Wilhelm II for immunity from war. In reality the system of balance of power had needlessly brought the world to the verge of a bitter and unnecessary conflict.
Almost immediately after the war clouds lifted Europe had evidence of the small amount of tolerance the leading classes of Germany had for the slightest manifestation of the spirit of compromise in the matter under discussion. The chancellor under whom the recent settlement was made was von Bülow, who thought it better to adjust so small a quarrel than to incur the responsibility of war. His action received the stern denunciation of the military party. So strong was the criticism that he was forced to retire from office, his place going to Bethmann-Hollweg, who had the support of the militarists. The only explanation to be advanced for this turn of the affair is that the German national spirit was so much excited by the long agitation of men like Treitschke that a concession which others might consider only trifling seemed to them a sacrifice of national honor.
In 1911 occurred a third Moroccan incident, in which Bethmann-Hollweg took occasion to recover some of the attitude of assertiveness that von Bülow had given up in 1909. In pursuance of their plan to extend their protectorate over Morocco the French occupied Fez with a military force. A short time later the German warship Panther entered the Moroccan port of Agadir, ostensibly to protect German property. It was soon known that the German government proposed to hold the Panther at Agadir until the French withdrew from Fez. The war spirit again flared up. Russia still suffered from the wounds received from the hands of the Japanese, which Germany well knew; but Great Britain was in fighting condition and announced her support of France. After a short discussion Germany took a more complaisant attitude, and a settlement was made whereby the French were allowed a protectorate over Morocco on condition that they guarantee an “open door” in Moroccan trade and transfer to Germany two valuable strips of territory in the French Congo region.
Again Europe breathed easily, and again wise men reflected that no real settlement had been made. France had been bluffed out of a valuable portion of her Congo colony and was not disposed to endure the affront longer than was necessary. Some day Russia would be fully restored to her strength and ready to help her ally in the face of German aggression. Until then France would have to yield. Meanwhile she was consoled by the reflection that Great Britain had pronounced for her openly. That was something to take to heart. The great sea power, though slow to anger, was at last conscious of her danger if Germany overran France and seized a channel port.
On the other hand, Germany was not fully pleased at the outcome of the affair. The appearance of Great Britain in it was an indication that the Entente was a thing of vitality. Germany had been forced to moderate her demands, taking colonial territory while her whole thought for the future was not developing African colonies but curbing the power of France. Not only was France not checked, but she was much strengthened in a vital part of her power. She had acquired lands in just the region that she needed them to carry out her ambition to control the western end of the Mediterranean. If some day Spain were to become a republic, could she fail to establish cordial relations with the republic of France, and thus be swept into the anti-German group? It may well be that in these reflections were born two German impulses: first to win Great Britain to some kind of a compromise with Germany, detaching her, at least for a time, from the Entente; and second, to strike a vital blow before Russia was entirely recovered. Within the next three years she acted on each of these impulses.