The History of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, in the War, 1914-1918.

by John Victor Macartney-Filgate

Already severe casualties had been suffered by the 156th Brigade south-east of Zillebeke, who since September 5th had been in action under the 24th Divisional Artillery, while the 162nd Brigade working parties had also borne the weight of the hostile fire. From the 15th onwards, however, conditions became far more severe, for on that day began the organised bombardment by our guns prior to the forthcoming attack, and the resulting increase of counter-battery work by the enemy. On September 13th the 156th was put under the control of the 23rd Divisional Artillery on the relief by the latter of the 24th, and with A/103 formed part of the right group under Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler (O.C. 156th Brigade) whose headquarters were at Tor Top. On its arrival in the line on the 14th the 162nd Brigade was also controlled by the 23rd Divisional Artillery, but, with the exception of C/162 which was placed in the right group, the batteries went to form part of the left group, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Groves (O.C. 103rd Brigade) whose own batteries less A/103 made up the rest of the group. "A," "B" and D/162 lay on the northern, southern and western edges of Maple Copse (due east of Zillebeke) while C/162 was in action just south of Fosse Wood; the positions of the 156th Brigade have already been noted.

Scale 1:20,000.

It will be remembered that throughout July and August, 1917, a succession of big attacks was carried out by the British troops in the Ypres Sector, with the object of driving the enemy back from the semi-circle of low-lying hills which overlooked our trenches in the Salient. The proposed coastal operations of the foregoing chapter had, indeed, been planned in connection with the Ypres offensive, and with the breaking off of the former the batteries were sent down to take part in further undertakings against the Passchendaele-Gheluvelt ridge. The ill-omened autumn offensive against the Passchendaele ridge was, in fact, about to begin, and the first battle of the series was fixed for September 20th. For this, the limits of the zone covered by the Divisional Artillery were Clapham Junction on the north and Dumbarton Lakes on the south, the 162nd taking the left portion of the zone, that is from the northern limit for 700 yards southwards to Polderhoek Château, the 156th the right portion of the zone from Dumbarton Lakes 700 yards northwards; the middle gap was covered by the centre group of which the 33rd Divisional Artillery formed no part. It had been extraordinarily hard to find any marked feature upon which to range the guns, but Gheluvelt Mill, situated as it was upon a small mound, offered a tolerably clear feature for registration purposes, and this was utilised by the majority of the battery commanders prior to the barrages which now began.

The whole barrage table for the forthcoming attack had, by the 15th, been issued to the batteries, and the practice barrages which now began to be carried out consisted sometimes of portions of this table, sometimes of the complete barrage fired in its entirety. As a rule these "rehearsals" were fired at half the rate which would be used on the day of the attack, but the same proportions of shrapnel, H.E. and smoke shell were adhered to, and therefore if only a part even of the barrage were fired—such as the portion behind which the infantry would advance from the first to the second objective—the curtain of fire as it appeared on the ground would offer an exact model of the real attack barrage, except for a certain diminution of density. This fact was important, for it was realised that the bad state of the ground to be attacked over would force the infantry to advance very slowly, and that therefore a great deal depended upon the barrage to keep enemy machine-gun fire down until our infantry could get to grips with their assailants. Every day one and sometimes two practice barrages were fired, and on each occasion one officer of considerable experience was sent up from every artillery group to observe the effect thereof. In particular, reports were rendered dealing with the density of the barrage, whether all batteries opened fire simultaneously, whether there were any gaps or rounds falling short, whether the average height of the shrapnel bursts was correct and whether the barrage crept forward uniformly. After every barrage these reports were examined and collected, and before the next practice was carried out the necessary alterations had been made.

The first practice barrage began at 4.0 P.M. on September 15th and was carried out along the whole Corps front; followed certain minor adjustments, and at 5.30 A.M. on the 16th it was fired again. At 10.0 A.M. on the same day an "Army barrage," i.e., a barrage on the whole of the Army front, was fired, to be followed on the afternoon of the 17th by another Corps barrage. On September 18th the last two Army barrages were fired, one at 6.0 A.M. and one at 8.30 P.M., and at 11.0 A.M. on the 19th the Corps had its last rehearsal. It was a relief when these practices were over; they invariably called down heavy retaliation from the enemy who, as soon as he saw an infantry attack was not pending, turned the full blast of his guns on to our batteries. It was impossible to cease firing and put the detachments under cover, for this action would have resulted in gaps appearing in the barrage and confusing the observers who, unaware of what was happening, would have reported that the barrage was uneven and full of "holes." The programme had to be carried out from start to finish whatever the enemy did, and if the batteries lost heavily in these days it was all that was to be expected of the Salient. Lose heavily they did, both in officers and men, and as the latter stood around their guns in the small hours of the 20th, ready to begin this time the real barrage covering the assault, there was not one detachment which had not already been seriously depleted in numbers, which had not been compelled to call up considerable reinforcements from the wagon-lines.

It was on September 18th that the orders had been received which fixed the 20th as the day of attack, and on the last two nights, the 18th/19th and 19th/20th, the howitzers of both brigades busied themselves with prolonged gas bombardments of the enemy batteries. The only hope of salvation for the guns lay in silencing some of those batteries, and they knew that their chances of surviving the long all-day barrage which they were to carry out on the day of the attack rested almost entirely on the efforts of the two preceding nights, and on the work of the heavy artillery which, by intense counter-battery work on the 20th, would try to keep down the enemy fire.

Twenty minutes to six in the morning of Thursday, the 20th, had been fixed for the delivery of the assault, and some thirty minutes before this the detachments of all batteries manned their guns and stood by, ready for the signal to go. Very feverish were those last few minutes of waiting, for nearly every battery was being heavily shelled, and it was probable that, as soon as the attack was launched, the enemy guns which were causing all the trouble would come under the counter-fire of our own "heavies," and would at any rate diminish the now alarmingly heavy fire which they were directing upon the wretched detachments.

With terrible slowness and deliberation the minutes passed; 5·9 in. and 4·2 in. shell were crashing every moment into the battery positions, ammunition was exploding, men were being knocked out and a number of direct hits were destroying the guns, killing and wounding every single man of the detachments. In some of the batteries a few more minutes of this would have put every gun out of action, but mercifully zero hour was at last reached, a sheet of flame lit up the entire countryside and with a great roar the barrage began. The batteries of the 33rd Division poured forth a curtain of fire in front of the advancing infantry, the heavy artillery bombarded the enemy batteries and roads, and, whatever happened all round them, whatever bombardment they suffered, the detachments were now fully occupied and took heed of nothing but their work. The assault had begun!

The infantry who were even now advancing under cover of the guns of, amongst others, the 156th and 162nd Brigades were, as already stated, troops of the 23rd Division. On the right the attack was continued by the 41st Division, on the left by the 2nd Australian Division, and together the long line advanced slowly through the mud towards the enemy trenches. The ground was very bad; it was estimated that the infantry advancing across No Man's Land could not cover one hundred yards in less than six minutes, and accordingly the barrage was so timed as to move forward twenty-five yards every minute and a half. Even at this slow pace the infantry were hard put to keep up with it, while the work of the gunners was rendered exceedingly heavy; for the ultimate objectives were fairly deep within the enemy lines, and with the barrage moving so slowly the infantry were not due to reach their farthest goal till a late hour, while an intense rate of fire had to be maintained over their heads the whole time. Moreover, there was not one battery which by now had not had some of its guns knocked out, and the speed of the remainder had, of necessity, to be increased in order to keep up the full volume of fire.