From 5.40 A.M. onwards the batteries roared forth at intense rate; slowly the barrage crept on ahead of the infantry till it reached and covered the first objective; halted there for fifty minutes while the assaulting troops reorganised themselves, and at 7.8 A.M. moved off to the second objective, now at the slower rate of one hundred yards in eight minutes. At 7.40 A.M. the second objective was reached and covered, and for two hours and thirteen minutes a protective barrage was maintained what time both infantry brigades in the forward line brought up their reserve battalions for the attack on the 3rd and last objective. At 9.53 A.M. the last phase of the attack began and, moving forward now at only ten yards per minute, the barrage started to creep towards the third objective, reached it at twenty-five minutes past ten and, passing over it, put up a protective curtain of fire beyond while the infantry established themselves in the newly won trenches. This protective barrage, covering as it did the ultimate objective of the day's fighting, had to be maintained until well on in the afternoon; since it was fired at a slower rate, however, it now became possible to relieve some of the detachments at the guns and to set about clearing up the battery positions.
As already described, nearly all the batteries were heavily shelled just before the launching of the attack early in the morning. Shortly after the earlier phases of the barrage this hostile bombardment had eased off under the counter-battery work of our own heavy artillery, but throughout the morning—and, in fact, during the whole of that day and night—every one of the battery positions was searched and swept at intervals by 5·9 in. and 4·2 in. howitzers, the resulting damage to personnel and equipment being very great. With gun muzzles pointed now to a high elevation, small detachments maintained a protective barrage at a slow rate of fire while the remainder of the men—after eating a hasty meal—began to repair and reorganise the positions.
Yawning holes gaped everywhere; guns had been knocked out and had to be dragged from the pits on to the road; ammunition, buried or scattered by hostile fire, was dug up; the dead were removed and placed away near the road, whither presently a wagon would come for them, while the gun pits themselves required to be rebuilt so as to be fit for the new guns which the wagon-lines had already been ordered to bring up. It was gloomy work, this, and was rendered all the more depressing by the certain knowledge that presently the enemy would open fire and would wreak the same havoc all over again, but the outstanding necessity presented itself of keeping every gun and every battery fully ready at a moment's notice to support the infantry and prepared to open fire on any target within range.
All this time news at the batteries had been scarce. A Captain from the right and left artillery groups had been attached to the two infantry brigades (68th and 69th) covered by the guns, and, in addition, subalterns from the same artillery groups had accompanied the two assaulting battalions in the attack on the third objective. Their duty, however, was to report straight to Group headquarters, and therefore it was left to the batteries only to surmise from the continuity of the progress of the barrage that the attack must have, at any rate at first, succeeded. The primary objective—the "Red Line"—ran from Fitzclarence Farm through Herenthage Château to the eastern edge of Dumbarton Wood, while the second objective—the "Blue Line"—extended from a point midway between Black Watch Corner and Cameron House down east of Veldhoek to the eastern edge of Bass Wood, and, as the weight of artillery forming the barrage on the divisional front alone consisted of 84 18-pdrs., 30 4·5 in. howitzers and 42 heavier guns and howitzers, not counting the batteries detailed for special work, it was hoped that these two objectives at least might be overrun with comparative ease. It was in the advance to the "Green Line," the final objective of the day's battle, which ran from Carlisle Farm due south for eleven hundred yards, bending back slightly to the west of Gheluvelt Wood but embracing Tower Hamlets, that trouble might be forthcoming, for by then the enemy should have recovered from his first surprise and might offer very considerable resistance.
At last news was received. A short message stated that all objectives had been taken but that very heavy fighting had occurred in the advance upon the last objective, and only the excellence of the creeping barrage had made success possible. The official report written later by the 23rd Division stated: "The barrages were very punctual and effective. Prisoners seemed dazed and utterly demoralised. The creeping barrage from the second to the third objective and the protective barrage beyond the latter are deserving of special mention. Replies to S.O.S. were both prompt and effective, rapidly dispersing any attempts at concentration or counter-attack. This instilled great confidence into our infantry." These last remarks were not received till a later date; at the time there came only the bare news that all objectives had been taken and that a large part of the success gained was owed to the excellence of the barrage. It was good to learn that the day was won, that success had been achieved, and it offered some slight comfort to know that the service of the guns, which had involved such heavy losses amongst the detachments, had been of avail. Only on the right had non-success been met with, and there the left brigade of the 41st Division had been unable to advance beyond the second objective. The troops covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery, however, threw out a protective flank; the S.O.S. barrage was so arranged as especially to protect the right of the 23rd Division which was in the air except for the thin defensive flank already referred to, and gunners and infantry set themselves to watch for the inevitable counter-attacks.
All through the afternoon the batteries had been busy breaking up concentrations of the enemy, and hitherto had been successful in keeping them at bay. The valley of the Reutelbeek and the area around Reutel Village offered some cover, and continued calls from the infantry kept the guns at work on these areas. A determined counter-attack launched shortly after 7.0 P.M. was beaten off under our artillery fire; all night intermittent bursts from every battery swept the enemy hollows and approaches, and at 4.30 A.M. on the 21st a special barrage was fired with the object of breaking up any enemy operation which might have been planned for daybreak. By these means, and by continuing these methods throughout the day of the 21st, the infantry were able to maintain all their gains, and by the evening of the 21st were assured of their position. Two furious counter-attacks by the enemy, delivered after an artillery bombardment lasting one and a half hours in each case, were broken up at 3.0 P.M. and at 7.0 P.M. by our artillery fire, and gunners and infantry alike now set themselves to try and repair the wreckage of their positions before offensive operations should break out anew.
The heavy firing which preceded the attack, the all-day barrage which had been maintained on the 20th and the wastage of ammunition incurred through enemy shells blowing up the dumps around the guns necessitated very heavy work all through the 21st and 22nd in bringing up ammunition from the wagon-lines. The lines of the 162nd Brigade were a great deal too far back for carrying out so much gun-line work, and, as early as the 15th, forward wagon-lines composed of one section per battery had at first been maintained on the eastern outskirts of Dickebusch; later, after being heavily shelled on the night following the attack, they had been moved across the road to the neighbourhood of Dickebusch church. From here, and from the 156th Brigade lines a little farther back, parties of pack horses came up on the 21st to carry ammunition from the nearest dumps to the battery positions, for it was impossible in the majority of cases to bring ammunition wagons and teams anywhere near the guns. Light railway tracks had been run as far forward as possible, and, from the termini at Valley Cottages, Verbrandenmolen and other points which the little petrol-driven trucks were able to reach about once in four days, the pack animals carried the ammunition to the batteries. During the whole of the two days following the attack this transport of ammunition was carried out, although continually interrupted by hostile shell storms which inflicted many casualties amongst men and horses, and by the 23rd not only were dumps at the guns completely up to strength again, but further new guns had come up from the Corps gun "pool" on the Reninghelst-Steenvoorde Road, and had in the majority of cases replaced all the guns knocked out during the previous week's fighting.
It was well that the guns had succeeded in replenishing their ammunition on the 21st and 22nd, for on the 23rd began preparations for a fresh attack. Throughout the two preceding days the enemy had pounded and smashed every battery position in the attempt to prevent as far as possible any further operations, but as fast as the guns were damaged repairs were executed, and at seven o'clock in the morning of the 23rd every battery was able to take part in the Corps practice barrage which had been fixed for that hour. Like its predecessors it was fired at a reduced rate to that at which the real attack barrage was to be fired, and like its predecessors it called down severe hostile retaliation. C/162 (Major Hill) was so heavily shelled that it was compelled to move out to a fresh position three hundred yards to the left flank, and every battery received the usual searching which now had come to be regarded as inevitable, while the rest of the day saw shell storms of increasing violence delivered upon every area where any of our batteries were to be found.
On the night of September 24th/25th the infantry of the 33rd Division relieved the 23rd Division, and General Stewart, moving up to Burgomaster Farm in Dickebusch, assumed command of the artillery covering the front. The whole of the 25th marked a day of intense activity amongst the guns. At 5.40 A.M., while the infantry relief was still in progress, a strong counter-attack was launched by the enemy, preceded by a heavy barrage. For one and a half hours our batteries maintained a rapid rate of fire on their S.O.S. lines, but were unable to prevent the right of the 100th Infantry Brigade astride the Menin Road and the whole of the 98th Brigade from being driven back to the support line. At 11.35 A.M. the S.O.S. signal was again sent up by the 100th Brigade, and again the guns burst forth in their support—this time with success.
At 2.15 P.M. a Corps practice barrage was fired, and at 3.30 P.M., before the practice was over, devastating bombardment by guns of all calibres was opened upon our battery positions. For upwards of half an hour this bombardment continued, inflicting considerable damage upon the battery positions, and then for a short time the weary detachments had a rest. Not for long, however! At 5.30 P.M. the storm broke out afresh, this time upon gunners and infantry alike, and once again, now under heavy shell fire, the batteries responded to the S.O.S. signal sent up an hour later by the left brigade and by the Australians further to the left. This counter-attack was also repulsed, and by midnight it was found that the right brigade held their line intact except for a small portion of trench north of Menin Road, but that the left brigade north of the Reutelbeek had been beaten back three hundred yards, though possibly some posts were still held 150 yards in front.