But it must be affirmed, that we do, by a continual influx from God, enjoy all these powers, and receive the continuance of all these faculties from him, not as men receive things from one another, nor as wax receives the impression of the seal, but in a way as much above our conception, as creation is above our power; if we have all our power of acting, by a continual communication from him, and yet as free agents, have all our light from him, and yet are accountable intelligent beings; then it must be great weakness to affirm, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us in the same manner: for it would be saying, God cannot act upon us as he does act upon us.
The short of the matter is this. Either this writer must affirm, that our rational nature, our understanding faculties, our power of action, our liberty of will, must necessarily subsist without the continual action of God upon them, or else he must grant, that God can act upon our understandings and wills without making us as merely passive as the wax under the seal.
This writer says, Though the relation we stand in to God, is not artificial, as most are amongst men—yet this does not hinder, but that we may know the end he had in being related to us as Creator and Governor, and what he requires of his creatures and subjects. But how are we to know this? This, says he, the divine nature, which contains in it all perfection and happiness, plainly points out to us[¹].
[¹] Page 29.
If he had said, since God must act over us as Creator and Governor, according to his own infinite perfection and happiness, therefore his conduct over us may be very mysterious, he had drawn a plain conclusion. But he proves all to be plain, because God is to govern us according to something that is not plain, according to his own incomprehensible nature.
His argument therefore proceeds thus. God must govern us according to his own infinite perfection and happiness; but we do not know what his infinite perfections and happiness are:
Therefore we plainly know how he is to govern us.
Now if this writer is capable of taking such an argument as this to be demonstrative, it is no wonder that all his principles of religion are founded upon demonstration.
But if he knows no more of what arises from the relation between God and his creatures, than he has here demonstrated, he might be very well content with some farther knowledge from divine revelation.
It is because of this incomprehensible relation between God and his creatures, that we are unavoidably ignorant of what God may justly require of us either in a state of innocence or sin. For as the fitness of actions between beings related, must result from their respective natures, so the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, on which the relation between God and man is founded, makes it utterly impossible for mere natural reason to say, what kind of homage, or worship, he may fitly require of man in a state of innocence; or what different worship and homage he may, or must require of men, as sinners.