And to appeal to the infinite perfections of God, as plainly pointing this out, is the same extravagance, as to appeal to the incomprehensibility of God as a plain proof of our comprehending what God is.
As to the obligations of moral or social duties, which have their foundation in the several relations we bear to one another, these are the same in the state of innocence or sin, and we know that we truly act according to the divine will, when we act according to what these relations require of us.
But the question is, What distinct kind of homage, or service, or worship, God may require us to render to him, either in a state of innocence or sin, on account of that relation he bears to us as an all-perfect Creator and Governor?
But this is a question that God alone can resolve.
Human reason cannot enter into it, it has no principle to proceed upon in it. For as the necessity of divine worship, so the particular manner of it, must have its reason in the divine nature.
Sacrifice, if considered only as an human invention, could not be proved to be a reasonable service. Yet considered as a divine institution, it would be the greatest folly not to receive it as a reasonable service. For as we could see no reason for it, if it was of human invention, so we should have the greatest reason to comply with it because it was of divine appointment. Not as if the divine appointment altered the nature and fitness of things; but because nothing has the nature and fitness of divine worship, but as it is of divine appointment.
Man therefore, had he continued in a state of innocence, and without revelation, might have lived in an awful fear, and pious regard of God, and observed every duty both of moral and civil life, as an act of obedience to him. But he could have no foundation either to invent any particular manner of divine worship himself, or to reject any that was appointed by God, as unnecessary. It would have been ridiculous to have pleaded his innocence, as having no need of a divine worship. For who can have greater reason, or be fitter to worship God, than innocent beings? It would have been more absurd, to have objected the sufficiency of their reason; for why should men reject a revealed manner of divine worship, because God had given them reason of their own, sufficient for the duties of social and civil life?
And as reason in a state of innocence and perfection, could not have any pretence to appoint the manner of divine worship, so when the state of innocence was changed for that of sin, it became more difficult for bare reason to know what kind of worship could be acceptable to God from sinners.
For what the relation betwixt God and sinners makes it fit for God to require or accept of them, cannot be determined by human reason.
This is a new state, and the foundation of a new relation, and nothing can be fit for God to do in it, but what has its fitness resulting from it. We have nothing to help our conceptions of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, as our Governor and Preserver, but what we derive from our idea of human fathers and governors: which idea only helps us to comprehend these relations, just as our idea of human power helps us to comprehend the omnipotence of God. For a father or governor, no more represents the state of God as our Governor and Preserver, than our living in our father’s family, represents the manner of our living in God.