These relations are both very plain, and very mysterious; they are very plain, as to the reality of their existence; and highly mysterious and inconceivable, as to the manner of their existence.
That which is plain, in these relative characters of God, plainly shews our obligations to every instance of duty, homage, love, and gratitude.
And that which is inconceivable in them, is a solid foundation of that profound humility, awful reverence, internal piety and tremendous sense of the divine Majesty, with which devout persons think of God, and assist at the offices of religion. Which excites in them a higher zeal for doctrines and institutions of divine revelation, than for all things human; that fills them with reverence for all things, places, and offices, that are either by divine or human authority, appointed to assist their desired intercourse with God.
And if some people, by a long and strict attention to reason, and the fitness and unfitness of things, have at last arrived at a demonstrative certainty, that all these sentiments of piety and devotion, are mere bigotry, superstition, and enthusiasm; I shall only now observe, that youthful extravagance, passion, and debauchery, by their own natural tendency, without the assistance of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery. And though it is not reckoned any reflection upon great wits, when they hit upon the same thought, yet it may seem some disparagement of that reason and philosophy, which teaches old men to think the same of religion, that passion and extravagance teach the young.
To return: As there is no state in human life, that can give us a true idea of any of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, so this relative state of God towards sinners is still less capable of being comprehended by any thing observable in the relations, betwixt a judge and criminals, a creditor and his debtors, a physician and his patients, a father or prince, and their disobedient children and subjects.
For none of these states separately, nor all of them jointly considered, give us any full idea, either of the nature and guilt of sin or how God is to deal with sinners, on the account of the relation he bears to them.
To ask, whether sin hath solely the nature of an offence, against a prince or a father, and so is pardonable by mere goodness; whether it is like an error in a road or path, and so is entirely at an end, when the right path is taken; whether its guilt hath the nature of a debt, and so is capable of being discharged, just as a debt is; whether it affects the soul, as a wound or disease affects the body, and so ought only to move God to act as a good physician? All these questions are as vain, as to ask, whether knowledge in God is really thinking, or his nature a real substance. For as his knowledge and nature cannot be strictly defined, but are capable of being signified by the terms thinking and substance, so the nature of sin is not strictly represented under any of these characters, but is capable of receiving some representation from every one of them.
When sin is said to be an offence against God, it is to teach us, that we have infinitely more reason to dread it on God’s account, than to dread any offence against our parents, or governors.
When it is compared to a debt, it is to signify, that our sins make us accountable to God, not in the same manner, but with the same certainty, as a debtor is answerable to his creditor; and because it has some likeness to a debt, that of ourselves we are not able to pay.
When it is compared to a wound, or disease, it is not to teach us, that it may as justly and easily be healed as bodily wounds, but to help us to conceive the greatness of its evil; that, as diseases bring death to the body, so sin brings a worse kind of death upon the soul.