Since therefore the nature and guilt of sin can only so far be known, as to make it highly to be dreaded, but not so known as to be fully understood, by any thing we can compare to it:
Since the relation which God bears to sinners, can only be so known, as to make it highly reasonable to prostrate ourselves before him, in every instance of humility and penitence; but not so fully known as to teach us, in what manner, God must deal with us: it plainly follows, that if God is not an arbitrary being, but acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation, he must, in this respect, act by a rule known only to himself, and such as we cannot possibly state from the reason and nature of things.
For if the nature of things, and the fitness of actions resulting from their relations, is to be the rule of our reason, then reason must be here at a full stop, and can have no more knowledge to proceed upon, in stating the nature, the guilt, or proper atonement of sin in men, than of sin in angels.
For reason can no more tell us what the guilt of sin is, what hurt it does us, how far it enters into, and alters our very nature, what contrariety to, and separation from God, it necessarily brings upon us, or what supernatural means are, or are not, necessary to abolish it; our reason can no more tell this, than our senses can tell us, what is the inward, and what is the outward light of angels.
Ask reason what effect sin has upon the soul, and it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what effect the omnipresence of God has upon the soul.
Ask reason, and the nature of things, what is, or ought to be, the true nature of an atonement for sin, how far it is like paying a debt, or healing a wound, or how far it is different from them? And it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what is the true degree of power that preserves us in existence, how far it is like that which at first created us, and how far it is different from it.
All these enquiries are, by the nature of things, made impossible to us, so long as we have no light but from our own natural capacities, and we cannot take upon us to be philosophers in these matters, but by deserting our reason, and giving ourselves up to vision and imagination.
And we have as much authority from the nature of things, to appeal to hunger and thirst, and sensual pleasure, to tell us how our souls shall live in the beatific presence of God, as to appeal to our reason and logic, to demonstrate how sin is to be atoned, or the soul prepared, and purified, for future happiness.
For God has no more given us our reason to settle the nature of an atonement for sin; or to find out what can, or cannot, take away its guilt, than he has given us senses and appetites to state the nature, or discover the ingredients of future happiness.
And he who rejects the atonement for sins made by the Son of God, as needless, because he cannot prove it to be necessary, is as extravagant, as he that should deny that God created him by his only Son, because he did not remember it. For our memory is as proper a faculty to tell us, whether God at first created us, by his only Son, as our reason is to tell us, whether we ought to be restored to God, with, or without the mediation of Jesus Christ.