The works of the Rev. John Wesley, Vol. 06 (of 32)

by John Wesley

And as our idea of God, though consisting of incomprehensible perfections, helps us to a real and certain knowledge of the divine nature; and though all mysterious, is yet the solid foundation of all piety; so our idea of Jesus Christ, as our Mediator and Atonement, though it be incomprehensible as to its real nature, yet helps us to a certain knowledge of Christ, as our Mediator and Atonement; and, though full of mystery, is yet full of motives to the highest piety, love, and gratitude unto God.

All objections therefore, raised from any difficulties about the nature of atonements, propitiations, and satisfactions, as these words are used in common language, are vain, and entirely groundless.

For all these objections proceed upon this supposition, that atonement, or satisfaction, when attributed to Jesus Christ, signify neither more nor less, than when they are used as terms in human laws or in civil life; take away this supposition, and all objections are entirely removed with it.

To return: I have granted this writer his great principle, That the relations of things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, is the sole rule of God’s actions: and I have granted it upon this supposition, that it thence follows, that God must act according to his own nature; and therefore nothing could be fit for God to do, but what had the reason of its fitness in his own nature: and if so, then the rule of his actions could not fall within our comprehension. And consequently, reason alone, could not be a competent judge of God’s proceedings; or say, what God might, or might not, require of us: and therefore I have, plainly turned his main argument against himself, and made it fully confute that doctrine, which he intended to found upon it.

But though I have thus far, granted the nature and relations of things and beings, to be the rule of God’s actions, because that plainly supposes, that his own nature must be the rule of his actions; yet since our author, and other modern opposers of revealed doctrines of religion, hold it in another sense, and mean by it, I know not what eternal, immutable reasons and relations of things, independent of any being, and which are a common rule and law of God and man, I entirely declare against it, as an erroneous and groundless opinion.

Thus, when this writer says, If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must he not be an arbitrary being? As he here means some eternal, immutable relations, independent of God; so, to suppose, that God cannot be a wise and good being, unless such eternal, independent relations, be the sole rule of his actions, is as erroneous, as to affirm, that God cannot be omniscient, unless mathematical demonstrations be his sole manner of knowing all things. And it is just as reasonable to fix God’s knowledge solely in mathematical demonstrations, that we may thence be assured of his infallible knowledge, as to make I know not what independent relations of things, the sole rule of his actions, that we may thence be assured, he is not arbitrary, but a wise and good being.

And we have as strong reasons to believe God to be, in the highest degree, wise and good, without knowing on what, his wisdom and goodness is founded; as we have to believe him to be omniscient, and eternal, without knowing on what his omniscience is founded; or to what, his eternity is owing. And we have the same reason to hold it a vain enquiry, to ask what obliges God to be wise and good, as to ask what obliges him to be omniscient, or eternal.

And as it would be absurd to ascribe the existence of God to any cause, or found it upon any independent relations of things, so it is the same absurdity, to ascribe the infinite wisdom and goodness of God to any cause, or found them upon any independent relations of things.

Nor do we any more lose the notion, or lessen the certainty of the divine wisdom and goodness, because we cannot say on what they are founded, than we lose the notion of God, or render his existence uncertain, because it cannot be founded on any thing.

And as in our account of the existence of things, we are obliged to have recourse to a being, whose existence must not be ascribed to any cause because every thing cannot have a cause, no more than every thing can be created, so in our account of wisdom and goodness, there is the same necessity of having recourse to an infinite wisdom and goodness, that never began to be, and that is as different as to its manner of existence, from all other wisdom and goodness, that have a beginning, as the existence of God is different from the existence of the creatures.