* But if it be necessary to hold, that there is an infinite wisdom and goodness that never began to be, then it is as necessary to affirm, that such wisdom and goodness can no more be founded upon the relations of things, than the unbeginning existence of God can be founded upon the existence of things. And to seek for any reasons of a wisdom and goodness that was always in the same infinite state, is like seeking the cause of that which can have no cause, or asking what it is that contains infinity.
* When therefore this writer saith, Infinite wisdom can have no commands, but what are founded on the unalterable reason of things;[¹] he might as justly have said, an infinite Creator can have no power of creating, but what is founded on the unalterable nature of creatures.
[¹] Page 247.
* For the reason of things, is just as unalterable, as the nature of creatures. And if the reasons and relations of things are nothing else but their manner of existence, or the state of their nature, certainly the relations of things must have the same beginning, and the same alterable or unalterable nature, as the things from whence they flow. Unless it can be said, that a thing may exist in such a manner, though it does not exist at all.
When therefore he says again, That the will of God is always determined by the nature and reason of things;[¹] It is the same as if he had said, the omnipotence of God is always determined by the nature of causes and effects. For as all causes and effects are what they are, and owe their nature to the omnipotence of God, so the relations of things are what they are, and owe their nature to the wisdom and will of God.
[¹] Page 65.
Nor does this dependance of the relations of things on the will of God, destroy the nature of relations, or make them doubtful, any more than the existence of things depending on the power of God, destroys the certainty of their existence, or renders it doubtful. For as God cannot make things to exist, and not to exist at the same time, though their existence depends upon his power, so neither can he make things to have such relations, and yet not to have such relations at the same time, though their relations depend upon his will.
So that the ascribing the relations of things to the will of God, brings no uncertainty to those duties of life, which flow from such relations, but leaves the state of nature with all its relations, and the duties which flow from them, in the greatest certainty, so long as nature itself is continued; and when that either ceases entirely, or is only altered, it is not to be wondered at, if all its relations cease, or are altered with it.
Our author says, Dare any one say, that God’s laws are not founded on the eternal reason of things?[¹]
[¹] Page 425.