* It may be asked, Is there then no reason or nature of things? Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things, considered independently of the divine will, have no more obligation in them, than a divine worship considered independently of, and without any regard to the existence of God. For the will of God is as absolutely necessary to found all moral obligation upon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious worship. And the fitness of moral obligations, without the will of God, is only like the fitness of religious worship without the existence of God.
And it is as just to say, that he destroys the reason of religion, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the will of God. And as religion cannot be solidly defended, but by shewing its connexion with, and dependence upon God’s existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with reason, but by shewing them to be the will of God.
It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in itself, which is in itself absolutely unfit to be done?
This question consists of improper terms. For God’s will no more makes actions to be fit in themselves, than it makes things to exist in, or of themselves. No things, nor any actions have any absolute fitness, of and in themselves.
A gift, a blow, the making a wound, or shedding of blood, considered in themselves, have no absolute fitness, but are fit or unfit according to a variety of accidental circumstances.
When therefore God by his will makes any thing fit to be done, he does not make the thing fit in itself, which is just in the same state considered in itself, that it was before, but it becomes fit for the person to do it, because he can only be happy, or do that which is fit for him to do, by doing the will of God.
For instance, the bare eating a fruit, considered in itself, is neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit is appointed by God for our food, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit is poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If eating of a fruit is prohibited by God, then it is as unfit as to eat our own damnation.
But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered in itself fit or unfit: but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the will of God.
Supposing therefore God to require a person to do something, which according to his present circumstances, without that command, he ought not to do, God does not make that which is absolutely unfit in itself, fit to be done: but only adds new circumstances to an action, that is neither fit, nor unfit, moral, nor immoral in itself, but because of its circumstances.
Again, it is objected, If there is nothing right or wrong, good or bad, antecedently and independently of the will of God, there can then be no reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than another.