It is answered, first, That all goodness, and all possible perfection, is as eternal as God, and as essential to him as his existence. And to say, that they are either antecedent or consequent, dependent or independent of his will, would be equally absurd. To ask therefore, whether there is not something right and wrong, antecedent to the will of God, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent cause of his existence. And to ask, how God can be good if there is not something good independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there be not something infinite independently of him. And to seek for any other source or reason of the divine goodness, besides the divine nature, is like seeking for some external cause and help of the divine omnipotence.
The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neither antecedent, nor consequent to his will.
Secondly, Nothing is more certain, than that all moral obligations and duties of creatures towards one another, began with the existence of moral creatures. This is as certain, as that all corporeal qualities and effects, began with the existence of bodies.
As therefore nothing has the nature of a cause or effect, nothing has any quality of any kind in bodies, but what is entirely owing to matter so created and constituted by the will of God; so no actions have any moral qualities, but what are wholly owing to that state and nature in which they are created by the will of God.
* Moral obligations therefore of creatures have the same origin, and the same reason, that natural qualities and effects have in the corporeal world, viz. the sole will of God. And as in a different state of matter, bodies would have had different qualities and effects; so in a different state of rational beings, there would be different moral obligations, and nothing could be right or good in their behaviour, but what began then to be right and good, because they then began to exist in such a state and condition of life. And as their state and condition could have no other cause or reason of its existence, but the sole will of God, so the cause and reason of right and wrong in such a state, must be equally owing to the will of God.
The pretended absolute independent fitnesses, or unfitnesses of actions therefore in themselves, are vain abstractions, and philosophical jargon, serving no ends of morality, but only helping people to wrangle and dispute away that sincere obedience to God, which is their only happiness. But to make these imaginary absolute fitnesses the common law both of God and man, is still more extravagant. For if the circumstances of actions give them their moral nature, surely God must first be in our circumstances, before that which is a law to us, can be the same law to him.
And if a father may require that of a son, which his son, because of his different state, cannot require of his brother; surely that which God may require of us, may be as different from that which a father may require of a son, as God is different from a father.
Again, if God is as much under a law as we are, then he is as much under authority; for law can no more be without authority, than without a law-giver. And if God and we are under the same law, we must be under the same authority.
* But as God cannot be under any law in common with us his creatures, any more than he can be of the same rank or order with any [♦]of us; so neither can he be under any law at all, any more than he can be under any authority at all.
[♦] word omitted in text “of”