Judas, Pontius Pilate, and the Jews that called for our Saviour’s crucifixion, had equal need of a Saviour with those that believed in him. Chorazin and Bethsaida wanted the light of the gospel as much as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were, God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded.
So that this argument, founded on the equal need of all, or former ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for such a particular time and state of things and persons.
He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does things because they are easy, or forbears things because they are difficult to be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought to have revealed such things to all nations or persons, because it was as easy to him, as to do it to any one nation or person; unless it be supposed, that the easiness of a thing is a reason why God does it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it must be liable to the same charge.
But if God does things, not because they are easy, but because they are infinitely good and fit to be done, then the reason why God has afforded different revelations, to different ages and persons, is this, that his manner of revealing every thing, might be worthy of his own fore-knowledge of the effects of it, and that every thing that is particular in the time or manner of any revelation, might have its fitness resulting from the relation betwixt a good God and his creatures, whose changing state, different conduct, tempers and actions, are all eternally fore-known by him.
Again, it is objected, that a divine revelation must either be the effect of justice, or else of mercy and free goodness; but in either of these cases it ought to be universal; for justice must be done to all. But if it is the effect of mercy and free goodness, this writer asks, “How a being can be denominated merciful and good, who is so only to a few, but cruel and unmerciful to the rest?”[¹]
[¹] Page 401.
It is answered, That there is neither justice in God without mercy, nor mercy without justice; and to ascribe a revelation to either of them separately, in contradistinction to the other, has no more reason in it, than to ascribe the creation separately either to the wisdom or power of God, in contradistinction to the other.
Secondly, A divine revelation is not owing barely to the justice or free goodness of God, but to the goodness, mercy, and justice of God, governed and directed by his eternal fore-knowledge of all the effects of every revelation, at any, or all times.
* God ordains a revelation in this, or that manner, time, and place; not because it is a justice that he cannot refuse, not because it is a matter of favour or free goodness, and therefore may be given in any manner at pleasure; but because he has the whole duration of human things, the whole race of mankind, the whole order of human changes and events, the whole combination of all causes and effects of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the consequences of every revelation, plainly in his sight; and according to this eternal fore-knowledge, every revelation receives every thing that is particular in it, either as to time, matter, manner, or place.
* All complaints therefore about that which is particular, or seemingly partial in the time and manner of any revelation, are very unjustifiable; and shew, that we are discontent at God’s proceedings, because he acts like himself, does what is best and fittest to be done, and governs the world, not according to our weak imaginations, but according to his own infinite perfections.