* We will not allow a providence to be right, unless we can comprehend the reasonableness of all its steps; and yet it could not possibly be right, unless its proceedings were as much above our comprehension, as our wisdom is below that which is infinite.
For if the relations of things, and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, be the rule of God’s actions; then all the revelations that come from God, must have their fitness resulting from the relation his fore-knowledge bears to the various states, conditions, tempers, and actions of free agents, and the various effects of every manner of revelation.
But if God cannot act worthy of himself in any revelation, unless he acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation; then he must act by a rule that lies out of our sight, and his providence in this particular must be incomprehensible to us; for this very reason, because it has that very fitness, wisdom and goodness in it, that it ought to have.
CHAPTER III.
Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation.
THE former chapter has plainly shewn, from the state and relation between God and man, that we must be strangers to the true reasons on which a divine revelation is founded, both as to its time, matter, and manner.
But it is here objected, “If God by reason of his own perfections must be thus mysterious and incomprehensible, both in the matter and manner of divine revelation; how can we know what revelations we are to receive as divine? How can we be blamed for rejecting this, or receiving that, if we cannot comprehend the reasons on which every revelation is founded, both as to its matter and manner?”
If a man may be blameable, or commendable, for his right or wrong belief of a God; then a man may be accountable for a right or wrong belief of such matters, as are in their own nature too mysterious for his comprehension. And tho’ a man knows the reasons of a divine revelation, either as to its matter or manner, as imperfectly as he knows the divine nature; yet he may be as liable to account for believing false revelations, as for idolatry; and as full of guilt for rejecting a true revelation, as for denying the only true God.
Secondly, Tho’ we are insufficient for comprehending the reasons, on which the particular matter or manner of any divine revelation is founded; yet we may be so far sufficient judges, of the reasons for receiving or not receiving a revelation as divine, as to make our conduct therein justly accountable to God.