Medea and Cato acted as truly according to the judgment of their reason at that time, as the confessor that chuses rather to suffer, than deny his faith.
Had not Medea and Cato thought it best to do what they did, at the time they did it, they would no more have done it than the confessor would chuse to suffer rather than deny his faith, unless he had judged best so to do.
And when we say reason governs the passions, it means no more, than that reason governs itself; that it acts with deliberation and attention, does not yield to its first judgments, but uses second, and third thoughts.
So that guarding against the passions, is only guarding against its own first judgments and opinions; that is guarding against itself.
To all this may, perhaps, be objected, that our passions arise from bodily motions, and depend upon the state of our blood and animal spirits, and therefore what we do under their commotions, cannot be attributed to our reason.
It is readily granted, that the body has this share in our passions and tempers: but then the same thing must be granted of the body, in all the acts and operations of the mind. So that if our desires and aversions cannot be imputed to our reason, because of the joint operation of the animal spirits in them; no more can syllogisms and demonstrations be attributed to our reason, because the operation of bodily spirits concurreth in the forming of them.
For the most abstract thought, and speculation of the mind, has as truly the conjunct operation of bodily spirits, as our strongest desires or aversions. And it is as much owing to the state of the body, that such speculations are what they are, as it is owing to the state of the body, that such passions are what they are.
For the motions of the bodily spirits are inseparable from, and according to, the state and action of the mind: when reason is in speculation of a trifle, they concur but weakly; when reason speculates intensely, their operation is increased. And sometimes the attention of the mind is so great, and has so engaged and called in all the animal spirits to its assistance, that the operations of our senses are suspended, and we neither see, nor feel, till the attention of the mind has let the spirits return to all the parts of the body.
Now will any one say, that these intense thoughts are less the acts of the mind, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits, than when it is acting with indifference, and so has a lesser quantity of bodily spirits?
Yet this might as well be said, as to say, that the assent or dissent, in speculation, is the act of our reason; but liking or disliking, loving or hating, are not the acts of our reason, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits.