For, as the mind is in a different state when it desires good, or fears evil, from what it is when it only compares two triangles; so the motions of the bodily spirits, have only such a difference, as is correspondent to these two states of the mind. They act and join as much in comparing the triangles, as in the desire of good, or fear of evil. And the mind is just as much governed by the body, in its passions, as in its calmest contemplations.
For as the gentle operation of the animal spirits is then correspondent to the state and action of the mind; so in all our passions, the strong and increased motion of the animal spirits, is equally correspondent thereto.
So that reason is no more the agent, in our tempers and passions, than in our dry and sedate speculations.
It may happen, that a man may have as great an eagerness in solving a mathematical problem, as another hath to obtain any great good, or avoid any great evil.
But may it therefore be said, that it is not reason that solves the problem, because the bodily spirits are so active in it?
To draw now some plain consequences from the foregoing account.
First, If reason be the universal agent in the natural man; if all the difference among such men, is only such a difference as reason makes, then nothing can be more extravagant, than to affirm any thing concerning the degree of perfection, or imperfection of reason, as common to man. It is as wild and romantic, as to pretend to state the measure of folly and wisdom, of fear and courage, of pride and humility, of good humour and ill-humour, common to mankind: for as these states of the mind, are only so many different states of reason; so no uncertainty belongs to them, but what, in the same degree, belongs to reason.
Secondly, Granting that all matters of religion must be agreeable to right, unprejudiced reason; yet this could be no ground for receiving nothing in religion, but what human reason could prove to be necessary; for human reason is no more right, unprejudiced reason, than a sinner is sinless, or a man an angel.
Granting again, that a man may go a great way towards rectifying his reason, and laying aside its prejudices; yet no particular man can be a better judge of the rectitude of his own reason, than he is of the rectitude of his own self-love, the brightness of his own parts, and the depth of his own judgment.
For there is nothing to deceive him in self-love, in the opinion of his own merit, wit, and judgment, but what has the same power to deceive him, in the opinion of his own reason. And if, as our author says, “It be the fate of most sects to be the fondest of their ugliest brats.”[¹] None seem so inevitably exposed to this fatality, as those whose religion is to have no form, but such as it receives from their own hearts.