General Chlapowski arrives at Keydany, having ordered general Dembinski to Wilkomierz.—The position of the two forces and their line of operations.—Examination of these arrangements.—Neglect of the important position of Kowno.—General Chlapowski, at Keydany, proposes to form a provisional government, and obtain a levy of troops.—Dispositions of the Lithuanians, as effected by the mismanagement of our leaders.—Advantages offered to the enemy by the delay at Keydany.—Brave defence of Kowno, by the small force left there.—Skirmish at Wilkomierz.—The opportunity of concentrating all the forces at Keydany, and repassing the Niemen, is neglected.—The enemy presses his pursuit.—Battle of Rosseyny.—Attack on Szawla.—Loss of the ammunition and baggage of the corps.—The corps retreats in order to Kurzany, protected by a rear guard of cavalry and light artillery.—At Kurzany the corps is subdivided into three parts.—Destination and strength of each.—Examination of this plan.
General Chlapowski, whom we shall hereafter name as having the chief command of the Lithuanian force, arrived on the night of the 22d of June at Keydany, having sent orders to general Dembinski to withdraw with his corps, and to march to Wilkomierz. (10) [Plan XXXIV.] The corps of general Dembinski arrived, on the 21st, at Szerwinty, and on the 22d, at Wilkomierz. On quitting Podbrzeze, general Dembinski left a small detachment in the environs of Myszogola, to act as partizans.
The position of our corps was then as follows;—The larger force was at Keydany (2). The corps of Dembinski was at Wilkomierz, and a small corps (c) under the command of general Szymanowski was in the environs of Szawla. Our line of operations was on the river Swienta (S) and along the Wiliia (W), for a short distance below the junction of the former river with it. To defend the passage of those rivers against the enemy, the following detachments were designated. Kowno (11) was occupied by two battalions of Lithuanian infantry, recently levied, under the command of colonel Kikiernicki, and a squadron of the 11th regiment of lancers, also Lithuanian, and recently formed.
At Janow (12) was a battalion of infantry and a squadron of the 11th lancers, under the command of colonel Piwecki. At Wieprz were three squadrons of the 10th lancers.
This separation of our forces in Lithuania, and, above all, this designation of the most recently organized troops for the defence of the passage of the two rivers, with a full knowledge of the great strength of the enemy, was a gross error. To leave the defence of Kowno, a place of so much importance, to three battalions of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, all of them newly formed troops, and that, too, without ammunition, (for they had barely three rounds each,) was a course perfectly inexplicable. Besides all this, the river Swienta was so shallow as to be fordable by both infantry and cavalry, and in some places even by artillery. Why then was that river defended? It was owing, in fact, to good fortune that all these detachments were not cut off.
On the arrival of the two corps at Keydany and Wilkomierz, the organization of a provisional government for the province, was commenced. Diets were convoked at these two places, to organize an administration, and to procure levies of forces. Although these arrangements were all proper in themselves, yet it was a late hour to undertake them, and no place could have been so well adapted for them as Wilno. Had the corps of Saken been pursued and broken up, Wilno would have been ours; and all such arrangements could have been made there under the most favorable circumstances. In that event, the brave Lithuanians would have come in from all sides and crowded our ranks, without waiting for any appeal to be made to them. But at present, a new crisis had arrived. We had fought the battle of Wilno with a disastrous result. The enemy had become acquainted with the inferiority of our forces, and had begun to understand the errors of our commander, and was prepared to take advantage of them. In fine, the Lithuanians themselves, witnessing all this gross mismanagement, became disgusted, and after having once so cheerfully tendered their co-operation, began, at length, to discover that they were sacrificing themselves in vain, and that the fate of the inhabitants of Wilno would await them. This people, as we have already stated, had commenced their insurrection two months before they had hopes of any assistance from our forces, and badly armed as they were, they had maintained a partizan warfare during this period with uniform success. We can, therefore, have no reason to reproach them, if after the misconduct which was exhibited before their eyes, they began to be reluctant to join their forces to our own, and chose to reserve the sacrifice of their exertions and their lives for some other occasion, when there might be some hope of useful results.
The six or seven days which we passed thus at Keydany and Wilkomierz, seemed as if designed to invite the enemy to pursue his advantages, and to lead him to the idea of surrounding our forces. The enemy, fortunately for us, did not improve the opportunity which we presented him, but remained inactive. This inactivity, whether it arose from the imbecility of his commanders, or whatever other cause, afforded us an opportunity of changing our plans, and of extricating ourselves from the dangerous position in which we were placed. But instead of this, we awaited his attack. On the 29th, the enemy commenced an attack upon every point, at Wilkomierz, Wieprz, Janow, and Kowno, with his whole force.
A corps of 4,000 Russians, with 16 cannon, commenced the attack on Kowno, defended, as we have said, by 2,000 new troops. From morning until night, the defence was sustained with great courage. The contest was for the first half of the day in the town itself, and the rest of the day was spent in disputing the passage of the bridge over the Wiliia. The Russians occupying all the houses upon the banks of the river, and the neighboring heights, commenced a terrible fire of artillery and musquetry upon the bridge, which was defended by a body of infantry, almost without ammunition. At nightfall, colonel Kikiernicki, seeing that the Russian cavalry had found means of fording the river, ordered a retreat, but remained himself at the head of a single company, defending the bridge, until he learnt that the rest of the corps had passed the town of Sloboda, and had gained the heights which are behind the town. Upon that bridge, fell the captain of this company, Zabiello, a Lithuanian. He was shot in the act of cutting away the bridge with his own hands. This company, after having thus sustained their post at the bridge with the greatest bravery, commenced their retreat. The Russian cavalry, having succeeded in fording the river, had already commenced acting in their rear. At the same time, the Russian columns of infantry were debouching upon the bridge. Colonel Kikiernicki, perceiving his situation, animated his little corps to make the desperate effort of breaking through the Russian cavalry, and of gaining Sloboda. His spirit was seconded by his brave followers, and this company of one hundred men, raising the hurrah, forced a passage through the enemy's cavalry, gained Sloboda, and, under cover of night, succeeded in joining their comrades.[76] In this effort, colonel Kikiernicki fell wounded, and was made prisoner by the enemy.
The detachment, having lost one half of their numbers in the sanguinary attack to which the mismanagement of our general had exposed them, took the road to Janow. In this manner ended the attack on Kowno, and the Russians took possession of that important post, which might be regarded as the key to all our communications with Poland.