There can be no excuse for not having fortified Kowno. It is a town, containing ten or twelve thousand inhabitants, of which one half, perhaps, were Jews, but they could have been employed in the construction of the works. It was also most favorably situated for defence, being surrounded by heights on every side.
On the same day, sanguinary skirmishes took place at Janow, Wieprz, and Wilkomierz. The two first towns were abandoned. In the attack on Wilkomierz, which was successfully repelled, an action took place, in which the lancers of Poznan and Plock threw themselves upon the flank of Russian cavalry, and, after causing severe loss, took about eighty prisoners, consisting of Circassians. General Dembinski, on the night of the 29th, learning that our positions of Janow and Wieprz were abandoned, quitted Wilkomierz on the next day, and took the road to Szawla. [Plan XXXIV, (13)]. Although the occupation, by the enemy, of the town of Kowno, and the interruption of our whole line of operations on the Swienta and Wiliia, made our situation very perilous; yet it was still possible to avoid the disasters which followed, and to effect a return to Poland. By concentrating all our forces at Keydany, we could have effected a passage of the Niemen, in the same manner as we had already done in the direction of Gielgudyszki, which would have left the enemy in our rear; while on the other side of the Niemen, the enemy were not in force enough to prevent our passage. But, instead of doing this, as if to insure our ruin, a small detachment, consisting of four squadrons of cavalry, and the sappers, under the command of colonel Koss, were sent to make a bridge over the Niemen! This measure is perfectly inexplicable. Scarcely had this detachment arrived at the river, and commenced the erection of the bridge, when they were attacked on two sides, by the cuirassiers and the artillery of the enemy. They were saved only by the judicious conduct of colonel Koss, who threw himself into the protection of the neighboring forest, and succeeded in rejoining the corps. The loss which we incurred by this expedition, of all our implements for the construction of bridges, was irreparable.
From this time, the enemy did not for a moment lose sight of us; and throwing his superior forces upon the great road which leads from Keydany, through Rosseyny (14), to Szawla, forced us to take that direction which was the most dangerous for us, as the field of operation for our forces was continually becoming more and more contracted.
COMBAT OF ROSSEYNY.
The cause of this action, which it would have been most desirable to have avoided, was a strong attack by the enemy upon the rear-guard of general Chlapowski which was marching on the road to Szawla. To avoid exposing the rear-guard to a great loss, or even to the chance of it, the command was given, to take position, and the corps was placed in order of battle. The battle of Rosseyny, which lasted scarcely four hours, was very sanguinary, and highly honorable to the Polish arms. The object of the enemy on this occasion was to surround our left wing. As soon as he perceived that our corps had taken position and was arranged in order of battle, the enemy brought forward his artillery, consisting of 24 pieces of cannon, and commenced a heavy fire upon our centre. This fire did not cause a great loss, for, our position being elevated, the shot struck too low to be effective. A few moments after this fire of artillery was commenced, a strong column of Russian cavalry showed itself on our right wing. This column had with it a body of light artillery, which commenced fire also. On our left wing, which was supported upon a marsh, and, for that reason, in little expectation of an attack, but a small force was collected. This wing was composed of a battalion of infantry and the 1st regiment of lancers. These troops had been placed on this wing to repose from the combats and fatigues of the day and night preceding, in which they had acted as rear-guard. The brave lancers, however, at the first sight of the enemy, demanded of the general to be permitted to make a charge. This permission being given, at the first discharge of the Russian artillery, our soldiers threw themselves with impetuosity upon both the cavalry and the artillery of the enemy. The capture of sixty prisoners and the spiking of three cannon were the fruits of this brilliant attack. It was the last charge of that brave regiment.
Our centre was not less fortunate than our left wing. Our artillery being better placed than that of the enemy, several of his pieces were dismounted, and his fire began to slacken. For some hours a light fire of tirailleurs was continued on both sides, when our generals, seeing that the enemy did not renew the attack, gave orders to evacuate the position, and to resume the march for Szawla.
On the same night, the corps arrived at Cytowiany. There our forces were joined by the corps of general Rohland, which had had a bloody skirmish at Beysagola, [Plan XXXIV, (15)] on the same day on which general Dembinski was also attacked at Poniewieze. The corps of general Chlapowski left the next day for the attack of Szawla, which was occupied by a Russian garrison. The corps of general Dembinski, which as we have already stated, was marching by another route upon Szawla, arrived there at mid-day on the 7th. That general, considering the smallness of the Russian garrison in this town, consisting only of four battalions of infantry, and six pieces of cannon, after waiting a short time for the arrival of the corps of general Chlapowski, concluded to send a summons, by colonel Miroszewski, to the Russian commandant, proposing to him to surrender, and save a useless effusion of blood. The Russian colonel Kurow would not accept of these friendly propositions, and compelled general Dembinski to order an attack; a very moderate one, however, as he was in hopes that the arrival of our superior forces would soon convince the Russian commander that a defence would be useless. In fact, the corps of general Chlapowski arrived at about 5, P.M. at a village about four miles from Szawla, where he was met by an officer, sent by general Dembinski, with a report of the circumstances which had taken place. Indeed, the sound of the cannon and musquetry, ought already to have satisfied general Chlapowski that general Dembinski was engaged in the attack; but instead of hastening to his assistance he went into camp, and thus remained until two hours past midnight. At two o'clock then, of the morning of the 8th, the corps took up the march, and arrived by day-break before Szawla.
ATTACK ON SZAWLA.
On examining the plan of this battle, and considering the smallness of the Russian garrison in Szawla, we cannot but be satisfied that the town ought to have been taken at the first assault, and it will seem almost incredible that after having occupied four hours in an unsuccessful attack, we should have at last quitted our position.