"'Saturday, June 4th.—Informed General Grierson that the infantry and train under the most favorable circumstances could only make a few miles beyond Salem and to regulate his march accordingly. Train arrived at Lamar about noon, issued rations to the infantry and rested the animals. It rained heavily until 1 o'clock p. m., making the roads almost impassable. Moved headquarters to the Widow Spright's house, two miles west of Salem, and Colonel Hoge's brigade of infantry to Robinson's house, four miles from Salem.
"'Sunday, June 5th.—Infantry and train started at half past four o'clock a. m., and joined the cavalry, two miles east of Salem. At 10 o'clock a. m., issued rations to the cavalry and fed the forage collected by them. Infantry remained in camp during the day; cavalry moved to the intersection of the LaGrange and Ripley and the Salem and Ruckersville roads. Col. Joseph Karge, 2nd New Jersey, with 400 men, started at 6 p. m., with instructions to move via Ripley to Rienzi, to destroy the railroad; to proceed north, destroy bridge over Tuscumbia and to join General Grierson at Ruckersville. Heavy showers during the afternoon.
"'Monday, June 6th.—Infantry and train moved at 4 o'clock a. m., on the Ruckersville road. Commenced raining at 5 a. m., and continued at intervals all day. Progress very slow, marched 13 miles and made headquarters at Widow Childers, at intersection of the Saulsbury and Ripley and the Ruckersville and Salem roads. Cavalry moved to Ruckersville. The advance guard of the infantry encountered a small party of rebels about noon and chased them towards Ripley on La Grange and Ripley roads.
"'Tuesday, June 7th.—Upon information received from General Grierson that there was no enemy near Corinth, directed him to move toward Ellistown, on direct road from Ripley, and instruct Colonel Karge to join him by way of Blackland or Carrollsville. Infantry moved to Ripley and cavalry encamped on New Albany road two miles south. Encountered a small party of rebels near Widow Childers and drove them toward Ripley. In Ripley, met an advance of the enemy and drove them on New Albany road. Cavalry encountered about a regiment of rebel cavalry on that road and drove them south. Several showers during the afternoon, and the roads very bad.
"Wednesday, June 8th.—Received information at 4 o'clock a. m. that Colonel Karge was on an island in the Hatchie River and sent him 500 men and two howitzers as re-inforcements. Winslow's brigade of cavalry moved 6 miles on the Fulton Road. Infantry and train moved five miles on same road. Colonel Waring's brigade remained in Ripley awaiting return of Colonel Karge, who joined him at 5 o'clock p. m., having swam the Hatchie River. Rained hard during the night.
"'Thursday, June 9th.—Sent back to Memphis 400 sick and wounded men and 41 wagons. Cavalry and infantry moved to Stubbs', fourteen miles from Ripley; issued five days' rations (at previous camp.) Rained two hours in the evening.
"'Friday, June 10th.—Encountered the enemy at Brice's Cross-Roads, 23 miles from Ripley and six miles from Guntown.'
"At Ripley it became a serious question in my mind as to whether or not I should proceed any farther. The rain still fell in torrents; the artillery and wagons were literally mired down, and the starved and exhausted animals could with difficulty drag them along. Under these circumstances, I called together my division commanders and placed before them my views of our condition. At this interview, one brigade commander and two members of my staff were, incidentally, present also. I called their attention to the great delay we had undergone on account of the continuous rain and consequent bad condition of the roads; the exhausted condition of our animals; the great probability that the enemy would avail himself of the time thus afforded him to concentrate an overwhelming force against us in the vicinity of Tupelo and the utter hopelessness of saving our train or artillery in case of defeat, on account of the narrowness and general bad condition of the roads and the impossibility of procuring supplies of forage for the animals; all agreed with me in the probable consequences of defeat. Some thought our only safety lay in retracing our steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however, (and with some propriety, too,) that inasmuch as I had abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before and given as my reasons for so doing, the "utter and entire destitution of the country," and that in the face of this we were again sent through the same country, it would be ruinous on all sides to return again without first meeting the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General Washburn had acquired, there could be no considerable force in our front and all my own information led to the same conclusion. To be sure my information was exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory and had I returned I would have been totally unable to present any facts to justify my cause, or to show why the expedition might not have been successfully carried forward. All I could have presented would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would naturally do under the circumstances and these would have availed but little against the idea that the enemy was scattered and had no considerable force in our front.
"Under these circumstances, and with a sad forboding of the consequences, I determined to move forward; keeping my force as compact as possible and ready for action at all times; hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did not, yet our losses might at most be insignificant in comparison with the great benefits which might accrue to General Sherman by the depletion of Johnson's army to so large an extent.
"On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond Ripley, I assembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline in their camps; keeping their troops always in hand and ready to act on a moment's notice. That it was impossible to gain any accurate or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved us to move and act constantly as though in his presence. That we were now where we might encounter him at any moment, and that we must under no circumstances allow ourselves to be surprised. On the morning of the 10th, the cavalry marched at half-past 5 o'clock and the infantry at seven, thus allowing the infantry to follow immediately in rear of the cavalry as it would take the cavalry a full hour and a half to clear their camp. The habitual order of march was as follows, viz: Cavalry with its artillery in advance; infantry with its artillery; next, and lastly, the supply train, guarded by the rear brigade with one of its regiments at the head, one near the middle and one with a section of artillery in the rear. A company of pioneers preceded the infantry for the purpose of repairing the roads, building bridges, &c., &c.